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Summary
This thesis explores the dynamics of knowledge accumulation from disease outbreak
responses. It explores the development of a paradigm of disease outbreak response over
the last 20 years, and then explains how this paradigm was challenged and re-entrenched
by the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis. The methodology for this thesis was split into two arms:
a document analysis arm and an interview analysis arm. Based in an embedded case
study, the document analysis makes the argument for a re-entrenchment of the paradigm
through analysing the depth and detail of lessons learned from the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis.
Within this broad case, an analysis of interviews with 14 report authors and 23 report users
allows for a detailed examination of the production and use of codified knowledge in disease
outbreak responses. The thesis makes two primary contributions - one empirical and the
other theoretical. For its empirical context, this thesis demonstrates a path-dependency in
knowledge accumulation from disease outbreak responses and makes recommendations as
to methods for ameliorating this. The thesis finds how a lack of meaningful engagement in
expert panel processes can bias so-called lessons learned reports. In its theoretical context,
this thesis contributes an additional empirical context to the literature on knowledge
accumulation and learning. The thesis finds that knowledge accumulation in outbreak
responses differs from other disaster scenarios because of an isolation of the Global Health
epistemic community and offers evidence for codified knowledge as a useful tool and process
for learning in complex, ambiguous, equivocal scenarios.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Disease outbreaks, such as the recent Ebola crisis in west Africa, have plagued humanity
for millennia. Outbreaks can cause huge loss of life, causing intense damage to economies,
and doing long-term harm to social and political institutions. Like other disasters, disease
outbreaks can be characterised as ‘focussing events’ which provide increased attention to
issues surrounding the disaster (Birkland, 2009; Kingdon, 1984). Though this attention
does not always produce ‘knowledge’ per se,1 this attention does produce knowledge in
the sense that attention is paid to the causes and effects of the disaster and may lead to
recommendations for policy and possibly behaviour change. Successive disasters, then,
can lead to an increasing stock of knowledge from which to draw on whereby new exper-
iences are transformed, concepts are refined, theories disproven, new theories produced,
new experiences transformed. The question this thesis asks is how is codified knowledge
accumulated from disease outbreak response?
This thesis focuses on the production and use of codified knowledge in the form of so-
called ‘lessons learned’ reports. In his work on learning from disasters and agenda setting,
Birkland (2009) describes these documents as ‘fantasy documents’ and outlines how they
are frequently inadequate analytically and fail to induce the required political and eco-
nomic resources to implement recommendations. Furthermore, multiple scholars explore
reports like these for their performativity and their attempts to put forth an authoritative
narrative that re-establishes the pre-eminence of social institutions (Gephart et al., 1990;
Brown, 2000, 2004). This thesis argues that this standard analysis is incomplete, finding
that the utility of these reports depends upon their construction processes, their particip-
1For example, many would not consider attributing causality for a volcanic eruption to a god’s dis-
pleasure as ‘knowledge’, but this is still an articulation of cause and effect that could produce policy or
behaviour change.
2atory and analytical rigour, and the manner in which they present and disseminate their
recommendations. This thesis finds that, rather than being fantasy documents instru-
mentalised by institutions trying to protect their authority, these reports are performative
at an epistemic level as well as a social level.
This introductory chapter begins by highlighting the empirical rationale for this study,
demonstrating the tendency for old lessons to be rediscovered rather than learned from
over time. The chapter then briefly outlines the theoretical framing for the study, outlining
learning cycles and the crisis features that arrest them. The chapter next moves on to
outline the methodology for the thesis. The contributions of the thesis are outlined next,
before the structure of the thesis is set out.
1.1 Empirical Context
The rationale for this thesis is motivated by the observation that so called lessons learned
from epidemics seem not to be learned, but instead are rediscovered, suggesting a failure
of knowledge accumulation in this important context. This section outlines the empirical
context for this thesis, describing consistent lessons across outbreaks. The section then
outlines the contemporary Global Health Security paradigm; the dominant paradigm for
disease outbreak response.
Consistency in lesson learning is not necessarily a phenomenon unique to outbreak
responses. Pollock (2013) at the Emergency Planning College performed a review of 33
different inquiries (including Pandemic Influenza, 2009) and found a number of ‘persistent
lessons learned’ across 25 years of public inquiries. As Pollock puts it “[t]he consistency
with which the same or similar issues have been raised by each of the inquiries is a cause
for concern” (Pollock, 2013, p.7). It is therefore not necessarily surprising that lessons
from disease outbreaks consistently re-occur.
On epidemic response, we can begin to see the similarity across lessons learned by
looking at lessons from the 2003 SARS pandemic and the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis. Table 1.1
compares the lessons codified in Chapter 5 of the 2003 World Health Report and the 2015
report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel. The similarity in recommendations between
these two is striking considering they are over a decade apart. It is notable that some
lessons seem to have been learned while there is less progress with others. In particular,
we can see that lessons on reporting and communications are consistent across time but
that the lessons for travel and trade restrictions as well as medical countermeasures have
changed significantly. This thesis examines why this is the case.
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4We argue that a Global Health Security paradigm (GHSp) dominates the current logic
for epidemic response. This paradigm has risen throughout the 21st Century with the
increasing use and acceptance of ‘health security’ (Rushton, 2011; McINNES and LEE,
2006; McInnes and Rushton, 2012; Elbe, 2002, 2005, 2010) and ‘global health’ (Lakoff,
2008, 2010, 2017; Harman and Wenham, 2018) narratives of health. The rise in these
two narratives of health has led to shifts in the way outbreaks are conceptualised: (i)
narratives increasingly focus on outbreaks of human disease, originating mostly in less
developed nations (Elbe, 2011; Rushton, 2011); (ii) the global and security aspects of
these framings increasingly recognise health as a transnational endeavour (Hameiri and
Jones, 2013), not soluble by a single state or actor; and (iii) the national security logics
inherent in health security create an emphasis on borders and rapid responses (Davies,
2008; Dry, 2008).
Combined, these narratives form the framing of Global Health Security which concep-
tualises infectious disease outbreaks and has shaped the accumulation of knowledge from
disease outbreaks to produce a system which relies on three pillars of response: (i) the
national security logics and focus on outbreaks of human disease - particularly from devel-
oping nations (Elbe, 2011; Rushton, 2011) - leads to a focus on surveillance and monitoring
of disease for rapid response (Davies, 2008; Dry, 2008, 2010; Roberts and Elbe, 2017); (ii)
a recognition that health is transnational in nature (Hameiri and Jones, 2013) leads to
increasingly centralised authority for WHO operational capacity (Davies, 2008; Kamradt-
Scott, 2015; Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Fidler, 2004); and (iii) the linkages
between national security and health - particularly those linked to preparedness (Lakoff,
2008, 2017) and medicalising security (Elbe, 2010) - leads to a focus upon the rapid re-
search, development and production of therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostic technologies
(Biomedical Countermeasures Elbe et al., 2014a; Roemer-Mahler and Elbe, 2016). This,
we argue, has shaped - and is still shaping - the accumulation of knowledge over the last 20
years, leading to a development of certain, privileged knowledges, while others languish.
1.2 Theoretical Outline
Next, we turn to theories of learning and knowledge accumulation. Learning can be said
to operate in a cycle, but that the nature of disease outbreaks (and crises more generally)
inhibits this cycle. This section outlines the theoretical framework for the thesis.
First, learning and knowledge accumulation can be conceptualised by a cycle: task
experiences are abstracted into knowledge which is then re-used in similar task experi-
5ences. This conceptualization of knowledge accumulation as cyclical has been elaborated
on by scholars such as: Kolb (1984) in education studies, Argyris and Scho¨n (1996) in
organizational learning, and Argote and Miron-spektor (2011) in knowledge management.
In each case, experiences are transformed into knowledge — forming an experiential view
of knowledge accumulation
This conceptualization, however, also demonstrates the central difficulty of learning
from disasters. There are three different factors which Zollo and Winter (2002) highlight
barriers to the learning cycle: event rarity, event heterogeneity, and event ambiguity. In
the first instance, disease outbreaks do not happen every day, every month, or - espe-
cially when considering large-scale epidemics - even every year. This rarity means that,
often, individual or group experiences can be forgotten or even lost with people who leave
organizations, arresting the knowledge accumulation cycle.
Second, event heterogeneity means that, even if individuals remember previous exper-
iences, they may not necessarily be involved or have knowledge applicable to the context.
Outbreaks are complex events which can vary depending on pathogen, country context,
availability of therapeutics, risk of spread, population migration patterns, and a myriad
other possible variables. For many lessons, this variability limits their applicability across
contexts, inhibiting the knowledge accumulation cycle.
Third, event ambiguity means that causes and effects of the outbreak are unclear
and that various knowledges are equivocal in learning from them. The complexity of
outbreaks means that individuals can disagree on causes and effects and, due to an inability
to fully disentangle complex webs of causality, both are equally true knowledges. This
ambiguity can inhibit the knowledge accumulation cycle by constraining the abstraction
of experiences into new knowledge.
These three barriers to the knowledge accumulation cycle can impede the accumulation
of knowledge from disease epidemics. According to Zollo and Winter (2002), codified
knowledge is a method to overcome these barriers. Codified knowledge can overcome these
barriers by transferring knowledge across time, place, and person as well as allowing for an
explicit discussion of the ambiguities and complexities of outbreak response. Adding the
repetition found in reports from outbreaks and disasters, so-called lessons learned reports
form an interesting focal point and gap for research. This thesis therefore takes a focus on
so-called lessons learned reports from disease outbreaks, studying the role of these reports
in knowledge accumulation from epidemic response.
61.3 Research Design
Given these theoretical and empirical contexts, the main research question of this thesis is
how is codified knowledge accumulated from disease outbreak response? The sub-questions
which attempt to answer this in the context of the Ebola crisis are:
• What knowledge was codified from the 2013-2016 Ebola crisis?
• How was codified knowledge used during the 2013-2016 Ebola crisis?
• How was codified knowledge produced after the 2013-2016 Ebola crisis?
To answer these questions, this thesis analyses 267 ‘lessons learned’ documents and
37 semi-structured interviews to examine the overall lessons from the Ebola Crisis and
the processes of report production in the two embedded-cases. We focus on an embedded
case study of the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis, including historical context, literature analysis,
and the study of two key policy reports: the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel, and the
Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola.
The case selection for this thesis began with selecting the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis as
its broad topic. Having outlined the Global Health Security paradigm, the characteristics
of the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis challenged the pillars of response: the outbreak was dis-
cussed within the Global Health Security paradigm, as both a threat to security as well
as a global challenge (Mcinnes, 2016); the surveillance regime was lacking, taking three
months of confirm the first case (Wilkinson and Leach, 2015; Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2016) and that warnings about the severity of the crisis was not heeded
(Liu, 2014, 2015b); WHO was highly criticized for its delayed response (Sack et al., 2014;
Wilkinson and Leach, 2015; Boseley, 2015a) and even led to the UN Secretary-General
establishing a full UN Mission2 which superseded leadership away from WHO (Heymann
et al., 2015); and medical countermeasures were not rapidly produced for use in the out-
break, clinical trials were impeded by ethical issues (WHO Ethics Working Group, 2014),
and clinical trials were too late and failed to recruit sufficient patient numbers (Boseley,
2016). This absence of the dominant paradigm’s response pillars, despite the outbreak
still being understood through the paradigm, made exploring its lessons a crucial case for
exploring knowledge accumulation. This is because if knowledge production follows the
dominant paradigm in this context where the understanding fails to adequately respond,
then it can be reasonably generalised to other, less-crucial cases.
2The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER).
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the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel and the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel, were
chosen for their similar timelines, similar answers, diverging institutional contexts, and
different processes. The Interim Assessment Panel was a WHO-mandated, mid-outbreak
panel that was institutionally conceived and run with a very small number of people, in-
cluding a highly influential chair. The Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel had a large
membership and, as its name suggests, framed itself as ‘independent’ of institutional pres-
sures. Despite these differences both reports had similar themes, recommendations, and
content. As a result, this epistemic convergence despite process and institutional diver-
gence makes them useful test cases for how process and paradigm constrains knowledge
accumulation.
This study uses two types of evidence to assess how knowledge accumulates from
disease outbreak responses. First we conducted a meta-analysis of various reports across
three samples (academic, operational, and policy) which delineate lessons-learned from the
Ebola Crisis. This was targeted at producing an overview of the lessons, understanding
how different constituencies produced different lessons, and examining the levels of analysis
for different lessons. This was then mapped onto the Global Health Security paradigm to
understand the extent to which this paradigm dominates the lessons.
Finally, the study also uses data from 36 semi-structured interviews with two samples:
report authors and report users. In interviewing report authors, the aim was to understand
the process by which each of the two reports were put together; what differences were
there and what were the similarities? In interviewing users, the aim was to understand
how and why users of these reports (across policymakers and practitioners) incorporate
their content into their behaviours, if at all.
1.4 Contributions
This thesis makes three main contributions. First, we argue that analysis of lessons learned
reports solely as performative artefacts is insufficient. Authors including Birkland (2009);
Gephart et al. (1990); Brown (2000, 2004) present analyses of reports as performative
objects which reconstitute trust in social institutions after a crisis, while authors including
Weick (1993); Colville et al. (2013); Dwyer and Hardy (2015); Bosma et al. (2015) use
reports as a basis for reconstructing intracrisis decision-making. We argue that an analysis
which acknowledges the processes by which these reports are produced and used is equally
important for a fuller understanding of their social role.
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to outline the role that reports play in knowledge accumulation from disease outbreak re-
sponse. Much of the disaster management literature focuses on either the performativity
of or lack of learning from codified knowledge products (Brown, 2000, 2004; Roux-Dufort,
2000; Easthope, 2007; Pollock, 2013; Coles, 2014). Furthermore, a number of studies
emphasise the complexity and political difficulty of learning from disasters more broadly
(Comfort and Kapucu, 2006; Comfort, 2005; Comfort and Louise, 2004; Corbacioglu and
Kapucu, 2006; Deverell, 2009; Elliott, 2009; Kapucu et al., 2010a; Kouzmin et al., 1995).
By focussing on knowledge accumulation through codified knowledge, this thesis contrib-
utes a characterisation of a hitherto understudied process for learning from disasters.
Finally, we argue that lessons learned reports which are conducted in a performative
manner are not simply a missed opportunity for learning but an active re-entrenching
of established assumptions and power structures, privileging certain types and holders of
knowledge over others. In presenting the Global Health Security paradigm we demonstrate
a set of lessons that are frequently cited and developed at the expense of other possible
lessons. A key contribution of this thesis is demonstrating that the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis
was understood through the lens of this paradigm as well as demonstrating how codified
knowledge production and use contributed to the re-entrenchment of this paradigm.
1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis proceeds with Chapter 2 which explains the theoretical aspects of the study.
It begins by detailing theories of knowledge accumulation in non-crisis scenarios before
introducing crisis-learning elements. The analytical framework is then constructed using
the theory of sensemaking as a lens to understand the process of knowledge codification.
This section argues that codifying knowledge as a process is part of the value of codified
knowledge.
Chapter 3, next, moves on to detail the research method. It begins by outlining
the research design and the motivations for case selection. The chapter then proceeds
to describe the process of document collection, delineate the samples, and explain the
analytical process. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the interview structure,
process, and analysis.
Following this, chapter 4 discusses the Global Health Security paradigm. The chapter
begins by outlining the role and history of the World Health Organization, a central actor
in disease outbreak response. The chapter then goes on to discuss the globalised and
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examining its history, its discourse, and its implications. The chapter then moves on to
examine the three pillars of response in the paradigm: surveillance for rapid response,
central authority of WHO, and rapid production of biomedical countermeasures.
Chapter 5 argues for the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis as a crucial case3 in exploring know-
ledge accumulation from disease outbreaks. The chapter begins by outlining the challenges
to the three pillars that the Ebola Crisis posed. The chapter follows up by detailing the
results from the document analysis described in chapter 3. In this part of the chapter
we shall see how lessons from the crisis broadly map onto the Global Health Security
paradigm, with some notable exceptions. However, we will also see that lessons within the
GHSp are explored in much more detail than those that are not. This lays the groundwork
for exploring why in the subsequent chapters.
Chapters 6 and 7 detail the two case studies; the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel
and the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel. These chapters outline a four-phase process
for both reports which emerged from the analysis of interview data. These phases are:
Framing and Scoping, Evidence collection, Solidifying a Narrative, and Dissemination and
Engagement. The chapters outline these four phases and explain how the processes within
them shaped the final report. Furthermore, the final phase will show how the utility of
these reports is constrained by their production processes and thereby their impact.
Chapter 8 proceeds in three thematic sections, and then draws conclusions. The first
thematic section justifies the first contribution of this thesis. It does so by describing
the current understanding of lessons learned reports as performative ‘fantasy documents’
which play little or no role in learning from crises, and then challenging that analysis by
arguing that process is an equally important analytical frame due to our case reports’ input
differences and output similarities. Next, the chapter explores the second contribution by
describing various features of learning processes and highlighting how the processes of
learning in these reports are absent of these features. Third, the chapter argues that these
reports are constraining and guiding knowledge accumulation by observing performative
processes through a learning lens and finding that their performativity does not just filter
learning but shapes what is learned. Finally, the concluding section of this thesis re-
states the three main contributions, explores some limitations to the thesis and ends with
3A crucial case is one in which a theory “fits a case in which it is least likely to be true, and thus
is convincingly supported” (George and Bennett, 2005, p.9). By framing the Ebola Crisis as case which
challenges the dominant paradigm (and thus the most likely to challenge assumptions), theorising which
highlights path dependency is the least likely to fit the case and is thus robustly supported.
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suggestions for further research and recommendations for policy.
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Chapter 2
Conceptual Framework
2.1 Introduction
Having outlined our central problem, we turn our attention to conceptualising knowledge
accumulation in disease outbreak response. This chapter looks at how knowledge accumu-
lation operates in non-crisis contexts, how crisis affects these processes, and how lessons
learned reports are constructed. The aim of this chapter is to show how knowledge accu-
mulation in disease outbreak contexts has been under-theorised specifically, but also that
the very processes by which knowledge is produced in crises more generally is a neglected
dimension.
In order to do this, the chapter looks at three interrelated questions. First, how is
knowledge accumulated? This question, addressed in the next section, entails understand-
ing how knowledge accumulates in non-crisis circumstances. This section will explore the
difference between learning and knowledge as well as exploring the dynamics of tacit and
codified knowledge.
Secondly, Section 2.3 explores the question of how does knowledge accumulation operate
in crises? This section begins by asking what it is that makes a crisis different from non-
crisis contexts. The section then elaborates on barriers frequently cited as difficulties in
learning and knowledge accumulation from crises like a lack of political will, low-resource
commitments, and a fear-apathy cycle of attention that impedes the implementation of
lessons learned. The section then looks at how event rarity, event heterogeneity, and event
ambiguity can contribute to poor learning from crises. Finally, the section then elaborates
on how codified knowledge offers a theoretical solution to these barriers.
Finally, the chapter explores knowledge codification to answer the question how do
lessons learned reports accumulate knowledge from crises? First, the section looks to
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the ‘lessons learned’ report as an object of analysis - exploring its performative and ac-
countability roles in crisis response. Next the section looks at how sensemaking has been
employed to explore how learning from disasters operates and to conceptualise the way in
which public inquiry reports perform an intrinsic part of re-establishing the social order.
The chapter is then summarised by the construction of a conceptual framework detailing
how codified knowledge forms part of the knowledge accumulation process from disease
outbreak responses.
2.2 How is knowledge accumulated?
This section outlines conceptualisations of knowledge accumulation in non-emergency con-
ditions in order to understand why these processes differ in emergency contexts. The first
part of this section theorises learning and knowledge processes to understand the dif-
ferences and similarities between the two. The section will highlight how learning and
knowledge are two sides of the same phenomenon but that learning refers to the process
of knowledge production, whereas knowledge processes refer more to knowledge as an
artefact to be transferred, created, accumulated, etc.
Next the section moves on to characterise the continuous nature of knowledge accu-
mulation. The section will explore the cyclical nature of learning and how knowledge
accumulates in similar cycles. This cyclical and continuous nature of knowledge accu-
mulation will then be explored later in this chapter to understand how crisis contexts
differ.
Finally, this section will describe some social and political facets of knowledge. Pre-
dicated upon the conceptualisation of knowledge as both an epistemological artefact and
a socio-political construction, the section describes the role of assumptions and paradigms
in knowledge accumulation, highlighting the social and political aspects of knowledge ac-
cumulation.
2.2.1 The nature of learning and knowledge
The concepts of learning and knowledge are commonly discussed together because learning
is a knowledge process. There exist a large number of theorizations of learning depending
on the unit of analysis and disciplinary lens:
• In cognitive psychology, learning focuses on the individual development of knowledge
through processes of conditioning, mimicry, and cognitive abstraction (Maier et al.,
2001)
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• In social psychology, learning focuses on the ways in which small groups transfer,
transform, and transact knowledge with one another (Maier et al., 2001)
• In project management, intra- and inter-project learning focuses on the processes by
which knowledge is formed in projects and transferred between them (e.g. Scarbrough
et al., 2004; Prencipe and Tell, 2001; Dietrich et al., 2013; Ahern et al., 2014)
• In organization studies, learning is a key process in competitive advantage and main-
taining absorptive capacity in order to learn from a firm’s external environment (e.g.
Crossan et al., 1996, 1999; Easterby-Smith, 1997; Easterby-Smith et al., 1998, 2000;
Argyris and Scho¨n, 1996; Argyris, 1999)
• In policy studies, learning is the process of knowledge development about the ef-
fectiveness of various policies and political strategies (e.g May, 1992; Hall, 1993;
Knoepfel and Kissling-Na¨f, 1998)
In these conceptualisations there is a common thread: learning is a process whereas know-
ledge is a ‘product’.
Considering learning as a process and knowledge as a product is a conceptual dis-
tinction that has produced the separate fields of organizational learning and knowledge
management (Easterby-Smith et al., 1998). Organizational learning is a process oriented
literature that aims to produce the capacity to learn within organizations so as to produce
competitive advantage (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). Knowledge management, however,
is more focused on knowledge as a product, viewing the ways in which firms create, pro-
duce, transform, transfer, disseminate, share, codify, and integrate knowledge (Nonaka
and Takeuchi, 1995). In essence, for organizational learning, the process of learning is an
end in itself, whereas knowledge management sees knowledge as an end and learning as
a means. This distinction forms the basis of the conceptual framework elaborated upon
later in this chapter.
Knowledge, however, is not a simple ontological category. Conceptualising knowledge
requires a recognition that different types and typologies of knowledge exist. The first,
and most important, typology for this thesis splits knowledge into two types: codified
and tacit. Polanyi (1962) is oft cited as the progenitor for this typology - his book,
Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Polanyi, 1962), elaborated on
the tacit and codified elements of knowledge. The difference here lies in explicability - can
knowledge be explained? If knowledge is written, spoken, drawn, or in any way recorded,
it can be said to be codified. If it is not, or if it cannot be, then it is said to be tacit.
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When we consider knowledge, however, this distinction is not a simple categorization.
As Nightingale (2003) points out, codified knowledge requires a level of tacit knowledge
to interpret. This is because the transformation from tacit to codified requires a set
of assumptions (the reader can read English, for example) or prior understandings (the
exact definition of a particular term, or what a particular symbol represents, for example)
and thus those understandings are required to decode the codified into tacit knowledge.
For Nightingale (2003), the tacit permeates knowledge and codification is a symbolic
representation of an individual’s tacit understandings - the codified is infused with the
tacit.
This embedding of knowledge within individuals is the rationale behind Szulanski’s
understanding of knowledge as ’sticky’ (Szulanski, 1996). In this conceptualisation, Szu-
lanski notes that it is difficult to transfer knowledge from one individual to the next - and
from one business unit to the next - because of this tacit element. Tacit knowledge is
so embedded in individuals that losing the individual also results in a loss of knowledge.
Combining this with Nightingale above we can come to the conclusion that all knowledge
is difficult to transfer, because all knowledge is partly tacit (Szulanski, 1996; Nightingale,
2003).
This understanding has formed the basis of many theories and conceptualisations across
knowledge management, organizational learning, and innovation studies. For example,
in An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Nelson and Winter (1982) show how
organizational routines and processes embed tacit knowledge into an organization such
that, when individuals leave, the tacit knowledge remains. This fits with the theory-of-
action perspective (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978) above - which details how, even without
consciously knowing it, actions in an organization have a tacit theory behind them which
understands why a process exists and the expected outcomes. This theory behind the
action is embedded tacit knowledge within the organization.
Further to this, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) - the authors credited with the shift from
Organizational Learning to Knowledge Management (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000) - pro-
posed a four-element typology of knowledge processes concerning two axes of tacit/explicit
knowledge. Figure 2.1 (overleaf) shows the processes of the various quadrants, elaborated
as knowledge processes, forming the SECI framework for which Nonaka and Takeuchi are
frequently cited.
• Socialization: This tacit-to-tacit process entails the transfer of knowledge from per-
sonal to shared through imitation, demonstration, observation, guidance, practice.
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• Externalization: This tacit-to-explicit process entails the codification of personal-
tacit knowledge into explicit forms of knowledge like reports, diagrams, manuals,
etc.
• Combination: This explicit-to-explicit process entails the combination of explicit
knowledges into shared-explicit forms - this mainly constitutes the production of
additional reports, manuals, etc. in order to collectivise knowledge.
• Internalization: This explicit-to-tacit process entails the performance of tasks mak-
ing use of explicit knowledge thus transforming the users’ tacit knowledge.
These four knowledge processes constitute the SECI framework (for Socialization, Ex-
ternalization, Combination, and Internalizations), the basis of much of the knowledge
management literature. The notion that tacit knowledge can be transformed and com-
bined through processes of externalisation and combination into more explicit forms of
knowledge for use in different contexts and time-periods is one we will come back to.
Figure 2.1: SECI Framework of knowledge conversion processes
Source: (Nonaka, 1994, p.19)
This distinction between tacit and codified knowledge, then, is useful for our purposes
because it demonstrates how knowledge is embedded in people and processes. As we shall
see later, this ’stickiness’ (Szulanski, 1996) of knowledge creates a number of problems
for the knowledge accumulation cycle in disease outbreak response. Further to this we
shall see how the codification of knowledge, while imperfect, can help to bypass some of
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these blockades in the cycle. Additionally, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) demonstrated how
processes of socialization, externalization, combination and internalization allow for the
transformation of knowledge between personal and shared and between explicit and tacit.
Each of these theories, however, tends to operate on the assumption that knowledge
is a value-neutral or value-free object that can be transformed, transferred, and tailored
to new situations freely. The acknowledgement that knowledge is ‘sticky’ is dependent
upon the notion that tacit knowledge is ’embedded’ in individuals and difficult to transfer
because it cannot be articulated. While this is true, it ignores the social dimensions
of knowledge which ties particular knowledges to particular technologies, assumptions,
and communities. The next section of this chapter goes into more detail of the production
and accumulation of knowledge, looking at its cyclic and continuous nature. The following
section then explores how these processes are social and political, as well as epistemological.
2.2.2 The Continuous Nature of Knowledge Accumulation
Under this framework, we can begin to conceptualise knowledge accumulation in non-
crisis contexts. The first concept we will utilise here is cyclicality. This refers to the
way in which learning and knowledge accumulation operates in continuous cycles of ex-
perience and knowledge. This section will explore three conceptualisations of learning
and knowledge accumulation as cyclical from Education Theory (Kolb, 1984), Organiz-
ational Learning (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978), and Knowledge Management (Argote and
Miron-spektor, 2011). These three distinct, yet conceptually similar, will demonstrate
how learning and knowledge accumulation tends to operate in continuous cycles.
David A. Kolb’s highly-cited work Experiential Learning: Experience as the source of
learning and development (Kolb, 1984) derives a theory of learning which is both scalable
(in that it can be applied to multiple scales from individual to large groups and even socio-
technical regimes (Byrne, 2011)) and provides a useful basis upon which we can build an
understanding of learning. The theory (called Experiential Learning) is built upon the
foundations of the work of three prior philosophers; Jean Piaget, John Dewey, and Kurt
Lewin.
Dewey built his theories around higher education and the involvement of mature stu-
dents and students from poorer background in the late 1930s; he notes that learning in
students is more effective if connected to concrete experiences. Lewin, an organizational
scholar, demonstrated that individuals in organizations learned best ’in an environment
where there is dialectic tension and conflict between immediate, concrete experience and
17
analytic detachment’ (Kolb, 1984, p.9). Finally, Piaget studied the cognitive develop-
ment of children and the development of knowledge creation processes; discovering that
intelligence as a process is directly related with increasing experience of the world.
Building upon the works of these three, Kolb noted a distinct commonality across the
theories: a dialectic interaction between concrete experience and conceptual schemes in
individuals’ minds (Kolb, 1984). This means that the way in which students understand
the world is constantly informing how they interact with the world, and the way in which
the world responds and acts is constantly informing their understanding of the world.
Learning, for Kolb, is ’the process whereby knowledge is created through the transform-
ation of experience’ (Kolb, 1984, p.38). This definition emphasises how experiences are
interpreted and inform our understandings of the world, which then proceed to impact
how we interact with the world.
Kolb’s processes of learning are based around a cycle of moving from experience to
concept and back. There is a process of observation and reflection in which the experience
is inducted from to form concepts, and moving from concept to experience is a process
of testing by which concepts are imposed on experiences in order to test them (Kolb,
1984) (see Figure 2.1). For Kolb, then, learning is a constant cycle between experience
and abstraction; a cyclic interaction between being and thinking. In effect, for Kolb, stu-
dents learn by continually interacting with the world and conceptualising why interactions
happen.
Figure 2.2: The cycle of learning according to Kolb (1984). Experiences are transformed into knowledge
through processes of reflection and abstraction, then that knowledge is tested and used in new experiences.
Source: Author’s representation of Kolb (1984)
This cyclic connection between experience and knowledge is carried through to the
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organizational domain by Argyris and Scho¨n (1978). In their seminal work Organizational
Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective, Argyris and Schon note that individuals, whilst
working, hold particular theories about the consequences and meanings behind their ac-
tions. Learning, therefore, is a modification to a theory of action. Theories of action
are also enshrined within organizational routines, procedures, and activities (Nelson and
Winter, 1982). When an organization acts, it does not do so without an underlying theory
as to what that action will lead to.
Additionally, there is a marked difference between espoused theory and theory-in-use
(Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978). Although an action may be said to be because of a particular
rationale or a person may claim to act in a particular way in a situation (espoused theory),
it may be for an entirely different motive or an entirely different action in the actual
situation (theory-in-use). This difference is particularly salient for disaster/crisis when
actions are constrained by a crisis mentality and a need to be reactive.
This experience-based view of learning has been adopted and extended to the organ-
izational domain by Argote and Miron-spektor (2011). In their view, organizations learn
through processes that transform task experiences into organizational knowledge. When
confronted with a task, an organization will search through existing knowledge for a man-
ner in which to operate – this can range from as simple as filling in a standardised form
to performing a complex management operation. When the task is done, knowledge is
produced (regardless of it being made explicit) which describes the prior knowledge’s suit-
ability for handling the task – knowledge is either confirmed and strengthened or it is
modified in the face of new data. This new knowledge (and the old knowledge) is then
searched through for appropriate ways to handle the next task, and so on ad infinitum.
This cycling between experience and knowledge, for Argote and Miron-spektor (2011), is
the learning process - leading to an accumulation of knowledge over time.
Learning and knowledge are therefore intimately linked, despite their conceptual dis-
tinction. Learning is understood as a process concept while knowledge is an artefact of
that process. Moreover, it is noted that learning and knowledge accumulation operate in
a similar manner. Both operate under cyclical processes by which experiences are trans-
formed into knowledge and re-used in new experiences. The next section explores these
processes in more detail, looking specifically at the function of paradigms and assumptions
in creating path-dependent knowledge accumulation.
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2.2.3 Paradigms and Assumptions: The Social & Political Dimensions
of Knowledge
Knowledge Accumulation through a cycle of experiences and knowledge is not a wholly
passive process, as Kolb noted it requires active interpretation and experimentation to
understand the boundaries and probabilities of knowledge. Furthermore, knowledge pro-
cesses of Socialization, Externalization, Combination, and Internalization are also active
processes which require that individuals interact with one another. These active processes
of experience interpretation and transformation are constituted by interactions between
the epistemological (how is it known), social (who is knowing), and political (why people
know) dimensions of knowledge. This section details the role that paradigms and assump-
tions play in the sociology and politics of knowledge.
One cornerstone of the sociology of knowledge is rooted in the history of science and
Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) notion of paradigms. Kuhnian paradigms are important for ex-
ploration here for two reasons: the first is that this thesis makes a claim for a Global
Health Security paradigm, constituted by a securitizing and globalizing narrative and
three central tenets (a rapid-response surveillance regime, increasing authority for the
World Health Organization, and the rapid production of biomedical countermeasures)
and these paradigms give us a set of criteria by which to assess this claim. The second
reason is that we aim here to expand upon the social and political aspects of knowledge
accumulation and Kuhn’s paradigms (along with other conceptualizations of paradigms
we shall explore later) provide us a basis upon which to examine these.
For Kuhn, and in particular his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970),
a paradigm consists of two definitions:
“On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. On the
other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-
solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as
a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.” (Kuhn,
1970, p.175)
A paradigm refers primarily, for Kuhn, to a set of assumptions and knowledges which
a given community accept as a basis for advancing scientific understandings of nature
(Kuhn, 1970). This paradigm is therefore a basis upon which knowledge is accumulated.
Under Kuhn, knowledge accumulation is termed the process of ‘Normal Science’ (Kuhn,
1970). Through the processes of ‘normal science’ Kuhn shows how the assumptions of a
20
paradigm refocus the lens of the science onto particular facets: “by focusing attention upon
a small range of relatively esoteric problems, the paradigm forces scientists to investigate
some part of nature in a detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable’ (Kuhn,
1970, p.24). A paradigm, then, allows for a deeper and increasingly complex appreciation
of those facets of science which are being focused upon than would be possible without a
paradigm.
In this way, the phenomena brought into focus by a paradigm is understood in more
and more depth through a specific set of puzzle-solving lenses (Kuhn, 1970). This notion
of knowledge accumulation as increasingly deep and complex puzzle solving sits well with
Argote 2011 and Crossan 1999 who conceptualise learning as a change in either cognition
or behaviour. In essence, the facets of a phenomenon focused on by a paradigm are
characterised by increased complexity and depth of analysis compared to those outside
that paradigm.
While this explains the effects of paradigms and how they shape the accumulation of
knowledge, there is also the issue of which paradigm dominates. Kuhn (1970) acknowledges
this by elaborating that a successful paradigm must be “sufficiently unprecedented to
attract an enduring group of adherents ... [but] sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of
problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve” (Kuhn, 1970, p.10). In order
to be successful, paradigm must offer a level of novelty to attract a community to its lens
and it must offer a set of pathways for future research.
Although this Kuhnian conceptualization is specific to scientific knowledge, the notion
of paradigms has been extended to other areas by other researchers. Dosi (1982), for
example, demonstrates how abstraction of scientific paradigms1 can be broadly applicable
to technologies through technological paradigms. Dosi defines a ‘technological paradigm’
as “an “outlook”, a set of procedures, a definition of the “relevant” problems and of the
specific knowledge related to their solution” (Dosi, 1982, p.148). Again, we return to the
idea that a paradigm is a framework of assumptions and lenses which define a particular
problem set.
The conceptualization of a paradigm of Dosi (1982) comes with two effects, largely
1To abstract this concept to technologies, Dosi 1982 conceptualises technology as ”a set of pieces of
knowledge, both directly ”practical” (related to concrete problems and devices) and ”theoretical” (but
practically applicable though not necessarily already applied), know-how, methods, procedures, experience
of successes and failures and also, of course, physical devices and equipment” (p.151-152), thus relating
technology and the paradigmatic manner of their development as directly related to the knowledge content
which underpins their functioning.
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surrounding the technological implications of Kuhn (1970) and paradigms. Given the
paradigm’s focus on particular facets of science and exploration, two phenomena arise:
• Defining Directions to Pursue and Neglect - “a technological paradigm (or other
research programme) embodies strong prescriptions on the directions of technical
change to pursue and those to neglect” (emphasis original Dosi, 1982, p.152)
• An Exclusion Effect - “the efforts and the technological imagination of engineers
and of the organizations they are in are focussed in rather precise directions while
they are, so to speak, “blind” with respect to other technological possibilities” (Dosi,
1982, p.153)
These two phenomena contribute to what Dosi (1982) calls a ‘technological traject-
ory.’ “We will define a technological trajectory as the pattern of “normal” problem solving
activity (i.e. of “progress”) on the ground of a technological paradigm” (emphasis ori-
ginal Dosi, 1982, p.152). This technological trajectory essentially functions to guide the
knowledge accumulation as it progresses.
Again, we see increasing depth and complexity in the function and capacity of know-
ledge accumulation, in this case related to the production and use of technology. For Dosi
1982, technological trajectories are constituted by increasingly complex systems of know-
ledge surrounding technologies and their uses. In particular Dosi 1982 argues, by drawing
from Nelson & Winter 1982, that it is the complementarities within these systems which
drive the path-dependency of paradigms. Increasing complexity of knowledge in the dir-
ections pursued, then, is another feature of paradigmatic knowledge accumulation.
This is not to say that the technological trajectory fully determines the accumulation
of knowledge. As Dosi notes, “the selection operated at each level, from researcher to
production-related technological efforts, among the possible “paths”, on the ground of
some rather obvious and broad criteria ... there might still be many possible technological
paradigms that could be chosen” (Dosi, 1982, p.155). A paradigm, then, does not wholly
limit knowledge accumulation to a single pathway, but it limits the problem-space to those
defined within the paradigm and pathways are constrained to those within the problem-
space.
For Dosi, a paradigm is similar to Kuhn’s conceptualization in that a technological
paradigm is a constellation of ideas, assumptions, and problems that underpin the pro-
duction, use, and knowledge surrounding technologies. This definition creates two further
effects stemming from paradigmatic thinking: an exclusionary effect, and a dictation of
directions to neglect and pursue. These two effects contribute to the establishing, through
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a technological paradigm, of technological trajectories that guide the pathways of techno-
logical progress.
Dosi’s paradigms are also chosen through multiple social processes which function to
establish particular technological trajectories. In this case, variables like economic in-
terests, technological history & expertise, and institutional configuration “are likely to
operate as focussing forces upon defined directions of technological development” (Dosi,
1982, p.155). Although Dosi speaks primarily in terms of economic pressures (marketab-
ility, profitability, etc.) the general principle is that paradigms compete on a social level
as well as on an epistemic level.
In addition to Dosi’s technological paradigms, Hall (1993) extends this concept to
policy. Hall explains how “policy paradigms are rather like the scientific paradigms that
Thomas Kuhn has identified, and we can take advantage of this analogy to develop some
hypotheses about how the learning process in public policymaking might proceed” (Hall,
1993, p.279). Here we have a direct linkage between learning in policy processes and the
role that paradigms play.
For Hall, more so than Dosi or Kuhn policy paradigms are more sociological in nature
than they are epistemological. This is because “although the changing views of experts may
play a role, their views are likely to be controversial, and the choice between paradigms can
rarely be made on scientific grounds alone” (Hall, 1993, p.280). While this is also a core
tenet of Kuhn’s and Dosi’s conceptualizations of paradigms, Hall places the socio-political
- rather than the scientific - at the core of his conceptualisation of paradigms.
This is because policy paradigms are frequently, according to Hall, predicated cent-
rally upon the authority of experts. “Faced with conflicting opinions from the experts,
politicians will have to decide whom to regard as authoritative, especially on matters
of technical complexity, and the policy community will engage in a contest for author-
ity over the issues at hand” (Hall, 1993, p.280). When paradigms are competing - and
when paradigms are established - the authority of certain experts over others plays a key
role in the dominance of one paradigm over others, and thus the direction of knowledge
accumulation.
Decisions surrounding the authority of various expert will necessarily be a socio-
political one, rather than scientific. As Lancaster notes in the case of political decision-
making surrounding Naloxone, whose expertise is valued is an incredibly important aspect
of policy development. In Lancaster’s case, patient and advocate expertise were frequently
undervalued and the expertise of scientists were overvalued: “Time and time again, par-
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ticipants bemoaned the limitations of the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ and the barriers it pro-
duced, turning instead to other ways of knowing” (Lancaster et al., 2017b, p.13). The
very notion of a ‘hierarchy of evidence’ is inherently political, privileging certain types
and sources of evidence over others.
Furthermore, as Clarke et al. (2003) stress with the case of increased biomedicalisation
in the United States, these paradigms act in the reverse too. A socio-political field chooses
a paradigm to become dominant, that paradigm then acts to shift the socio-political field to
further entrench its assumptions.2 As Clarke et al. put it, biomedicalization is “reconsti-
tuting the many institutional sites of health-care knowledge production, distribution, and
information management” (Clarke et al., 2003, p.162). As paradigms evolve, they begin
to remake the communities they evolve in - this evolution further shifts the socio-politics
of knowledge and evolves the paradigm further.
Experimentation and failure create opportunities for competing paradigms to oust
the dominant paradigm. Hall notes that “a policy paradigm can be threatened by the
appearance of anomalies, namely by developments that are not fully comprehensible, even
as puzzles, within the terms of the paradigm” (Hall, 1993, p.280). However, as Clarke et al.
(2003) show, because the knowledge configurations have been shifted by the paradigm the
manner in which anomalies are understood is still governed by the paradigm’s central
assumptions.
Paradigms, then, are constellations of assumptions and ideas which communities hold
to be true in order to assess certain aspects of a phenomenon in more detail than would
otherwise be possible. These paradigms guide the lenses of inquiry to highlight areas to
be pursued, and to obfuscate areas to be neglected. In this manner, paradigms can guide
what knowledge is accumulated along particular trajectories, accumulating knowledge in
areas pursued and not in those neglected.
Additionally, paradigms are as much social phenomena as they are epistemological.
The selection of a paradigm is a largely social process by which multiple constellations
of ideas, assumptions, and their adherents compete and negotiate until one begins to
dominate. As a paradigm becomes more and more established, the community that accepts
it becomes shaped by its assumptions and ideas. This reshaping of the community then
2This notion of a paradigm ‘making’ society essentially personifies the paradigm, which is not wholly
accurate. More practically, as a socio-political field begins to accept the assumptions of a paradigm,
society begins to rearrange itself to be more closely aligned with the visions provided by the paradigm. It
is, however, useful here to imagine a paradigm as having agency because of its dual epistemological and
socio-political features - ideas have their own power.
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reshapes how knowledge is produced and distributed, creating varying politics of who can
contribute what knowledge and why.
As we have seen in this section, knowledge can be characterised as either tacit or
codified. This distinguishes between knowledge which is explainable by writing, talking,
drawing, etc. (codified knowledge) and that which cannot be explained and must be
demonstrated, practised, or observed (tacit knowledge). This distinction is not fully clear,
however, and even codified knowledge has many tacit elements (Nightingale, 2003) which
make it ‘sticky’ (Szulanski, 1996) and difficult to transfer from person to person or across
time.
Furthermore, we have seen how recursive cycles of experience transformation and know-
ledge utilisation create a continual shaping and reshaping of knowledge in response to
current contexts and needs. Knowledge Accumulation in non-crisis settings is, therefore,
characterised by continuity. Continuous cycles of knowledge accumulation in individuals,
in groups, and in organizations, are subject to the ‘stickiness’ of knowledge.
2.3 How does knowledge accumulation operate in crises?
The previous section outlined how learning and knowledge accumulation operate in non-
crisis contexts. We saw how knowledge can be thought of as tacit (that which is inexplic-
able) and codified (that which is articulated). We also saw how knowledge accumulation
can be conceptualised as operating in a continuous cycle, iterating between experience and
knowledge. Finally, we saw that the knowledge accumulation process is a highly social
one, frequently affected by social dynamics and power.
This section moves from the ordinary context of non-crisis times to the extra-ordinary
context of crises. First, the section asks the question what makes a crisis different? This
question addresses the features of a crisis that make it different from a non-crisis context.
The answer to this question explores the very definition of a crisis as an extra-ordinary,
discontinuous, and unstable event or context where normal or routine practices are insuf-
ficient or ineffective.
Next, this section moves on to the question how does this affect knowledge accumu-
lation? This question addresses how these characteristics of a crisis (extra-ordinary, dis-
continuous, and unstable) affects the non-crisis knowledge accumulation processes. This
will highlight the rarity, ambiguity, and heterogeneity of crisis events as disrupting the
continuity of the knowledge accumulation cycle and therefore interrupting knowledge ac-
cumulation itself.
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Finally, the chapter will turn to the question what role can knowledge codification play?
This question focuses on knowledge codification as one possible solution to the interrupting
of the knowledge accumulation cycle. Knowledge codification can allow for the transfer of
knowledge (lessons) from one crisis to the next through its capacity to be transferred from
one place or person to another. Additionally, knowledge codification is a process in and
of itself which can aid in clarifying or codifying ambiguity for future interpretation. The
section then summarises before moving on to discuss our analytical object - the lessons
learned report.
2.3.1 What makes a crisis different?
Crises are qualitatively different to normal life. They are situations filled with profound
fear and anxiety. Why are crisis situations so different to normal situations? What is it
that makes a crisis so confusing and alarming? They are so different because our normal
ways of acting and understanding are ineffective or insufficient for coping with the situation
in front of us. They disrupt the normal equilibrium of our daily lives and puncture our
sense of the world.
At its more instrumental, Keller and Al Madhari (1996) propose a definition based on
a probabilistic model. For these authors, a crisis is defined as having ten of more fatalities,
costing more than US$1 million, and directly affecting more than 50 people. This highly
instrumental definition, however, does not give us any indication of what makes a crisis
qualitatively different such that knowledge accumulation is affected.
Looking at the more qualitative ways in which crises are defined, it is clear that the
broad consensus is simply ‘not normal.’ As Booth (1993) describes, a crisis is “a situation
faced by an individual, group or organisation which they are unable to cope with by the
use of normal routine procedures” (Booth, 1993, p.86). In essence, a crisis is a situation
in which normal routines cannot take place - it is beyond the ordinary.
This definition, however, is not wholly useful for demarcating how knowledge accumu-
lation is different in crises. Thus we move on to slightly more specific factors: Fink 2000,
for example, describes crises as “fluid, unstable, dynamic events” (Fink, 2000, p.20), these
events are therefore uncertain and shifting as time proceeds. Hermann and Dayton (2009)
opt for a more constructivist or interpretivist definition, describing crises as “perceived to
involved high threat, time urgency and surprise” (Hermann and Dayton, 2009, p.235). For
these authors, a crisis is less about its non-normal features but its instability, its threat,
and its unpredictability.
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Following on from this, authors like Comfort and Louise (2004); Comfort (2005); Com-
fort and Kapucu (2006) and Kapucu (2008); Kapucu et al. (2010a,b); Kapucu and Ozer-
dem (2011); Kapucu and Garayev (2011); Kapucu et al. (2014) described crises as complex
events requiring complex responses. For these authors, a crisis doesn’t just need to involve
high threat, high time urgency, and high instability, but a crisis needs to be multifaceted
with multi-actor responses. This complexity is what separates a house-fire from forest-fire,
a car crash from a multi-vehicle pile-up.
Additionally, crises can be thought of in terms of the threat they pose to our ways of
thinking about the world. As Elliott (2009) notes, “crises may be distinguished from other
events by the challenge they present to established assumptions” (Elliott, 2009, p.159-160).
As our ways of understanding the world run into major problems, we enter a crisis. These
definitions all have one seemingly common thread: ‘normal’ processes or thinking simply
cannot cope in a crisis.
One further implication of this ‘non-normal’ understanding of crisis that is interesting
for our purposes is the notion of crisis as discontinuous. In their explorations of how
disasters and crises shape public policy, Kingdon (1984) and Birkland (1997) discuss how
these types of events disrupt ‘normal’ policy processes and have a focusing effect. As
Birkland puts it “whereas long-term social change is often the result of the ebb and flow
of broader social and economic conditions, social change and conflict are often punctuated
by sharp, sudden events” (Birkland, 1997, p.2). This discontinuity operates in two ways:
‘normal’ is punctuated by crisis, and crises are interspersed within ‘normal’.
Crises, then, are characterised as the ’extra-ordinary’ events that punctuate our nor-
mal lives. Crises are ‘high-impact, low-probability’ (Kingdon, 1984) events with which
normal routines and thinking are unable to fully cope. They are dynamic and complex
events characterised by uncertainty, instability, and unpredictability. Crises shatter our
assumptions and cease the continuity of ‘normal’ activity. Next, we turn our attention to
how these characteristics affect knowledge accumulation.
2.3.2 How do crises affect knowledge accumulation?
There are multiple, plausible explanations for the difficulties experienced in learning from
crises. These analyses are likely complementary and explanatory to various extents in
various case contexts. As noted by Coles in a review of learning from disasters ”literature
suggests several reasons for ‘the problem’ ranging from loss of corporate memory, denial
and complacency in organisations to the lack of resources or the political will to change”
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(Coles, 2014, p.3). Many of these explanations frequently refer to the problem of converting
those lessons which are identified into policy or action. This thesis takes a deeper look at
the step immediately prior - looking at the very production of lessons that are identified,
not how they are translated into policy.
Having defined a crisis as a dynamic, complex context characterised by uncertainty, in-
stability, and unpredictability for which ’normal’ processes and/or thinking are insufficient
or ineffective, it is incumbent upon us to explore how these characteristics affect the know-
ledge accumulation process. We proceed to examine three themes in this characterisation
that impede the accumulation of knowledge from disease outbreak responses. These three
themes (event rarity, event heterogeneity, and event complexity) are each explored in turn.
Event Rarity
One of the most frequently cited issues with learning from crises is that lessons are not
enshrined in practice and that a lack of training leads to loss of learning between outbreaks
(Pollock, 2013; Coles, 2014; Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006). At its core, this is an issue
of time; crises are, by definition, rare events which do not happen with any predictable
regularity or continuity which creates space for knowledge loss.
As we saw in the previous section of this chapter, one of the key features of knowledge
accumulation is continuity. Abstracting knowledge from a task experience and then being
able to apply that knowledge to future experiences allows for the refinement of concepts
and building of knowledge in individuals and organizations (Kolb, 1984; Argote and Miron-
spektor, 2011). However, this knowledge is often tacit and ‘sticky’ (Szulanski, 1996) which
makes it inherently difficult to transfer. This embeds knowledge within individuals which
may not necessarily be involved in future experiences of the same type.
Additionally, March (2010) argues that rare events’ infrequency creates problems in
inferring causality. “Organizations learn from experience, but learning seems problematic
when history offers only meagre samples of experience” (March, 2010, p.1). Lampel et al.
(2009) further this line of argument by noting how rare events are often a class of event
all their own, inhibiting comparison across types. “For many, if not most, individuals and
organizations, a rare event is a unique experience in a class of its own” (Lampel et al.,
2009, p.837). The learning from rare events then is not simply characterised by ‘sticky’
knowledge that cannot be transferred, but ambiguous and uncertain knowledge that may
not be applicable to the next event.
Event rarity, then, is first an interruption of the knowledge accumulation cycle - it
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allows for knowledge loss prior to implementation in new experiences. Second, it means
that training (and therefore more resources) are required to maintain tacit knowledge
between events. Finally the rarity of events means that they are frequently a category of
their own, making comparisons across types difficult.
Event Heterogeneity
As briefly explored above, events like crises and disasters are so rare that often they differ
in vast ways. An earthquake, a volcanic eruption, a tsunami and a disease outbreak
are clearly not the same and require different responses. Even within the same type of
event, the characteristics can vary enormously, often making it difficult to fully incorporate
knowledge from one event to the next.
In disease outbreaks this is especially true. Katz et al. (2018) produced a tool which
visualises the problem-space for disease outbreaks based on 12 response-relevant charac-
teristics3 producing a total of 34 million possible scenarios. Even discounting those which
are practically impossible, this process still produced 22 million distinct outbreak scen-
arios. Each of the 22 million would not require entirely bespoke responses but it is clear
that, with even 12 response-relevant characteristics, no two outbreaks will map onto one
another precisely.
The effect of this on knowledge accumulation is again one of continuity ; when events are
different, the lessons are not wholly usable or testable from one to the next. For example,
one lesson from the Ebola Crisis in this thesis concerns the orderly and compassionate
isolation of patients - this is a necessary measure to avoid the further spread and infection
between patients and healthcare providers or patients and loved ones. While this is a
sensible lesson for outbreaks of Ebola or other haemorrhagic fevers like Marburg fever,
vector-borne diseases like Zika virus or Lyme disease are not transmitted from person-
to-person so quarantine measures would be ineffective and excessive. This inapplicability
interrupts the cycle of experience and knowledge and limits the capacity for learning from
3Origin (natural or intentional); Type (animal only, human only, or zoonotic disease); Means of spread
(communicable or non-communicable); Route of transmission (airborne, bloodborne, waterborne, food-
borne, or vector-borne); Diagnostics (point of care and biosafety levels 1, 2, 3, and 4); Medical countermeas-
ures (antivirals, antibiotics, vaccine, post-exposure prophylaxis, or none); Outbreak location (accessible
to international community or not and whether conditions are non-permissive owing to conflict or other
instability); Affected populations (all, pregnant women, children, elderly, or targeted attack); Applicable
personal protective equipment (respirator, containment suit, mask, gloves, and gown); Morbidity (graded
at five levels from very low to very high); Response level (local, intermediate, national, regional, or global);
Policy measures in place (national, international, or none)
29
disease outbreaks.
The different contexts limit the usability of lessons, but further to this they limit the
capacity for experimentation. Varying contexts mean that, as in the case of event rarity, in-
dividuals or agents responding to one outbreak are not necessarily responding to the next.
As Yaqub (2017) notes in the case of vaccine clinical trials, fragmentation of knowledge
limits the possibility for knowledge accumulation: “in order to accumulate technological
knowledge, institutions needed to develop both visible and invisible infrastructure ... the
concerted effort to ensure qualitative attributes were interpreted into a set of shared quant-
itative design targets for the development of operational principles” (Yaqub, 2017, p.483).
This lack of capacity to fully collectivise knowledge, as the composition of any response is
different, limits the opportunities for knowledge accumulation.
Knowledge accumulation is limited by event heterogeneity in two ways. First, without
similarities from one outbreak to the next it is difficult to fully apply lessons from any one
outbreak to another. This is particularly salient given the number of possible outbreaks
that could occur (Katz et al., 2018). Secondly, the variations in responders limit the capa-
city for collectivising knowledge and building on the experience of one another, reducing
the scope for advancing knowledge.
Event Complexity
Event rarity and heterogeneity, then, mean that lessons from each event are either lost or
inapplicable. This, however, assumes that lessons are clearly identifiable at all. Frequently
the complexity of the event itself confounds the accumulation cycle during the abstraction
process - highly complex events are more difficult to fully comprehend, making clear cause
and effect difficult to discern.
The high complexity of crises and responses ensure that even the best planning cannot
fully cope with some events. Kouzmin et al. (1995) note how “under crisis conditions,
concepts such as ‘comprehensive’ or ‘integrate’ disaster planning and emergency manage-
ment are difficult to sustain” (Kouzmin et al., 1995, p.27). This means that even during
an outbreak, what has been planned or prepared beforehand may still be insufficient or
ineffective - leading to difficulties in applying newer knowledge.
Secondly, the complexity limits the ability to abstract knowledge at all - limiting the
building of theories from experience. Comfort (1996) notes that “there are too many
agents involved in performing too many different functions simultaneously under radic-
ally altered conditions to attribute direct, linear causality to any one agent or condition”
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(Comfort, 1996, p.3). Deverell (2009) echoes this: “in the midst of crisis the cause and ef-
fect loop might be difficult to distinguish as acting and thinking under time pressure, value
complexity, and uncertainty may be interwoven” (Deverell, 2009, p.80). This complexity,
then, can obfuscate deriving lessons at all, even if they could be transferred effectively.
The discontinuous nature of disease outbreaks is manifested through the rarity, hetero-
geneity, and complexity of the events. Event rarity inhibits the application of knowledge
in new contexts because tacit knowledge is likely lost through personnel turnover. The
limited number of rare events also means that only a small number of instances can be
learned from, limiting the scope for experimentation. Event heterogeneity similarly limits
the scope for experimentation by virtue of the limited comparability between events. Ad-
ditionally, heterogeneous events mean that lessons learned are not necessarily applicable
to future evens, even if they are learned and internalised. Finally, the vast complexity
of the events means that, regardless of whether a similar event occurs relatively quickly
after the another, the causes and effects of the various lessons are subject to multiple
interpretations.
2.3.3 What role can knowledge codification play?
In the face of this extra-ordinary, rare, unique, complex, and uncertain event how can we
accumulate knowledge? Given that our normal processes of producing and using know-
ledge are ineffective and insufficient, how can we continue to learn from our experiences
with these events? The focus for this thesis is on attempts to codify experiences, to write
them down or articulate them verbally in order to explain them to others or send them
to new places and times. Codification plays a dual role in knowledge accumulation from
disease outbreaks: a role as a knowledge artefact, transferring knowledge from one person,
place, or time to another; and a role as a knowledge process, giving opportunity to col-
lective reflection and sensemaking about the crisis at hand. We proceed here by exploring
how codified knowledge can be useful in ameliorating the three barriers to knowledge ac-
cumulation identified in the previous section: relocation ameliorating rarity, combination
ameliorating heterogeneity, and synthesization ameliorating complexity (Zollo and Winter,
2002).
Relocation
Codified knowledge as an artefact is principally useful for knowledge transfer. As has
been argued by many theorists (for example, Steinmueller (2000, 2001); Cowan and Foray
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(1997); Cowan et al. (2000); Cowan (2001); Kogut and Zander (1992)), the codification of
knowledge produces an artefact which can be used at different times, by different people,
for different purposes. For example, the creation of handbooks or manuals allows indi-
viduals across space and time to learn new methods or techniques, or even how to operate
and care for machinery. This codification takes know-how and allows others to use it.
The principle utility, here, of codified knowledge is that it allows individuals in differ-
ent outbreaks to use knowledge found in previous outbreaks. As put by Cohendet and
Steinmueller (2000) “Knowledge that has been codified into informational messages can
be reconstituted at a later time, in a different place, or by a different group of individuals
with varying degrees of effectiveness depending upon the ‘cognitive framework’ of those at-
tempting to use this information” (Cohendet and Steinmueller, 2000, p.197). This means
that if an outbreak re-occurs in a new location or new time, the lessons can still be trans-
ferred between individuals. This ameliorates the effects of event rarity by allowing for the
continuity of knowledge across events over time - restoring the knowledge accumulation
cycle.
Combination
What we also see with authors like Kogut and Zander (1992) is that the codification
of knowledge can also play a role in allowing for knowledge combination. Echoing this,
Prencipe and Tell 2001 note that “knowledge codification is important because of the gains
that can be made through new combinations of stocks of codified knowledge” (Prencipe and
Tell, 2001, p.1377). By writing a piece of knowledge down, that knowledge is preserved for
use in new areas or by new people who can combine it with other knowledges and produce
new knowledge.
Moreover, the very process of codifying knowledge into a more generalised form creates
a need for combining previous experiences with new. This is emphasised by Echajari
and Thomas (2015) who note that, through codification, “organizations are forced to go
beyond the mere accumulation of experiences and instead build effective capabilities about
generalizing an experience from one deal to the next” (Echajari and Thomas, 2015, p.972).
This combination of knowledge allowing for generalization allows for an overcoming
of the heterogeneity of crisis events. In particular, generalizing knowledge and combining
general rules with context-specific knowledge allows for knowledge to be used and tested in
new contexts. This reduced the barrier that heterogeneity plays because the codification
of knowledge forces some generality and allows for testing in new contexts.
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Synthesization
The process of codification, as we explored briefly in a previous section, involves the
transformation of knowledge from tacit to codified. This transformation is not a simple
substitution of tacit for the codified, it is a process of knowledge creation in itself. This
process requires the creation of new knowledges. Cowan and Foray (1997) argue that three
separate activities are required for this process: the development of messages to explain
previously created knowledge, the production of models to explain causal processes, and
the presence (or production) of a common language to describe the models. These pro-
cesses of codification not only require a translation of tacit to codified but a synthesization
of new, old, and previously unfound or unnoticed knowledges into codified knowledge.
This is further explored by Yaqub (2017) in the case of the poliomyelitis vaccine. In
this case, the authors argue, “knowledge may not necessarily integrate readily, testing
often requires standardisation, management, and co-ordination to create comparability
between experiments and ensure fragmented knowledge accumulates through the stages
and cross-sectionally across different groups working in parallel” (Yaqub and Nightingale,
2012, p.2144). In effect, the capacity to synthesize disparate fragments of knowledge is an
important facet of knowledge accumulation. This is particularly important given that, as
Nightingale (2000) shows, the codification and standardization of clinical trial protocols
vastly improved the capacity for knowledge synthesization.
This process of synthesization is particularly appropriate for ameliorating the com-
plexity barrier that is frequently encountered in knowledge accumulation from crisis. In
these situations of causal complexity where causes and effects are not necessarily linear
and have multiple inputs, outputs and feedback loops, knowledge codification processes
allow for a reflection on experience and synthesization with previous knowledges (Echajari
and Thomas, 2015). This process of increasingly accurate characterization of complex
causality through synthesizing new and old knowledges allows for an amelioration of the
complexity barrier to knowledge accumulation.
Crises, then, are typified by their extra-ordinary characteristics. In crisis contexts,
‘normal’ thinking and actions are unable to cope with the pressures placed upon them.
Further to this, crises can be characterised by their high-threat, time-urgent, and unstable
nature. These properties give rise to high complexity, demanding complex responses, and
blurring the capacity to distinguish linear causal processes.
These characteristics of crises create a number of blockages to the knowledge accumula-
tion cycle, impeding its progression. First, the extra-ordinary characteristics of crisis mean
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that these events are rare, thus impeding the capability of actors to implement knowledge
obtained in one event into another due to loss of memory or personnel turnover. Second,
the high-threat and unstable nature of the crisis, as well as its complexity, means that no
two events are the same. This limits the applicability of knowledge from one crisis to the
next and interrupts the usage process of the knowledge accumulation cycle. Finally, the
complexity of crises blurring causal processes makes abstracting knowledge from exper-
ience difficult at all. This difficulty in producing knowledge from crises reliably further
impedes the knowledge accumulation cycle.
The codification of knowledge, however, can help overcome these barriers. The ability
of codified knowledge to be transferred and used by different groups, at different times,
in different places means that knowledge can be more continuous across time and space.
Second, the ability of codified knowledge to be combined with new situational context-
specific knowledge allows for codification to ameliorate the heterogeneous barrier to know-
ledge accumulation. Finally, the codification process’ space for reflection and synthes-
ization of old, new, and different knowledges allows for a reduction and articulation of
complexity which allows knowledge to be accumulated.
2.4 How do lessons learned reports accumulate knowledge
from crises?
The previous section noted how we characterize crises as an extra-ordinary event for which
our normal ways of understanding or acting are insufficient or inapplicable. The previous
section further noted how the codified knowledge’s ability to be of relocated, combined,
and synthesized allowed it to overcome the barriers of event rarity, event heterogeneity,
and event complexity which impede knowledge accumulation. This section’s aim is to
develop further the role of codified knowledge in crises by focusing on the construction of
‘lessons learned’ reports.
This section proceeds with a first look at lessons learned reports. The section will look
at their role in accountability, allowing a society to apportion blame or a culpable institu-
tion to shift blame. We will also explore the performativity if the lessons learned report,
looking at how these reports often are ’fantasy documents’ (Birkland, 2009) which do not
necessarily constitute knowledge or learning but are constructed to look like learning. The
section then proceeds to explore the ‘sensemaking’ conceptualization to understand how
lessons learned reports perform on a societal level and also how they are constructed.
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2.4.1 The Lessons Learned Report
The lessons learned report - and the public inquiry that is often the precursor to them -
is an attempt at discerning a post-hoc understanding of a crisis or disaster. As such, they
are laden with meaning and symbolism beyond their attempts at learning. As such, as
seen in the previous section, they are frequently studied as political and social objects,
rather than as knowledge objects or processes. This thesis focuses on exactly that, the
knowledge role of lessons learned reports. This section will explore the performative and
accountability roles that lessons learned reports play.
Accountability
Lessons learned reports have been conceptualised as performing an accountability func-
tion by apportioning blame to actors deemed to be responsible for the failures that caused
the crisis (Brown, 2004). Accountability, it is theorised, ensures that decision-makers and
planners take the needs and priorities of particular constituencies into account - thus guid-
ing choice and judgement through what Tetlock (1985) calls an ‘acceptability heuristic.’ In
effect, accountability guides decision-making through sanctioning decisions which are not
perceived to be in the interests of the people or organizations to which a decision-maker
is accountable.
This apportioning of blame, through which accountability is established, in lessons
learned reports functions primarily through the description of events and a discourse of
judgement. As Brown (2000) argues, “retrospective reconstruction (description) of events
and judgemental commentary are thus integrated and mutually reinforcing: a rhetorical
strategy that permits a more authoritative distribution of blame and absolution” (Brown,
2000, p.63). This rhetorical construction of blame through first stating what happened and
then providing a commentary on why it happened is a common tool for apportioning or
ameliorating blame.
This creation of a particular narrative is prescient given that the report authors them-
selves are accountable for the report that they write. As Carroll (1995) explains “ the
teams who diagnose operational incidents are members of a society or culture with shared
assumptions, and because they are accountable for their report, they are encouraged in
various ways to put forward acceptable accounts of incidents, their causes, lessons learned,
and improvement strategies” (Carroll, 1995, p.185). This means that not only do the re-
port authors have control over who to blame, but they are also influenced by who could
blame them.
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This linkage of who can blame who and for what leads to what Moynihan (2009)
calls the ‘politics of accountability.’ Through a complex system of actions and discourses,
“actors seek to claim credit and shift blame. This can lead to defensiveness, unrealistic
narratives, and opportunism” (Moynihan, 2009, p.192). This political element means that
“information is suppressed or used as ammunition to rationalize behaviour and deflect
blame rather than identifying useful lessons” (Moynihan, 2009, p.192). This defensiveness
means that while reports are believed to (or are intended to) play an accountability role,
they are often only ‘performing’ that accountability role.
Performativity
The performativity and political dimensions are a very commonly studied aspect of les-
sons learned reports (Gephart, 1984; Gephart et al., 1990; Brown, 2000; Brown and Jones,
2000; Brown, 2004; Easthope, 2007; Birkland, 2009). Akin to the features of accountab-
ility described above, lessons learned reports are effectively political and social objects
which attempt to provide an authoritative account of the crisis and to re-legitimate social
institutions.
First, Gephart (1984); Gephart et al. (1990) find that lessons learned reports “develop
acceptable interpretations for the events, and thus to re-establish the legitimacy of social
institution” (Gephart et al., 1990, p.29). This notion of an ‘acceptable interpretation’
derives from the various attempts by different constituencies and groups to ‘make sense’
of a crisis in different ways (Weick, 1988). These varying accounts are reduced to a
single ‘acceptable account’ by the processes of report construction (Gephart et al., 1990).
This single ‘acceptable account’ is then used to justify and re-legitimate the actions and
existence of social institutions (Gephart, 1984).
This process of constructing a report’s narrative through negotiation of cultural un-
derstandings of ‘what happened’ is often suffused with power relations. As Brown (2004)
notes, “some voices are more (and some less) privileged, and it may often be more ap-
propriate to describe sense as a power effect rather than a negotiated consensus” (Brown,
2004, p.46). Like knowledge production in a previous section, this process of producing
an acceptable interpretation of a crisis is more social and political than it is epistemic.
Second, reports themselves need to perform accountability and learning to justify their
own existence. In particular, in order to have any effect, a report must be received by
its audience as true and authoritative. Reports do so “through recourse to a set of rules
governing knowledge, its production and representation, which they present as establish-
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ing valid and reliable accounts” (Brown, 2004, p.97). In effect, the report itself performs
authority through its “appropriation by a reader who relates it to his or her own context
and experience in a creative or hermeneutic process rather than merely reproductive fash-
ion” (Brown, 2004, p.97). This dialogue between reader, author, and report is the manner
through which a report ‘performs’ its authority and becomes accepted as the narrative of
a crisis.
Additionally, the reports themselves boost their own authority by making claims of
comprehensiveness and provenance (Brown, 2004). For example, stating a defined number
of sources and informants creates a sense that the report’s authors has ‘all the information’
and created a ‘true’ account of events based upon them - i.e. they were comprehensive
(Brown, 2004). Provenance provides legitimacy for the very performance of a review
and discusses the circumstances of its commissioning and why it exists - this provides
legitimacy for the document itself (Brown, 2004). These further embed the authority of
the report within the report’s text.
Similarly, the very learning that these reports produce is discussed as ’fantasy learning’
by Birkland (2009). In this understanding, Birkland returns to Argyris and Scho¨n (1978)
work on learning, utilising their conceptualisation of single- and double-loop learning4 to
argue that while reports are often useful for single-loop learning and error-corrections in
the theory behind actions. However, Birkland (2009) argues that the reports are not useful
for the assumption-challenging, double-loop learning because of the limited time that has
often elapsed between events and the reports describing them.
The key point for our purposes is how Birkland (2009) describes them as ‘fantasy doc-
uments.’ This description is used by Birkland because the reports “are often created and
disseminated for rhetorical purposes, even if their authors somehow believe that learning
has really occurred” (Birkland, 2009, p.146). This idea that reports are disseminated for
rhetorical purposes fits with the work of Brown (2000); Brown and Jones (2000); Brown
(2004) on public inquiries as sites of authority-building and demonstrates the performative
function of these lessons learned reports.
Birkland (2009) furthers this argument by outlining five types of investigation and
policy change which demonstrate the often tenuous link between lessons learned reports
4For brevity this was omitted from our discussion of Argyris and Schon’s work. Single- and double-loop
learning refers to whether learning was assumption-challenging (double-loop) or not (single-loop). For the
authors, single-loop learning is more about error correction and asking how theory-in-use can be improved,
whereas double-loop learning is about challenging the theory-in-use itself and asking whether it actually
achieves what is desired (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978).
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and policy learning. Table 2.1 summarises the five types of report-linked learning theor-
Table 2.1: Table of the five types of lessons learned report outcome based on Birkland (2009)
Lessons Learned Report? Policy Change?
No Investigation Policy change not linked to learning
Report is agency serving, incomplete, or states
the obvious
No change
A thorough and careful investigation No change
A thorough and careful investigation Change occurs but is not linked to findings of
report
A thorough and careful investigation Change occurs which is linked to the findings of
the report and learning from the event
Source: Author’s elaboration on Birkland (2009)
etically possible from no investigation with policy change (‘superstitious learning’ (Levitt
and March, 1988)) to a thorough and careful investigation with policy change linked to
the outcomes of the report. Clearly, the final option is the ideal type and Birkland (2009)
details, in a flow-chart format, this ideal model for event-related policy change.
Figure 2.3 shows this ideal-type model of event-related policy change. What is inter-
esting here is that it is a cycle of experience accumulation rather like our conceptualization
of knowledge accumulation from the previous section (Argote and Miron-spektor, 2011).
Furthermore, Birkland (2009) notes various social barriers to this cycle like a lack of at-
tention or group mobilization which produces limits to the accumulation of experience for
policy change.
Both Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3 show ideal outcomes of disaster event-related learning
processes but leave a large gap in terms of what a ‘thorough and careful investigation’
looks like and how change can be linked to the findings from this investigation. Some
indications are offered like mobilizing groups and increasing agenda attention but how
these are done and their linkages to these outcomes is unclear.
Lessons learned reports, then, are documents which often present ‘fantasy learning’
(Birkland, 2009). Their functioning as accountability documents is a function of their
capacity to apportion blame to those who are perceived to have failed in the crisis (Tetlock,
1985). This function of apportioning blame is often politically-sensitive (Moynihan, 2009)
and socially pressured (Gephart et al., 1990). Further to this, the reports are often also
performative of the kinds of learning that are expected from them. Birkland (2009) notes
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Figure 2.3: An ideal model of event-related policy change
Source: (Birkland, 2009, p.151)
their rhetorical purpose, while Brown (2000); Brown and Jones (2000); Brown (2004) notes
their performance of authority, provenance and comprehensiveness.
These investigations, however, are limited in their explorations of the knowledge ac-
cumulation or production role that lessons learned reports play. Furthermore, they are
limited in their explorations of process. These often explore the reports either as objects of
study (Birkland, 2009; Brown, 2000, 2004) or as indicators for the processes of sensemak-
ing from crises (Gephart et al., 1990; Colville et al., 2013; Weick et al., 2005; Weick, 1993).
The literature search for this thesis found no investigations into the learning processes of
lessons learned reports.
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2.4.2 Sensemaking
In order to understand the processes by which so-called ‘lessons learned’ reports are pro-
duced, this thesis uses a sensemaking perspective to analyse the individual and group pro-
cesses of knowledge codification. The rationales for utilising the sensemaking perspective
as a lens through which to examine the report construction process are two-fold. First,
the perspective provides a micro-view of macro-phenomena, exploring the individual and
group processes which underpin the broader social order (Gephart et al., 1990). Given
that this thesis is concerned with the manner in which micro-level knowledge codifica-
tion produces a macro-level effect on knowledge accumulation, this perspective is highly
relevant.
Second, the perspective’s applicability in the context of emergencies is already well-
established: Weick and Roberts (1993) observed “collective mind” on flight-decks on air-
craft carriers, Weick (1993) assessed sensemaking’s link to organization used the context
of the Mann Gulch disaster, and Colville et al. (2013) explored sensemaking in counter-
terrorism response. The perspective has also been used to examine the sense-giving and
authority construction of individual reports (Brown, 2000, 2004) and as such has already
been applied in similar contexts. The relevance here, however, is not the development
of the sensemaking perspective but knowledge accumulation in crises more broadly. This
section proceeds by first detailing the sensemaking perspective and its development. The
section will then draw out conceptual tools for analysis of the individual cases.
Sensemaking, as defined by (Brown, 2015, p.266), “refers generally to those processes
by which people seek to plausibly understand ambiguous, equivocal or confusing issues or
events”. This conceptualisation is inherently constructivist in philosophy; Weick (1995),
in his original construction, notes that sense is made and not an interpretation of events,
implying that there is not a closed set of interpretations from which to choose, but an
infinite range of senses which can be made from the events experienced. For the present
purpose, this means that there exist multiple, contestable, and equivocal perspectives
(Brown, 2015; Colville et al., 2013) through which the events of the 2013-2016 Ebola
Crisis can be viewed. In turn, this would indicate multiple, contestable, and equivocal
‘lessons’ that can be codified from a crisis.
Sensemaking, however, is not just a method for understanding the world, Weick (1993)
notes that “the basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplishment
that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs”
(Weick, 1993, p.635). Once sense is made of the world, that sense is imposed back onto
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the world and future events are understood through the existing sense made from previous
experience. As Maitlis (2005) notes “sensemaking thus both precedes decision making and
follows it” (Maitlis, 2005, p.21). Sensemaking, then, is a process not only for understanding
the world but also for interacting with it.
Sensemaking is also used in Neuroscience to refer to the way in which sensory inputs
are passed through various pathways of interpretation based upon pre-existing neural
connections (Klein et al., 2006a,b). As the senses experience the world, the interpretation
of those sensory inputs (including even which inputs get sensed at all) occurs through
integration with cognitive schemes based upon previous experience and knowledge (Klein
et al., 2006a). In effect, “our brains do not passively sense the world - they knit it from
moment to moment by braiding and knotting remembered encounters from the past”
(Francis, 2018, p.220).
Both Neuroscience and Organizational Studies, then, utilise ‘sensemaking’ to mean
the same processes but at different levels. For neuroscience, the individual is constantly
sensing the world and previous experiences shapes how the world is sensed and the ways
in which those senses are interpreted. For organization studies, sensemaking is a collection
of individual cognitive and active processes which constitute the making of organizations
and their behaviours.
Additionally, this conceptualization of an ongoing attempt to understand and make
reality overlaps well with Argyris and Scho¨n (1978) and their ‘Theory of Action’ perspect-
ive. This perspective, as seen above, notes that actions within an organization follow a
particular understanding of why that action is taking place (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978).
Similarly, the activities of individuals and groups under a sensemaking perspective are un-
derpinned by the sense that has been made of the world through previous activity (Weick
and Roberts, 1993).
Furthermore, sensemaking is also cyclical in nature (Colville et al., 2013). These recurs-
ive processes of understanding the world and creating it according to that understanding,
individuals’ sensemaking abstracts knowledge (or understandings) and tests them with
new experiences. This links sensemaking with our understanding of knowledge accumu-
lation as a cyclical process and shows how people act upon their understandings of the
world (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978).
Weick (1995) also noted that sensemaking is linked to organizing: groups must col-
lectively make sense of the world in order to act upon it as a cohesive group. As put
by Maitlis; “organizational sensemaking is a fundamentally social process: organization
41
members interpret their environment in and through interactions with others, constructing
accounts that allow them to comprehend the world and act collectively” (Maitlis, 2005,
p.21). In order to act collectively, a mutual understanding of the world and roles within
it is necessary.5.
From a process perspective, sensemaking is seen to act in a recursive cycle of noticing
cues, interpreting them, and acting upon the frames produced (Weick, 1995). Put a
different way, sensemaking is constituted by a cycle between conceptualising the world
and enacting it. This cyclical, ongoing nature of sensemaking overlaps with both the
learning view of Kolb (1984) and the knowledge accumulation cycle proposed by Argote
and Miron-spektor (2011). Sensemaking, then, is analogous to learning in that it is an
ongoing process constituted by shaping and reshaping conceptualizations of the world in
light of new and continuous experiences.
Lessons learned reports, in these terms, make sense of crises and attempt to understand
‘what happened’ to draw lessons for policy change (Gephart et al., 1990; Birkland, 2009).
While they can perform the theorised action of transferring knowledge across person and
place, these reports often are a more performative tool for re-establishing the authority
of social institutions (Gephart et al., 1990) and determining a narrative or understanding
of the events which took place (Brown, 2000, 2004). These reports, as we saw with
Birkland (2009), is part of event-related learning by being part of a ‘careful and thorough
investigation’ which results in related policy change.
2.5 Summary
We began this chapter with three questions. First, how does knowledge accumulation
operate broadly in non-crisis contexts? Next, how does knowledge accumulation change
when it comes to crisis contexts? And finally, how do lessons learned reports accumulate
knowledge from crises?
First, we found that a distinction between knowledge and learning was a useful place
to start. We saw how learning can be conceptualised as a process from which knowledge,
an artefact, is produced. We saw that there is an important distinction between codified
knowledge (that which is explicable and articulated) and tacit knowledge (that which
cannot be spoken aloud of written down, only demonstrated or practised). We also saw how
tacit and codified knowledge can be transformed from one to another through processes
5It must be noted that although a mutual understanding of the world is necessary for collective actions,
individuals can and do hold competing and equivocal understandings simultaneously (Maitlis, 2005)
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of socialisation, externalisation, combination, and integration.
We saw how knowledge accumulation operates in continuous cycles. These cycles were
demonstrated to be a dialectic interaction between experience and knowledge. First ex-
periences are abstracted and developed into new cognitive schemes and understandings
of the world, then those understandings are experimented with and used in new experi-
ences to test their validity. This process of cycling between experience and knowledge is
how knowledge accumulates - each time a new task experience is had, new knowledge is
combined with the previous knowledge.
In normal situations we can also see how knowledge accumulation is not just an epi-
stemic process but a social and political one. We saw how knowledge accumulation is
often constrained to certain pathways through particular paradigms. This constraining
to pathways is advantageous because it allows for a deeper exploration of particular phe-
nomena within the paradigm but excludes phenomena not included within the paradigm.
The process of paradigm construction is inherently political and social, generally relying
on politics of authority and evidence.
Second, we saw how crises differ from these normal situations and thus knowledge
accumulation operates differently. We saw that crises are different to normal situations
because they are extra-ordinary contexts that often have high consequences and limited
time for decision-making. Furthermore, they are situations in which the normal ways of
acting or thinking are insufficient. In effect, a crisis is qualitatively different to normal
contexts because it is so not-normal.
This non-normal aspect of crisis limits the continuous capacity for knowledge accumu-
lation in three ways. The rarity of these events means that the same people rarely respond
to the same event twice, meaning people are often responding to an event for the first time,
limiting knowledge accumulation. Second, the heterogeneity of the events means that no
two events are necessarily the same, making lessons from one event difficult for a person
to apply in the next. Third, the complexity of events means that attributing a root cause
or deriving simple linear lessons is difficult, if not impossible, in the first place.
We saw, however, that codifying knowledge allows us to ameliorate these barriers
thanks to three processes. First, relocating codified knowledge allows us to move some
knowledge from one place, person, or time, to another’s - thus overcoming the rarity
limitation. Second, combination allows us to take codified knowledge from multiple het-
erogeneous events and combined them to create general rules and heuristics for use in
multiple types of crisis. Finally, synthesization allows for the complexity of the events to
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be represented and compiled into a single codified document which presents lessons from
an event alongside the rationalisations for those lessons.
Third, we moved on to looking at the so-called lessons learned reports which form the
object of study for this thesis. We saw how they are intended for accountability purposes
to apportion blame, and that this is often a function which is political in nature. We
also saw how they perform a social role in establishing an authoritative account of ‘what
happened’ and allows for lessons to be derived as well as institutions to be re-legitimated.
Finally, we saw that sensemaking is an essential component of lessons learned reports
which allows for a culture to both learn from and socially accept a crisis.
As we saw from Birkland (2009), these lessons learned documents form part of an ideal-
type event-related learning cycle. However, these reports are often either not performed
or not ‘thorough and careful’ and infrequently lead to connected policy change. In this
conceptualisation, Birkland (2009) notes that a ‘thorough and careful’ investigation, in-
creased agenda attention, and group mobilization form the pattern of activities which give
rise to experience accumulation. Birkland (2009), however, does not note how a thorough
and careful investigation is conducted or how this increases agenda attention or mobilises
groups.
Expanding this cyclical concept across time we can see how a paradigm might begin
to evolved through various cycles in successive outbreaks thanks to incomplete or weak
learning in each instance, Figure 2.4 shows this graphically. If we imagine three outbreaks
which occur in succession in different contexts, with different people, and with a number
of years between them we can establish a timeline for accumulation. In each of these
outbreaks, various different knowledges are assembled on a micro-scale through different
learning processes. In Outbreak 1, therefore, we see four knowledge cycles which represent
four different knowledges produced and used within the outbreak.
As we move to Outbreak 2 we see that only two previous knowledges have accumulated.
The loss of other knowledges could be due to inapplicability of lessons, a loss of the people
holding knowledge, or an inability to fully describe or explain such knowledge. We can
also see that, due to the heterogeneity of events, that a new knowledge has been produced
and used that was not usable or present in outbreak 1.
Once we move to outbreak 3 we are left with just one knowledge. Through a com-
bination of two knowledges from outbreak 1 and the loss of the other knowledge from
outbreak 2, we have reached an outbreak with a one-knowledge solution. This is a drastic
and abstract example but it demonstrates a line of logic: knowledge accumulation can be
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Figure 2.4: Mapping the knowledge accumulation cycle over time in discontinuous outbreaks.
Source: Author’s elaboration and expansion on Kolb (1984)
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viewed through an evolutionary lens whereby the ‘fitness’ of a knowledge is measured by
its transferability from one outbreak to the next through complete accumulation cycles.
It is this evolutionary lens that this thesis will bring to bear upon the 2013-2016 Ebola
Crisis and its knowledge accumulation.
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Chapter 3
Research Design
3.1 Overview
The previous chapter detailed the theoretical underpinning for this thesis and explained
the conceptual framework for the study. The thesis uses an embedded-case method to ex-
amine the knowledge production processes during the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis. In looking
at this case, the study focused down on two examples of expert panel reports: the Ebola
Interim Assessment Panel and the Harvard-London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medi-
cine Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola. This thesis used two sources of
data to analyse these cases: document data and interview data.
This chapter expands on the research design, first by looking at the embedded case
method employed and the rationale for case selection. Next the chapter explains the
document sampling frames and collection, then expands on the analysis and use of lesson
co-occurrence networks as a method for determining how central a lesson is to the broader
case. The chapter then looks at the interview data sampling method for the two interviewee
samples, motivating the interview design, and explaining interview analysis. The chapter
summarises with a note on the analytical interaction between the broad case and the two
specific cases.
3.2 Case Study Method
The approach used in this thesis is an embedded-case method. In the context of the
macro-case of the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis, the thesis looks at the knowledge accumulation
processes in the case of two expert panel reports produced during the outbreak: the Ebola
Interim Assessment Panel and the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global
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Response to Ebola. This section will first explain the rationale behind using an embedded-
case approach, then the section will rationalise why these particular cases were selected.
3.2.1 Approach
This project uses a case-study method to assess and analyse the production of codified
knowledge from to the response to the Ebola Crisis (2013-2016). Case studies form an
intrinsic basis for social science research (Byrne and Ragin, 2009). As Ragin and Becker
(1992) note, a case is more accurately characterised as a complex system. In the analytical
frame of the researcher, the equivocality and contextual embeddedness is reduced into a set
of theories about causal mechanisms which dynamically interact. In short, case studies
offer multiple opportunities for theorising whilst retaining thick description to explain
causal mechanisms (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Although case studies do not generate universal
laws, social research does not often aim to do so. Case study research, therefore, can allow
for generalisability, but with acknowledged constraints (Byrne and Ragin, 2009).
Case study analysis has limitations: possible bias in case selection, possible lack of
representativeness, and difficulty in evaluating the extent to which particular effects are
determined by situations (George and Bennett, 2005). However, the aim of the present
study is to analyse causal effects and processes, an aim to which case study research
is particularly suited. This is particularly prescient for this thesis given the complex
interactions within and between cases.
This thesis also makes use of the multi-level nature of case studies. There are various
levels at which one can find cases. For example, the case taken in this thesis is the 2013-
2016 Ebola Crisis, however this thesis does not explore the outbreak in its entirety. Instead,
the thesis begins with an examination of the variety of lessons that have been codified from
the Ebola Crisis. The thesis then moves on to detail the context, processes, and outcomes
of two expert panels which produced and codified knowledge from the outbreak. The utility
of case methods here is in the capacity to maintain external validity for the micro-level
cases through the boundaries provided by the macro-case (the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis)
(Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010). Effectively, by looking at two cases within a broader case,
it is possible to generalise the argument to the broader case context (Byrne and Ragin,
2009; Ragin and Becker, 1992; George and Bennett, 2005).
48
3.2.2 Case Study Selection
Case selection requires rationales for both the embedding case and the embedded cases.
This section will detail the reasoning behind selecting the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis as the
broad case; exploring the recency of the crisis and its paradigm-breaking nature. The
section will then move on to examine the rationales behind choosing the Ebola Interim
Assessment Panel and the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to
Ebola. The section will explore how the reports both fit into standard narratives despite
having different contexts and panel compositions thus revealing of how different processes
entrench the same narratives and recommendations.
Broad Case: The 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis
The choosing of the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis as the case for this thesis was based upon
two rationales. The first is the recency of the crisis ensuring that interviewees remember
the rationales and processes used to reach consensus conclusions. The second is that the
nature of the crisis breaks the three central tenets of outbreak response established in the
Global Health Security paradigm.
First, looking practically at studying the process of knowledge accumulation, inter-
viewees would need to have a recollection of events in a great level of detail. While this
would be possible for some interviewees in events past (for example, the 2003 SARS pan-
demic or the 2009 H1N1 Influnza A pandemic), having a set of interviewees for whom
these experiences were “fresh” and as recent as 1-2 years prior enabled a much deeper
recollection than for other outbreaks. The most recent outbreak therefore is the most
appropriate case for this investigation.
Additionally, the recency of the Ebola Crisis allowed competing perspectives to be
much more easily captured. Over time stories are told and retold, narratives are shared
more widely, and prior experiences are transformed through the lens of new experiences
(Weick, 1988; Colville et al., 2013). The further from the time of the outbreak a re-
search setting is, then, increases the likelihood that experiences will have been transformed
through new experiences and decreases the likelihood of data reflecting the experience of
the case being studied. In effect, by studying the Ebola Crisis, the data collected is more
likely to reflect knowledge produced during the Ebola Crisis and not knowledge from more
recent epidemics.
Secondly the case of the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis is a crucial empirical case. Chapter 4
will demonstrate the rise and construction of a Global Health Security paradigm (GHSp)
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which has come to underpin conceptualisations of outbreak response. This paradigm
contains three central tenets for response: disease surveillance for rapid response, an em-
powered and authoritative WHO, and the rapid production and disbursement of biomed-
ical countermeasures. The 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis was a case which demonstrates failures
on all three central tenets: surveillance was not rapid, WHO was weak and not authorit-
ative, and biomedical countermeasures were absent while clinical trials were plagued with
ethical and practical barriers. This absence of the central tenets represents a significant
challenge to the dominant paradigm of disease outbreak response and thus justifies an
exploration of how this drastic challenge shapes knowledge accumulation.
The 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis has been chosen as the broad research case because of
its recency and its challenge to the dominant paradigm. Recency allows for a ”fresh”
perspective, shaped by the events of the case itself and not viewed through the lens of
other, more recent cases. The challenge to the dominant paradigm allows us to characterise
this case as crucial; if the paradigm’s assumptions are not reconsidered here, then less
crucial cases can be assumed to not be reconsidered too.
Embedded Case Selection: The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel & the Harvard-
LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola
The rationale for choosing these two cases was born of a recognition that they are similar
and different in important ways. The two cases were both high profile, systemic scope,
high impact panel processes purporting to detail ‘lessons learned from Ebola’. These cases,
however, are different in their processes: while the Interim Assessment Panel report was
produced by a small, highly qualified team of experienced policymakers in an institutional
setting, the Harvard-LSHTM Independent panel’s report was produced by a large team
of highly expert academics in a setting designed with the express purpose of being ’inde-
pendent’. These two similar results from different processes allows us to investigate how
codification and sensemaking processes produce particular results.
Embedded Case 1 : The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (EIAP) was composed of six
individuals with policymaking and academic backgrounds in global health and humanitari-
anism. The panel was established by a Special Session of the Executive Board of the World
Health Organization which mandated “the Director-General to commission an interim as-
sessment, by a panel of outside independent experts, on all aspects of WHO’s response,
from the onset of the current outbreak ... to be presented at the Sixty-Eighth World
Health Assembly” (WHO Executive Board, 2015, p.12). This is not only a highly institu-
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tionalised setting within which to conduct an exercise in accountability, but the mandate
only allocated four months for the full exercise from panel appointment to presentation.
As we shall see later, this institutional setting and short time-frame constrained what
could be done and determined the results.
Embedded Case 2 : The Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the Global Response
to Ebola (HLIP), on the other hand, was composed of 22 individuals from civil society and
academic backgrounds in global health and humanitarianism. The panel was organized
by Suerie Moon, Julio Frenk, and Ashish Jha, and funded by the Rockerfeller Foundation.
This non-governmental setting, as well as an academic/civil society composition of the
panel, gives it the ‘independent’ in its name. Additionally, the establishing of the panel in
September of 2014 and the final publication in November of 2015 gave the panel over a year
to produce their report. This ‘independent’ setting and long time period for consideration
gives a very large divergence between the processes for the EIAP and the HLIP. Despite
these divergences, however, the lessons contained within the reports are strikingly similar.
A number of efforts have attempted collect and review the vast swathe of ‘lessons’
from the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis. Some examples include: WHO has produced its own
list of approximately 40 reports and papers (World Health Organization, 2016a); the
authors of some of these reports came together to review 7 reports in a commentary in the
British Medical Journal (Moon et al., 2017); and other authors of some of these reports
came together to review 4 ‘global commissions’ in a policy forum contribution for PLoS
Medicine (Gostin et al., 2016). Each of these analysis efforts noted the commonality in the
lessons across all of these efforts. This is particularly surprising given that these reviews
highlight the diverse compositions and contexts of the panels (World Health Organization,
2016a; Moon et al., 2017; Gostin et al., 2016).
In each of these reviews, four panels consistently appear: the Ebola Interim Assessment
Panel (World Health Organization, 2015e), the Harvard-London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine Independent Panel (Moon et al., 2015), the US National Academy
of Medicine’s Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future (Sands
et al., 2016), and the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on the Global Response
to Health Crises (Kikwete et al., 2016). Given the prominence of these four reports, the
representativeness of their lessons (World Health Organization, 2016a; Moon et al., 2017;
Gostin et al., 2016), and their varying contexts and compositions, these would form a good
sample for exploring processes of knowledge accumulation in the panels.
In deciding to explore the formation of lessons from the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis, it was
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Figure 3.1: Seven prominent global reports reviewing the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis. The four panels most
consistently appearing are highlighted and the two panels chosen for this thesis are outlined.
Source: Author’s elaboration on Table 1 of (Moon et al., 2017, p.6)
important to analyse panels whose scope was to examine the crisis itself. The rationale for
this is that these are the efforts which the question of ‘what happened?’ is most prescient
and therefore sensemaking efforts should be central to the knowledge codification process
(Kaliner, 2013). Figure 3.1 shows a summary of panels and scopes, highlighting the four
prominent reports and the two embedded cases for this thesis. The two panels chosen as
case studies are the two which are scoped only around the Ebola Crisis (the EIAP and
HLIP), not the two panels whose scope is much more far-ranging recommendations for
the future based on multiple past outbreaks.
This similarity between the sets of recommendations and the divergence in report
processes is the rationale for studying these cases. The two embedded cases were chosen
for their prominence and scope. This thesis focuses on these two cases to tease apart why
the different processes delivered such similar results. To do so we focus on the lessons
learned codified in a diversity of documents to explore the possible lessons that could have
been codified by each panel, then the two cases are examined in detail to find reasons why
they are so similar. The next sections discuss the document and interview data collection
and analysis in-turn.
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3.3 Document Data
As described, the thesis operates on two data types: documents producing codified know-
ledge from the Ebola Crisis and semi-structured. This section describes the rationale and
process for the collection and analysis of the documentary data.
In order to understand how knowledge is accumulated, it must first be understood what
knowledge was produced. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, learning from disease outbreak
responses has been guided by a particular Global Health Security Paradigm, established
over the past 30 years. This paradigm concerns the use of surveillance for rapid response,
the centralisation of authority within WHO, and the use of rapid production of med-
ical countermeasures (vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostic technologies). The collection
and analysis of documentary data was intended to depict the diversity of perspectives in
knowledge produced from the Ebola Crisis (2013-2016). Additionally, the method aimed
to recognise what types of lessons were learned most frequently and in what depth they
are discussed. The central rationale, then, for this method is understanding the full scope
of lessons from the Ebola Crisis and to what extent they follow this Global Health Security
Paradigm.
3.3.1 Document Collection
The collection of documents which present codified knowledge from the Ebola Crisis pro-
ceeded in three samples. The first, an academic literature sample, collected by querying
the Scopus database is a sample of documents produced in academic journals aimed to
gain a look at the academic analysis of the Ebola Crisis. Second, a grey literature sample,
collected from the archives of various non-academic publications aimed to understand how
practitioners understood the Ebola Crisis and what lessons were being drawn. Finally, a
policy sample collected from documents directly cited in policy-making aimed to under-
stand the lessons which have fed into policy decision-making. These samples yielded a
total of 267 items: 161 (65%) in the academic sample, 62 (23%) in the grey sample, and
34 (13%) in the policy sample. This sampling strategy aimed to gain an insight into the
breadth of possible ‘lessons learned’ from the Ebola Crisis, and to understand how these
lessons fit into the Global Health Security Paradigm.
Academic Document Sample
The first sample aimed to gain a systematic view of the academic literature. The primary
reason for this is that many of the authors of the two reports examined in this thesis are
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academics. These authors, then, are embedded in their own disciplinary communities as
well as their institutional context. Sampling the academic literature, then, gives a better
picture as to what lessons the academic community (of various disciplines) are drawing
and codifying.
To sample the academic literature, we first queried Scopus for any item containing the
word ’Ebola’ in its title, abstract, or keywords published after 2013 (most recent query
performed on 09/08/2017). This yielded 6121 documents whose metadata were exported
for sorting. The titles and abstracts of these were then used to sort documents manually,
looking in the title and abstracts for indicators of papers which likely contained functional
lessons learned. This generally included documents where the abstracts or titles included
the phrase ‘lessons learned’ or ‘lessons’ or ‘implications for policy/practise.’ This process
led to a sample of 161 documents which were then analysed in more depth.
Sampling the academic literature presents three limitations: First, the delay between
submission and publication of an academic paper reduces the likelihood that a paper has
been captured by the time frame. A news feature in Nature (Powell, 2016) details that
the median journal review time (time from submission to acceptance) is approximately
100 days, and that PloS ONE review times had increased from 37 days to 125 days over
a ten year period. In addition to this, there is also the delay between publication and the
paper being archived on Scopus, further reducing the likelihood that more recent works
will be captured by the search. However, the elapsed time between the end of the outbreak
(January 2016) and the most recent search (August 2017) is 573 days, and the elapsed time
between the PHEIC declaration (August 2015) and the most recent search (August 2017)
is 732 days. Both of these, even accounting for an average 100 days of review and editing
(Powell, 2016), would give authors more than a year to prepare manuscripts for submission.
Thus, this thesis makes the case that the academic sample used has sufficient coverage
from which to draw conclusions of the knowledge the academic community/communities
have codified.
Second, is a western content bias in the Scopus database. The Scopus Content Coverage
Guide (Scopus, 2017) reveals that the regional coverage for North America and Western
Europe is ‘more than 6,000’ journals and ‘more than 11,000’ journals, respectively. Re-
gional coverage for the Middle East and Africa is ’more than 750’ journals, revealing a
large bias towards North American and Western European content. In order to reduce this
bias, the database ’African Journals Online (AJOL)’ was queried. AJOL is a non-profit
whose aim is to disseminate scholarly work from across the African continent. Using the
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same search strategy as for Scopus, no papers were found which were not also found in
the Scopus search. While this does not ameliorate the bias, it does provide some evidence
that the Scopus database coverage is suitable for this thesis’ purposes.
Finally, there are barriers to publication which on the one hand serve to maintain
academic work’s robustness and validity, but on the other serve to value some knowledges
over others or to value certain authors over others. One study of medical publishing found
that, in a sample of 1191 researchers at the Paris Hospitals Board, the largest barriers
to publishing included a lack of time to write and submit, limited English writing skills
(particularly pertinent given the dominance of english-language publishing in academia),
lack of critical editing capacity, and a lack of funding support for editing or publication
fees (Duracinsky et al., 2017). These barriers to practitioner publication in academic
journal limits this academic sample’s likelihood of accurately representing the breadth of
knowledge produced from the outbreak. This was, however, offset by further the next two
further sampling strategies.
Responder Document Sample
The aim of this sample was to examine the knowledge codified in non-academic public-
ations. The rationale behind this was to be more inclusive of responder knowledge in
the analysis. Responder knowledge was important for the analysis because, while many
responders are also academics, that is not true of all responders. Therefore, including
non-academic responders in the sample widens the scope of possible lessons that can be
identified. However, the barriers to academic publishing noted above (limited academic
English writing skills, lack of time and resources, and lack of critical editing capacity)
limited the academic sample’s capacity to include responder knowledge.
The responder document sample, then, is a sample of non-academic publications codi-
fying lessons from the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis. To gain a view of responder lessons, then,
a number of non-academic, responder-oriented publications were identified which would
provide codified lessons from practitioners. Publications were: the Bulletin of the World
Health Organization, CBRNe World, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the CDC’s Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report, and the Humanitarian Practise Network’s Humanitarian
Exchange. Each of these publications was chosen for their operational/ response focus,
each providing insights aimed at professions in humanitarian or global health responses.
These publications’ archives were then searched for documents which refer to the 2013
Ebola Crisis.
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The decision was taken to exclude government documents from this sample because we
consider these as policy documents as opposed to responder documents. As the primary
focus of this sample was on the knowledge codified by responders, such documents were
outside of this sample’s scope. Additionally, not every state government involved in the
Ebola response has produced a lessons learned document, so this decision was further
motivated by the bias that including government reports would have introduced. Although
this decision limited the coverage of this responder document sample, it also limited bias
and kept the sample focused on response lessons.
Policy Sample
This final sample is tailored specifically to gain an understanding of what documents were
informing policy. This sample was designed to capture the kinds of lessons which were
being taken on by policymakers. This sample was provided by The World Health Organ-
ization’s planning, finance, and accountability group who held an Information session on
studies undertaken in response to the Ebola outbreak on the 24th of January 2016. As part
of the preparation for this, a list of documents were presented as prominent for inform-
ation.1 As such, this promotion by WHO, and their subsequent use in policy (many are
cited in the reports produced by the oversight body responsible for reforming WHO’s own
policies on health emergencies (Abdulla et al., 2015; World Health Organization, 2015b))
made the list an excellent resource which represented the documents making an impact
on policy.
This sample was limited to this list. The primary rationale was that these documents
had a clear and demonstrable direct impact on the policymaking of WHO. In using this
list of documents it can therefore be stated that these documents were directly impactful
on policy and the lessons that they contain were influential to policymakers in WHO, the
central directing and coordinating authority for global health.
Secondarily, scope again becomes a factor due the likelihood that policy documents are
limited in scope to evaluating one country or one organization’s response to the 2013-2016
Ebola Crisis. This scope would limit the comparability of the lessons across the three
samples if the policy sample were to include documents specific to a single organization
or country - rather than multinational or multi-organizational analyses. Keeping the
policy document sample to these allowed for a consistent comparison across samples whilst
maintaining a sample of documents that represents policy impactful lessons.
1http://www.who.int/about/evaluation/extended-list-of-ebola-reviews-may2016.pdf
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3.3.2 Document Analysis
The objective of the analysis was to assess whether, on the whole, lessons learned from
the 2013 Ebola Crisis followed the pattern established in Chapter 4. The analysis of
documents therefore had to make some quantitative measure of the frequency of certain
categories of lessons. This allowed us to accurately assess whether the frequency of lessons
is representative of the Global Health Security Paradigm: surveillance, WHO authority-
building, and rapid production and use of medical countermeasures.
In order to do this, lessons in each of the documents were identified and then clustered
together to form categories of related lessons for quantification. The analysis used two
methods to ensure that the pattern was consistent; first an inductive clustering model was
created using epistemic categories based on the author’s own understanding. Second a
lesson co-occurrence matrix was built which allowed a network model to be constructed
and clusters analysed through network relationships. This section outlines the analysis
in more depth beginning with the identification of lessons in the documents, moving to
the inductive aggregation of lessons, and finally the clustering and visualisation of lessons
using network analysis techniques.
Lesson Identification & Aggregation
To quantify lessons, they had to be identified in a manner which made them not so
amorphous as to be abstracted from their original intent but not so distinct from one
another as to preclude aggregation. As such, the term functional lesson was coined. A
functional lesson is an explicitly stated lesson with a clear intent to recommend action.
This definition was restrictive enough to exclude amorphous lessons but broad enough to
capture aggregable lessons.
In practise, the identification of lessons ranged from documents which contained re-
commendations explicitly, to those which required a more subjective identification of re-
commendations. For example, the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel’s Report contains
recommendations in clearly marked boxes, numbered in its executive summary. In cases
like these, the identification of lessons were simple; each recommendation is a single lesson.
In other cases, however, the recommendations were embedded in the prose of the
document and not highlighted in such a manner. This was more frequently observed
in the Grey and Academic samples than the Policy sample. In these cases, the lessons
were identified through reading the text and looking for the clear intent to recommend
action. For example; “Examination of a patient meeting the case definition of a suspect
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case of EVD should not be undertaken other than in an isolation room with the clinician
wearing full personal protective equipment” (MacDermott and Herberg, 2017, p.130). This
sentence is specific and mandates clear actions to be taken. As such it is coded as a lesson.
Finally, two other codes were created for documents which either were found, upon
closer reading, to contain no lessons fitting the criteria (n=71) or to not be about the
2013-2016 Ebola crisis (n=8). These two lesson categories were then discounted from
further analysis. In total 54 categories were aggregated from 146 sub-categories.
The identification of lessons, then, created a set of individual lessons from each docu-
ment which functioned as a proxy for quantification. These lessons, however, also needed
to be aggregated into similar empirical categories for quantification. For example, Medical
Countermeasures frequently refer to Vaccines, Diagnostics, and Therapeutics (as well as,
in some cases, Personal Protective Equipment), as such these three could be aggregated
into a broad category concerning Medical Countermeasures. Another example is that en-
gaging survivors and disincentivising bushmeat consumption are some of the contextually
specific methods in which communities were engaged and as such fit into the Community
Involvement category.
Methodologically, the aggregation of categories followed two main processes; the first
used the author’s own knowledge of outbreak response and subjective decisions of similarity
were used to induct the first coding framework. Second, a co-occurrence network analysis
(see next section) revealed particular clusters and coding links which could be aggregated
and may have been overlooked. This second process was also subject to the judgements
of the author, as the algorithm produces clusters based on select network criteria and
so co-occurring lessons may not necessarily be empirically related. Utilising the network
clusters as a guide, a second pass of aggregation and re-coding was performed, producing
the final results presented in Chapter 5.
Co-occurrence Network Analysis
The creation of a co-occurrence network to visually represent the data here was designed
to increase the reliability of the raw counts of lessons and to identify clusters of lessons.
In displaying the lessons in a co-occurrence network, it became possible to identify lessons
which frequently occur together in the same document. In doing so it was possible to
identify whether or not certain lessons were more central to analyses of this outbreak than
others, adding further analytical rigour to the question of whether or not the lessons from
the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis follows the Global Health Security Paradigm established in
58
chapter 4.
The first step in producing a co-occurrence network was to utilise NVivo’s built-in co-
occurrence matrix function. This function compares each pair of coding categories (a,a;
a,b; ... b,a; b,b; ... z,y; z,z) in every document and counts how frequently they occur
together in a document. This matrix was then cleaned to harmonise the row and column
headings, diagonal (a,a; b,b ... z,z) and duplicates were removed to create a clean matrix.
This clean matrix was then imported into the open-source network visualisation software
Gephi. This process was repeated for both the aggregated and disaggregated coding sets.
The network visualisation software requires not only the raw data to produce a network
but a structural form to use. The structural algorithm used in this case is called ’Force
Atlas 2’, a layout in which nodes (lessons) repulse one another and edges (co-occurrences)
attract one another (Jacomy et al., 2014). In this way, nodes which are joined by edges
cluster together and nodes which are not joined by edges are repulsed away from one
another. The network visualisations in this thesis also make use of the ’LinLog mode’ which
accentuates clusters by making the repulsion between two nodes inversely proportional
to the log of the distance between them, as opposed to inversely proportional to the
direct distance between them. In effect, small changes in the distance between two nodes
while they are closer together have a larger effect on the repulsion than changes at large
distances. While the attraction force remains proportional to the edge’s weight (number
of co-occurrences), the large changes at small ranges in node repulsion means that clusters
remain tight while nodes outside the cluster are repulsed out further. This then produced
the networks seen in section 5.3.1.
The second purpose of these networks, was to compare the differing patters on lessons
across each of the different samples. In order to do this two processes were performed across
the three samples; the first created a unified, multiplex (multiple, parallel edges) network
structure and compare the edges of the three samples, and the second performed the same
analysis but on normalized edge weights to look for sample size impact on the results. The
production of a normalized multiplex network allowed the creation of a constant network
structure with filtered edges. In these networks, one can visualise different effects in the
different samples more easily.
In creating a multiplex network, the whole network could be produced using the sum
of the samples’ edges and then each sample’s edges visualised individually to view how
each sample impacts overall network structure. To create this network, the above steps
were taken for each sample individually (aggregated and disaggregated) producing six
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individual networks whose edges were then exported from Gephi, compiled into two files
(aggregated and disaggregated) with a new ’SourceSample’ column and re-imported into
Gephi to produce a multiplex graph. The graph was produced in the same way as above
and each sample’s edges could be filtered out visually in the program. In order to produce a
normalized version of the edges, the edge lists were re-exported from the multiplex graphs
and each edge was multiplied by a scale factor of 100n where n is the sample size.
3.4 Interview Data
3.4.1 Interview Data Collection
In order to understand how reports are created and used, interviews with 37 report authors
and report users were conducted. In total, 14 report-authors and 23 report-users were
interviewed. The sampling approaches and interview protocols with respect to each of
these two constituencies differed from one another due to their slightly different purposes
and will be explored later in this section.
Each interview was semi-structured according to two protocols2 and designed to elicit
answers to a number of key questions and concepts related to codified knowledge produc-
tion and use. Each interview was audio recorded for future notes and quotes.3
Ethical Conduct
As part of the ethical conduct of this research, these recordings were subject to a number
of anonymity stipulations:
• Interviewees were given pseudonyms for the purposes of notes, recordings, and in-
text citations.
• Notes and recordings from the interviews were available only to the researcher and
the lead supervisor, as was the key which detailed who each interviewee was according
to pseudonym
• That the notes and recordings would be kept separate to the key
Some interviewees also requested additional dispensations like not being directly quoted
(n=2) or not identifying their organization (n=4), and others indicated they were happy
2see descriptions later in this section and full protocols in Appendix A-1 and A-2.
34 report-users’ interviews had recording issues and so are not directly cited because quotes could not
be verified.
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to be quoted by name. Each was assessed case-by-case and negotiated to ensure that
interviewees were comfortable with the purpose and process of interviewing, whilst also
allowing for optimum use of data given the conditions. In addition to this, each interviewee
was sent information on the study, how their data would be used, and the semi-structured
questions when approached to give participants knowledge information before providing
consent. Participants could also remove their data from the study at any point reasonable
prior to the submission of the thesis. Conducting this research was approved by a Cross-
School Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) at the University of Sussex, under Reference
number ER/JRH35/1.
Fieldwork
The first element of fieldwork was conducted in September of 2015 when the author atten-
ded and rapporteured for a Wilton Park4 dialogue. The dialogue, entitled The 2014-2015
West African Ebola Outbreak: Lessons for a Response to a deliberate outbreak,5 enabled
the author to see first-hand a report construction process through discussions and author
a report himself. While not directly cited or referenced and certainly not contributory to
any data, this dialogue did offer a number of insights into a report-construction process
which informed the author’s early ideas. Furthermore this dialogue also enabled additional
report-users to be recruited for participation in the study.
Official fieldwork in this thesis was conducted in the Summer of 2017. Two weeks were
spent in Geneva, Switzerland where interviews were conducted with WHO and human-
itarian personnel. Second, two weeks were spent in the United States - the first week in
Washington DC, the second in Boston, Massachusetts - where interviews were conduc-
ted with report authors and US-based policy-makers. During this visit, a Workshop on
Bioterrorism and Biosecurity, held by the Schar School of Public Policy at George Ma-
son University, was attended. This allowed for recruitment of additional report-users as
well as interactive engagement of report users in the preliminary results of the document
analysis and fieldwork. Additionally, over June and August of 2017, interviews were also
conducted at various locations in the United Kingdom including Public Health England,
the University of Cambridge, the Institute of Development Studies, and the London School
4Wilton Park is an executive agency of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office which holds frequent
dialogues, convening stakeholders and experts for multi-day workshops to explore topics. The culmination
of these dialogues is the publication of a report similar to a ‘lessons learned’ report which outlines a topic
and makes recommendations for policy.
5Hutton (2016)
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of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Finally, a 4-day visit to Accra, Ghana was conducted to present the preliminary find-
ings at the Global Emerging Pathogens and Treatment (GET) Consortium’s 3rd Annual
Conference on Emerging Infectious Diseases. During this visit, informal discussions with
other participants were had which informed some of the analysis and additional parti-
cipants were recruited.
Report-Authors
Report processes are the central, conceptual locus around which this thesis revolves. As
such, report authors were key to understanding the processes employed by the panels
and the ways in which the reports were built. The population of authors was sampled
first by selecting the two specific-cases (the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (EIAP) and
the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel (HLIP)) due to their process divergence and
knowledge convergence. This created a sample of 28 total authors who were e-mailed on
multiple separate occasions to recruit them to study. Of the 6 authors of the EIAP, 2
were interviewed along with a member of the secretariat to the panel; and of the 22 HLIP
authors, 11 were interviewed. This represents an interview rate of approximately 50%
which, although not ideal, was enough to reach theoretical saturation including repeating
narratives of key events in both report-building processes.
The aim of the interviews for report authors was to elicit the stories of how each
report was constructed. In particular, the aim was to understand how each of the authors
were involved in the sensemaking processes of knowledge creation and learning. As such,
questions centred around the actual processes and report-authors’ perspectives on them.
Appendix A.1 shows the interview protocol for report-authors.
Given the central rationale here was to elicit process stories, the protocol follows a
linear narrative from report inception through to dissemination. The protocol begins
with objectives of the individual and the report, the clarity of purpose, and the intended
outcomes. In asking this, it was possible to gain an insight into why the report was
established and the early stages of people becoming personally involved.
Next, the protocol explores how and why individuals were recruited for the panel. In
some cases, this was because the interviewee had been the instigator of the panel and,
as such, was asked how they chose other panel members. This question was aimed at
obtaining stories of how and why individuals came to be involved in the report panels.
This was important because varying rationales and methods of recruitment may: a) impact
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the manner in which panel members participate, and b) reflect the general frame of the
report in the initial stages.
Next, the protocol hits upon the processes of evidence collection and interpretation.
In this section of the protocol, the aim was to collect stories about various aspects of the
report itself. In some instances, specific recommendations were mentioned by interviewees
and the rationales and negotiations for those were discussed; in others discussions revolved
around the writing process and trying to harmonise various notes and comments. This
line of questioning revealed some of the insights on evidence collection and narrative
consolidation that can be seen in chapters 6 & 7.
The interview protocol then moves on to the individual themselves. This thesis acknow-
ledges that the central reason for panels is for the expertise and knowledge of individuals
to be collectivised and transformed into a codified document. Additionally, we recognise
that this process is reciprocal; individuals learn from their colleagues as much as their
colleagues learn from them. In asking questions of individual knowledge, we begin to
understand how individual experience impacts report codification processes.
The protocol moves to the engagement to understand how individuals were involved
in the dissemination of the report itself. This is because, assuming diverse perspectives,
different individuals will disseminate different aspects of the report. For some, the recom-
mendations surrounding medical countermeasures (for example) will be the important
aspects that they discuss in depth, for others it may be the governance challenges. In
asking how different individuals were involved in dissemination we can get a sense of how
varied the report’s impact was or could have been.
The protocol ends on the same question for both users and for authors: ”what do you
think were the main lessons from the Ebola outbreak?” This question was used to observe
the diversity of opinions around the lessons from the Ebola Crisis. Diverse answers to
this question do not necessarily guarantee diverse respondents were found, but at least
demonstrate a lack of full homogeneity across respondents. In effect, diverse answers to
this question (which were found) demonstrate, at least in principle, some diversity in the
respondents.
Report-Users
For report users, the aim was to understand how reports featured in the setting of policy,
operational, and the academic body of knowledge. Additionally, it was an aim to under-
stand how different epistemic locations/ disciplines received the reports and used them.
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Interviews were used for this purpose, rather than surveys, because an understanding
of why reports were (or weren’t) used was also a key aim of the study. As such, semi-
structured interviews were a more appropriate methodological tool for our purposes.
Table 3.2 shows a cross-tabulation of these two parameters (epistemic location/ discip-
line and role of user) and the number of interviewees that fit in each box. Whilst we accept
that the lines between each of these parameters is blurry at best, this tabulation allowed
us to ensure coverage of various constituencies. In selecting individuals for interview, the
Discipline/
Role
Clinical/ Public Health Social Science/ Law Disaster/ Crisis Response
Academia 1 3 1
Policy 3 2 3
Operational 6 1 2
Table 3.1: Number of interviewees who fit into the various categories defined by the parameters of discipline
and role. Each interviewee is counted only once into a single box.
process was effectively an idiosyncratic snowball. Having met a number of individuals at
Wilton Park and become familiar with prominent authors writing on the subject, as well
as key individuals in the actual Ebola Crisis response, the first phase was interviewing
these individuals. Then, snowballing from there, aiming to obtain as much of a diversity
as possible in the table above.
On the protocol itself, the aim here was to gain an understanding of knowledge and
how it is used and produced in their experience and role. In particular, here we try to
explore how individuals learn from their experiences, search for useful knowledge, and how
they use reports. In the first few questions we explore how the user is involved in outbreak
response as well as how they personally learn from their experiences.
The next set of questions is motivated by the concept that knowledge comes in differ-
ent types and from different locations. As proposed by Prencipe and Tell 2001, Nonaka
and Takeuchi 1995, and others, knowledge can come in multiple forms depending on the
knowledge and the frame of reference (tacit, codified, objective, subjective, personal, trans-
active, institutional, etc.), as well as from different locations (personal networks, technical
reports, academic papers, organizational repositories, prior education, prior experience,
etc.). These questions focus on what types of knowledge are used in outbreak response
and who produces them/ where they are found.
Next we move on to how lessons are internalised in organizations. We conceptualised
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from Organizational Learning that knowledge integration into organizations is a social
process as well as a knowledge process. In this vein, we ask questions about knowledge
integration to understand whether some forms or sources of knowledge are privileged over
others and why.
Finally we move into the so-called lessons learned reports that are the main focus of
this study. How are they used (if at all)? Why are they used? Who is using them?.
These questions (along with the distribution of interviewees across the two axes) allows
us to analyse the use of reports for various sets of individuals. These questions allow us to
understand what it is that makes reports useful and to ask whether report-construction
can better fulfil this utility.
In sum, the interview data was aimed towards understanding how and why knowledge
is codified in reports. What processes contribute to their production? What uses do they
serve? Collecting this data was done through two samples: the first a sample of report
authors based on the two case-reports, and the second a stratified sample attempting to
cover nine categories based on the two axes of epistemic location and institutional type.
The questions were designed to elicit responses based upon the conceptual framework: how
is sense made in the production and dissemination of the reports? How is knowledge found
and used for disease outbreak responses? These two samples and the two protocols give
us a reasonable view as to the how and why knowledge is codified from disease outbreak
responses. The next section explores how this data was analysed to answer these questions.
3.4.2 Interview Data Analysis
Interview data in this thesis was analysed in a similar way across the two samples but
with slightly different aims. For the report authors the aim was to construct a depiction of
the timeline and processes for the two case-reports and the way in which they were built.
For report users, the aim was to understand and analyse how and why reports are used
to inform disease outbreak response.
In the first instance, for both samples, interview notes were created. These notes were
written after the interview and sent to the interviewee for confirmation. The notes were
not transcriptions of the interview audio, but did contain verbatim quotes that indicated
to interviewees what would be used. This reduced the researcher’s time in transcribing
but also maintained ethical boundaries, allowing interviewees to remove their quotes.
Once notes were prepared, they were imported into NVivo 11 for analysis. This is
where the two samples differ. For the report authors, two passes of analysis were conduc-
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ted: the first pass to construct a timeline of events for the reports as well as note some
key repetitions and build possible theories; the second pass to analyse report author’s
discussions of each of these phases and events in turn, theorising how these events could
have shaped the final report’s narrative and recommendations. This process was broadly
focused around two main questions: what events constituted the construction of the report
in question, and how could these events have impacted knowledge accumulation via the
report?
When analysing for report users, the analysis was much more inductive. In this sample,
the central question was simply how do users find and use knowledge?. This analysis was
performed through highlighting the ways in which users found useful knowledge (whatever
form that may take) and exploring dynamics across the nine categories displayed in table
3.2. The main question addressed by this analysis were how does knowledge search and
use vary across different institutional settings and epistemic locations? How might this
affect the utility and production of codified reports.
Both analysis were thematic in nature, looking at the ways in which interviewees
described their experiences both in terms of authoring reports and in terms of using them.
Themes were identified by picking out repeatedly emerging commentaries or events using
lists of themes/events already seen. This then allowed for aggregating together similar
themes and events while exploring emerging theorisations for knowledge processes.
3.5 Summary
This thesis, then, utilises two overlapping phases of data collection and analysis. The
first phase focuses on what knowledge had been produced from the Ebola outbreak, using
a document analysis to answer this question. The second phase used interview data to
understand how reports were produced and used in the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis. The sum-
total of this data analysis was to understand the spectrum of codified knowledge in the
Ebola Crisis: what was produced? what was used? how was it produced and used?
Document data were collected in three samples: an academic sample of journal articles,
an operational sample constituted of documents aimed at practitioners, a policy samples
made up of documents used in policy. Each of the documents in these samples was
analysed to identify the recommendations made. These were then analysed to understand
what knowledge had been codified from the Ebola Crisis.
Interview data were collected through two samples: report authors were interviewed to
understand how reports were constructed, and report users were interviews to understand
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how reports were used. These were analysed thematically to answer the questions how is
knowledge codified? who is codifying knowledge? who is using codified knowledge? how
is codified knowledge used.
Having described the methodology and research design for the thesis, as well as the
conceptual framework in the previous chapter, this thesis now moves on to its empir-
ical content. The next chapter focuses on the rise of a paradigm in disease outbreak
response. The chapter will explore the discursive underpinnings of this Global Health
Security paradigm (GHSp) and then argue for three response pillars: syndromic surveil-
lance for rapid response, an authoritative and empowered WHO, and the rapid research,
development, and production of therapeutics, diagnostics, and vaccines. The chapter will
set the contextual stage for chapters 5-7 where the cases will be discussed.
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Chapter 4
The Global Health Security
Paradigm
4.1 Introduction
Thus far, this thesis has introduced the central problem of knowledge in disease outbreak
responses, conceptualised knowledge accumulation in disease outbreak responses, and out-
lined the methodology employed in order to understand how knowledge is accumulated
in disease outbreak responses. Next, this thesis aims to introduce what this thesis terms
the Global Health Security paradigm (GHSp), a central concept for the remainder of this
thesis.
The Global Health Security paradigm is constructed of four separate elements: a glob-
alized and securitized discourse and logic; a surveillance and monitoring regime linked to
rapid response; an increasingly empowered and authoritative World Health Organization;
and a biomedicalised vision of response where vaccines, rapid diagnostics, and therapeut-
ics are the primary components of an outbreak response. This current paradigm will be
demonstrated as dominating knowledge accumulation from disease outbreak response.
The chapter first begins with an outlining of the World Health Organization (WHO)
in order to explain the central role that WHO has played in advancing the GHSp and
in the vision the paradigm presents. Next, the chapter looks towards the discursive and
conceptualising elements and explores the globalized and securitized narrative and logic
that underpins the GHSp. Finally, the chapter looks towards the response elements of
the GHSp and describes the three pillars of a GHSp vision of disease outbreak response:
(i) syndromic surveillance for rapid response, (ii) an empowered and authoritative WHO,
and (iii) the rapid production and deployment of biomedical countermeasures.
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4.2 The World Health Organization’s evolving role in out-
break response
Before the Global Health Security paradigm is demonstrated, an introduction to the WHO
and its dynamic role in outbreak response is required. This is because WHO plays a central
role in the GHSp vision of outbreak response as well as having occupied a varyingly central
role in outbreak responses past. Furthermore, as we shall see in a later section, WHO has
played a key role in the dominance of the GHSp, particularly as it began its turn towards
Global Health Security as a discourse. It is for these reasons that this section focuses on
WHO’s historical roots and its role in previous outbreak responses.
The World Health Organization: Organization, History, and Roots
Established on April 7th 1948 (when it’s constitution came into force), WHO is an
autonomous executive agency of the United Nations (it’s parent organization being the
UN Economic and Social Council). It operates with a Secretariat (of which the Director-
General is head) and is governed by the World Health Assembly (WHA, composed of
health ministers from all 194 member states) which elects an Executive Board (34 tech-
nical experts elected for a period of three years) to oversee activities and advise the WHA
on policy and legislative matters.
WHO’s primary objective is “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible
level of health” (World Health Organization, 2014a). The primary objective, Article I of
it’s constitution, is clarified with a suite of specific functions laid out in Article II - of
relevance to this thesis are;
• “(a) to act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on all international
health work; ...
• (d) to furnish appropriate technical assistance and, in emergencies, ne-
cessary aid upon the request or acceptance of Governments; ...
• (g) to stimulate and advance work to eradicate epidemic, endemic, and
other diseases;” (World Health Organization, 2014a)
Though other functions are detailed around non-communicable disease priorities, these
three laid the groundwork for WHO’s central, coordinating role in disease outbreak re-
sponse. In essence, “the WHO has a legal obligation to its member states to assist them
in responding to, controlling, and ideally eliminating infectious disease” (Kamradt-Scott,
2015, p.21).
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The first priorities for WHO reveal a similar trend of communicable disease focus,
prioritising “malaria, tuberculosis, venereal disease, maternal and child health, nutrition,
and environmental hygiene” (BMJ, 1948, p.302). The priorities of WHO from it’s very
founding being headed up by a number of communicable disease threats (malaria and
tuberculosis are still endemic today, nearly 70 years later) demonstrates that its functions
were not merely constitutional but practical.
The focus of WHO on disease has its roots in a historical transition for global health
in the early 20th century; population medicine (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). Stemming from
Malthus (‘Malthusian crises’), the creation of germ theory, and the outbreak of Cholera,
19th Century medicine began a transition from a focus on treating individual maladies
to treating publics and environmental determinants of disease (Porter, 1999). Owing to
this transition to population medicine, and the numerous outbreaks which occurred in the
late-19th and early-20th Centuries, a number of disease outbreaks led to 14 various inter-
national sanitary conferences which emphasised the need for state responses to outbreaks
of disease and the eventual establishment of the Office Internationale d’Hygiene Publique
(OIHP) in 1907 (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
The 20th Century, however, also saw two World Wars which pushed the war death toll
above that of disease for the first time in history (Porter, 1999). In an effort to rebuild
populations after the First World War, the League of Nations established a Health Office
in 1922 to address the famine and disease that had been caused by the war (Kamradt-
Scott, 2015). Both the LNHO and OHIP would have their activities put on hold by the
Second World War and would eventually be subsumed by WHO (Sze, 1982).
The post-war period - in particular the San Francisco conference of 1946, at which the
idea of an international health organization was proposed - set the stage for the creation
of WHO (Sze, 1982). International Organizations were not uncommon in this period
(Mitrany, 1945). This stemmed from an acknowledgement of the economic and political
instability which appeared in Germany after the First World War, and a theorisation
that such instability was the cause of the Second World War (Mitrany, 1945). Utilising
International Organizations to help provide states with a measure of stability and social
services, the logic assumed that instability would be less likely and thus increase peace
and security between states. This rationale engenders WHO with foundational values
of health-for-security, an interesting similarity to the health-as-security turn in health
governance that we shall see later in this chapter (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
The World Health Organization from its outset was intended to be a central coordin-
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ating and directing authority for outbreak response. In a time when International Or-
ganizations were the central solution to political instability and health was moving to a
population-based model, the WHO satisfied a desire to protect the health of nations and
reduce the risk of trans-national epidemics. The next section examines WHO’s setting of
priorities and how its authority sits in an uneasy tension between expectations and reality.
WHO’s evolving priority-setting
Although WHO’s self-imbued authority to respond to disease outbreaks stems from its
constitution and identity as an international organization (IO), it by no means has the full
authority to act unilaterally. Priority-setting in the WHO is shaped by three factors which
constrain its capacity to fully exercise its authority; the governing role of the World Health
Assembly, the agenda-shaping power of Private Organizations’ voluntary contributions to
the WHO budget, and the decreasing proportion of WHO’s budget coming from Member
States’ assessed contributions. This section explores these three factors and how they
shape WHO’s priorities.
WHO’s constitution is the primary source of its self-imbued authority. The function
listed in Article 2, part (d) states that WHO is “to furnish appropriate technical assist-
ance and, in emergencies, necessary aid upon the request or acceptance of Government”
(World Health Organization, 2014a, p.2). This cements WHO’s directive to assist in health
emergencies, at least from a constitutional standpoint.
Additionally, the Director-General who receives a measure of individual authority in
epidemic disease responses. Article 28, part (i) of the WHO constitution allows the Exec-
utive Board to give the Director-General “emergency powers in the event of an epidemic
without the need for WHA approval” (World Health Organization, 2014a, p.9, emphasis
added). The article’s powers demonstrate not only that outbreaks are a priority for WHO
but that the Director-General can suspend the normal functioning of WHO to respond to
health emergencies, further demonstrating the intent that WHO be a primary response
agency.
The true authority of the WHO, however, stems from the delegated authority given to
it by member states of the World Health Assembly (WHA). WHA is made up of health
ministers of all countries that are signatories to WHO’s constitution. This signing of the
constitution delegates a measure of authority on WHO for setting policy on health matters
in accordance with the constitution. Furthermore, unlike many other IOs, WHO has the
authority to set policy without a need for subsequent ratification by states parties (Sze,
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1982).
Additional to the WHO’s constitutional and delegated authority, the International
Health Regulations (IHRs, formerly the International Sanitary Regulations) also imbue
large directing authority to WHO. The IHRs are a legally binding instrument of interna-
tional law which commits member states “to prevent, protect against, control and provide
public health response to the international spread of disease” (World Health Organization,
2005, p.10). Article 4 of the IHRs (as revised and passed by WHA in 2005) dictates that
“each state shall designate or establish a National IHR Focal Point ... [which] shall be
accessible at all times for communication with the WHO IHR Contact Points” (World
Health Organization, 2005, p.11, emphasis added). WHO, via the IHRs, therefore man-
dates an accessible and constant line of communication between States Parties and its
headquarters in Geneva, a considerable exercise of authority.
Further to this the IHRs mandate that “States Parties shall utilize existing national
structures and resources to meet their core capacity requirements under these regula-
tions, including with regard to: (a) their surveillance, reporting, notification, verification,
response and collaboration activities; and (b) their activities concerning designated air-
ports, ports and ground crossings” (World Health Organization, 2005, p.40). Not only do
the IHRs grant WHO monitoring authority over States Parties, but it enshrines a set of
core capacities that States Parties are required to implement in their own interiors.
WHO’s authority, however, is ultimately at the behest of its member states. The
members not only provide delegated authority but donate resources for WHO operations,
particularly in the event of a health emergency (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). This means that
the autonomy of WHO - and the agenda upon which WHO exercises that autonomy - is
intimately tied to that of its member states. On the one hand, this provides a mechanism
of accountability to prevent WHO from acting unilaterally. On the other, this resource-
constraint power is not distributed evenly across member states and so the priorities of
WHO can become aligned with those of the most prominent donor states.
In recent years, the control that budgetary constraints has on WHO actions has come
to light and affected the response to the Ebola Crisis. Over the almost-decade since the
onset of the financial crisis, assessed contributions from member states (mandatory dues
paid based on a country’s economic output) have been held at 0% nominal growth. WHO
therefore “had to cut nearly $1 billion from its proposed two-year budget, which today
stands at $3.98 billion” (Fink, 2014). This budget cut of around 20% has created deep
losses in personnel which cut emergency response personnel by almost two thirds and
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left the WHO unit responsible for communicable disease with only 52 regular employees
(Fink, 2014). This demonstrates that WHO’s authority and adherence to the priorities of
member states is not solely down to what WHO should or must do, but what it can do.
As a result of this, voluntary contributions (donations from partners which are not
mandatory) have moved from being 25% of WHO’s overall budget to 75%. Such a move
gives more resource-constraint power not to the member states but to those actors (be
they countries of private organizations) who can donate the most amounts to WHO.
In addition to simple resource-constraint power and influence, the monies which come
from private organizations often come tied to particular projects or priorities. For example,
money from the Global Alliance for Vaccine Innovation or the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) is generally allocated to either vaccine innovation or
AIDS/ TB/ Malaria projects, respectively 1. This inability to use 75% of its budget
for general projects or on its own agenda significantly reduces the WHO’s ability to be
responsive and flexible in response to emerging needs and shifting WHA priorities.
WHO, then, was established as the central coordinating agency for health matters,
particularly outbreak response. The authority of WHO to perform its activities is both
self-imbued constitutionally, but also delegated from the member states. WHO’s authority,
however, is not enough for it to operate; it also needs resources. This resource constraint
power exercised by the member states can align it with the priorities of those whose as-
sessed contributions are highest. Additionally, the increased proportion of WHO’s budget
taken up by private actors with money tied to particular projects severely limits WHO’s
ability to act responsively or proactively on global priorities. There exists, then, a tension
between an expectation of WHO’s authority and centrality in outbreak response and a
financial reality wherein flexible funds are decreasing and finances are increasingly tied to
external interests, limiting WHO capacity to respond to live up to its lofty expectations.
What we shall see in the remaining sections is how the WHO’s authority as well as the
expectations laid upon it have evolved over the last 20 years, from waning confidence in
WHO’s response to HIV/AIDS to a cementing of new, expanded authority and power for
WHO in the revised International Health Regulations.
1In 2017, GAVI voluntarily contributed 133m USD and GFATM voluntarily contributed 16m USD to
WHO; for GAVI 122m USD was specified (tied to particular projects) and for GFATM, all 16m USD was
specified (World Health Organization, 2018).
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4.3 Epidemic disease: A threat to life and livelihoods
Having detailed the history and role of WHO in outbreak responses, we now move onto
an explanation of the Global Health Security paradigm. First, this section explores the
development of the ’global health security’ narrative which has dominated the discourse
of 21st Century global health. In particular, this section explores the framing of infectious
disease as an existential threat on a global scale and its impact on the logic of disease
outbreak response. This narrative is the central framing for the Global Health Security
paradigm, and forms the basis of the pathways of knowledge accumulation that are pursued
and neglected.
Health security is a particular framing of global health that uses discursive techniques
called ‘speech acts’ to frame health issues as security issues (Buzan et al., 1998). A speech
act in this case is a linguistic device in which particular words and phrases have an action
beyond their literal meaning. 2 Buzan et al. (1998) put forward securitization as a speech
act which takes an issue and elevates it to a security issue, placing it beyond the normal
processes of politics and changing the nature of solutions. The speech act is performed by
noting a referent object (often the state), an existential threat to that object (in this case
a communicable disease outbreak), and exceptional emergency measures which are to be
taken in order to ameliorate such a threat. As such, when health became securitized it
was removed from a normal political space and gained priority as an emergent threat.
Global health is a different framing that has effectively become an epistemic community
over time (Harman and Wenham, 2018; Weisz et al., 2017; Lakoff, 2010). In this concep-
tualization, the ‘global health community’ effectively encompasses those actors which are
focused on the governance of public health such as WHO and the nation state. The logic
of global health, due to this, is inherently national and population oriented. This global
(public) health focus, it is argued, has complemented the rise in health security to produce
a focus on surveillance and governance mechanisms (Youde, 2012; Harman and Wenham,
2018).
This section explores the development of the Global Health Security framing, beginning
with its rise during the HIV/AIDS pandemic and its expansion in the new millennium. The
section then explores Global Health Security as a frame for the SARS epidemic in 2003,
the revisions to the International Health Regulations in 2005, and Pandemic Influenza
(H1N1) in 2009. Finally, the implications of this framing are explored, highlighting the
2The classic example is thanking someone by saying “thank you”; not only does the word have literal
meaning but by saying the word one is committing the act to which the word refers.
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stigmatisation and ‘othering’ of the infected, the national security logics of the framing,
and the increased use of military and security actors in outbreak responses.
4.3.1 Development of the Global Health Security Framing
Beginnings in HIV/AIDS (1980s-2000s)
A common root for the health security framing is a speech given by US Vice-President Al
Gore at the first meeting on the UN Security Council in January of the new millennium.
The speech detailed new, non-traditional dimensions of security, including; “The new
pandemics, laying waste to whole societies, and the emergence of new strains of old diseases
that are horrifyingly resistant to the antibiotics that protected the last three generations”
(Gore, 2000). These new dimensions of global security placed health issues squarely in the
frame as a threat to security. Additionally, not only was this meeting about HIV/AIDS in
Africa as a threat to international peace and security, but it was the first time a health issue
had been put before the UN Security Council (Peterson, 2002) - setting a precedent and
a clear message that health issues, particularly communicable diseases, had been elevated
to an international security threat (Elbe, 2002).
Additional to this, Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, declared January 2000 the
‘Month of Africa’ because it had “more than its fair share of the world’s problems” (United
Nations, 2000). Kofi Annan stressed that while AIDS was not a purely African problem
“nowhere else had AIDS become a threat to economic, social and political stability on
the scale that it now was in Southern and Eastern Africa” (United Nations, 2000). This
underlines a frequently cited implication of ’health security’ that the security provided is
for western states from the political instability and diseases of poorer states (Rushton,
2011; Davies, 2008; Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
Further, Peter Piot (one of the earliest responders to the original 1974 outbreak of
Ebola in Zaire and then Executive Director of UNAIDS) also discussed the political in-
stability created by the AIDS pandemic. Piot stated:
“war was the instrument of AIDS and rape was an instrument of war. Con-
flict and the resulting movements of people had fuelled the epidemic. Un-
doubtedly, however, the epidemic itself caused socio-economic crises which, in
turn, threatened political stability.” (United Nations, 2000)
Rhetoric as strong as this coming not from a politician but a highly respected scientist
brought the authority of science to the health security framing.
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The UNSC also passed a resolution (UNSCr 1308) in July 2000 which requested that
the Secretary-General order the development of HIV/AIDS knowledge dissemination pro-
grams for operations of peacekeeping in Africa. Thus further blurring the lines between
health and security, as well as fomenting a discursive tendency to frame health as a security
issues. The logic underlying the securitization of health is similar to the health-for-security
logic in that communicable diseases can create instability by altering the balance of power
between states (or within potential governments, in civil wars), change the course of con-
flicts through either deliberate use (biological weapons) or endemic disease (like HIV/AIDS
in Africa), and erode the legitimacy of social institutions (Peterson, 2002). The difference
here is that health is being framed as a security issue in its own right, rather than as a
contributing factor to future insecurity.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic was the first health security issue on a global scale. The
language of security enshrined the underlying logic: states were under threat from infec-
tious diseases - rich states were threatened by the diseases of poor states (Rushton, 2011;
Davies, 2008; Aldis, 2008; McInnes et al., 2012). From this moment onwards, the securit-
izing actors were the United Nations and scientists: the authority of health security as a
framing had risen from a US National Security objective to a global security object.
SARS and the Development of Health Security
Beginning in the Guangdong province of China, the SARS outbreak claimed the lives of
around 800 people and possibly infected over 8,000 individuals. The virus (SARS-CoV)
causes a potentially life-threatening form of pneumonia and was “unremarkable in certain
ways among infectious diseases” (Knoebler et al., 2004, p.2). Despite this profile, the
outbreak became an important event because of its novelty, its rate of spread, its origin,
and the reaction that states had to it.
The first aspect of the outbreak that made it remarkable was its novelty as a virus.
The pathogen, SARS-CoV, was previously unknown to science and required the rapid cre-
ation of symptomatic, diagnostic, containment, and treatment protocols (Knoebler et al.,
2004). Adding this to the emergence of HIV/AIDS (also previously unknown), and the
re-emergence of a number of infectious diseases (World Health Organization, 2002), there
was a push towards being prepared for any infectious disease rather than a specific set of
infectious diseases. This viewpoint of looking for particular arrays of syndromes, rather
than specific disease types, came to be known as syndromic surveillance and will be ex-
plored in more depth in the next section on the implications of SARS. This was, again, not
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wholly down to the outbreak, a critique of the International Health Regulations before the
outbreak was its limited scope with respect to infectious diseases (covering only Cholera,
Plague, and Yellow Fever) (Velimirovic, 1976), but this limitation was further crystallised
through the prism of the SARS outbreak (Davies, 2008).
The second important aspect of SARS is that it spread quickly. This is not to be
confused with a high person-to-person transmission rate, but that it spread from China to
Canada in four months (Davies, 2008). Such rapid spread of disease was placed squarely
on the shoulders of one new change in population mobility; international travel and trade.
The increasingly interconnected/ globalised world where diseases can spread across the
globe in a matter of days, weeks or months became the standard argument for future
policymaking with respect to outbreak response.3 As noted by Davies (2008), ’SARS
also demonstrated that relative geographical isolation was not a strong enough defence
in the face of an epidemic.’ [p.302]. This recognition that outbreaks could now spread
across continents rapidly cemented limiting this international spread as a central logic
to outbreak response; surveillance and rapid containment became the central tenets of
outbreak response.
Third, SARS started in a developed country which ran counter to all the previous
notions of epidemic disease being for ’poor’ countries - epidemics could not be contained to
one geographic region. As we saw with the characterization of AIDS as mostly an African
problem, there is an underlying logic of containment to health security which had been
advocating for ensuring disease was kept where it came from (Rushton, 2011). This often
came with the corollary that ’where diseases came from’ wasn’t the rich, western states
enacting health security but the poor, African states (Davies, 2008; Rushton, 2011; Aldis,
2008). SARS directly contradicted this underlying logic - it challenged the assumption
that poor countries were where emerging diseases were coming from, and showed that any
state could begin an epidemic.
Finally, SARS was widely recognised to have caused significant economic harm; one
estimate puts the global cost of SARS at US$54 billion (Lee and McKibbin, 2004). This
economic damage was largely centred on the countries most affected by the outbreak and,
in particular, caused problems for the outbreak response itself when it came to responding
in China. Due to the expected travel and trade bans that were likely to be put in place
after China confirmed the outbreak, causing large damage to the Chinese economy, the
3For example, it is found in the first page of the Revised International Health Regulations (World
Health Organization, 2005) and the opening paragraph of the 2007 World Health Report (World Health
Organization, 2007).
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Chinese government did not officially notify WHO upon the outset of the outbreak and
instead opted to attempt to respond internally (Fidler, 2004). What is interesting here is
that WHO was aware of the outbreak but was unable to activate response mechanisms due
to the lack of an official notification from within the country. This led to the increasing use
of non-state information in surveillance and verification of an outbreak (although official
notification must still come from the state, WHO can now act on non-official information)
and the inclusion of a “within 24-hours of detection” notification time-limit in the revised
IHRs World Health Organization (2005).
As the first major acute disease epidemic of the 21st Century, the SARS outbreak was
an important event in shaping global outbreak response. Four particular facets of the out-
break made it important: first, the novelty of the disease made disease-specific regulation
obsolete; second, the rapid spread of SARS emphasised the global interconnectedness and
that an outbreak in one state can quickly become a problem for others; third, the fact
that the epidemic started in a developed country flew in the face of the reigning assump-
tion that poorer states were the location of disease emergence; and fourth, the economic
damage (and fear of economic damage) can have real consequences for the response.
Solidifying Health Security: The revised International Health Regulations
Next we turn our attention to the revisions of the International Health Regulations which
were officially adopted in 2005. These revisions were an attempt at placing this new
discourse of Global Health Security into international law. Further to this, they obligated
member states to develop particular core capacities, enshrining not just the logic and
assumptions of Global Health Security into law, but the means by which insecurity would
be reduced.
The International Sanitary Conferences between 1851 and 1938 led not only to the
establishment of OIHP and eventually WHO, but the eventual passing of the International
Sanitary Regulations (ISRs) in 1951. The regulations enshrined the processes by which
states would ensure the sanitation of people and goods entering or exiting their borders.
Importantly, the regulations defined a list of six quarantinable diseases for whom special
attention and processes were required; Plague, Cholera, Yellow Fever, Smallpox, Typhus,
and Relapsing Fever.
The enactment of the ISRs did not last long before they needed to be amended in
order to keep up with new scientific developments (Kamradt-Scott, 2015), and so minor
amendments were made in 1955, 1956, 1960, and 1963. In 1967, however, the first major re-
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visions to the ISRs were circulated by the Expert Committee on International Quarantine
for comment by Member States. The subsequent regulations, renamed the International
Health Regulations, were passed in 1969 by the 22nd WHA. Amongst other things, these
revisions reduced the list of notifiable diseases to just four; cholera, plague, yellow fever,
and smallpox (which was removed after the successful eradication Smallpox) (Davies, 2008;
Gostin and Katz, 2016). Both the ISRs and IHRs were, however, noted as extensively un-
implemented and toothless (Kamradt-Scott, 2015); leading one commentator to question
the necessity of IHRs at all (Velimirovic, 1976). The lack of implementation of IHRs led
both to a lack of notification for disease outbreaks and excessive measures in restricting
travel and trade in the event of an outbreak - commentaries which exist to this day (Fidler,
2005; Kamradt-Scott, 2015; Velimirovic, 1976).
After numerous amendments and the problems with the ISRs persisting through to
the IHRs, a number of outbreaks in the early 1990s - cholera in Latin America, 1991;
plague in Surat, India, 1994; ebola in Zaire, 1995 - created further evidence that reform to
WHO’s outbreak policy and the IHRs was needed (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). One key factor
here, however, is the emergence of HIV/AIDS and the inability of the IHRs (1969) to deal
with its spread because it recognised only three diseases as notifiable and thus additional
policy and regulation needed to be created to tackle the epidemic. Additionally, as referred
to earlier, UNAIDS’ creation in 1996 was largely perceived to be down to WHO’s lack of
leadership (Cleves, 2008). Although the IHR revision process was begun prior to UNAIDS’
formation, the critiques formed a clear backdrop to the decision to revise the IHRs. These
were not, however, sufficient alone; Kamradt-Scott (2015) argues that a shifting security
landscape - the end of the Cold War and introduction of new security threats, like disease,
as described earlier - aided in arguments that a reinforced and more robust global health
system was needed. Therefore, in 1995, the 48th World Health Assembly passed resolution
WHA48.7 Revision and updating of the International Health Regulations.
Revisions were not passed until 2005. The revisions made three changes whose im-
portance we will explore later in this section:
1. The scope of the regulations was expanded from dealing with only Cholera, Plague,
and Yellow Fever to “illness or medical condition, irrespective of origin or source, that
presents or could present significant harm to humans” (World Health Organization,
2005, p.7)
2. The ability of WHO to act upon information not provided by States Parties was
shifted to WHO “shall offer to collaborate with the State Party concerned ... if the
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State Party does not accept the offer of collaboration, WHO may, when justified
by the magnitude of the public health risk, share with other States Parties the
information available to it” (World Health Organization, 2005, p.13)
3. The Director-General was granted the power to declare a public health emergency
of international concern (PHEIC) which is “an extraordinary event which is de-
termined, as provided in these regulations: (i) to constitute a public health risk to
other States through international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require
an international response” (World Health Organization, 2005, p.9)
The decade-long revision process is put largely down to the lack of political attention
and will towards the revisions from Member States. David Heymann, director of the
Expert Committee for the revisions, quoted in Kamradt-Scott (2015) notes that “delays
came because of a lack of feeling the urgency of the revision process among the member
states” (Kamradt-Scott, 2015, p.110). Furthermore, IHRs (2005) shift from focussing on
particular diseases of concern, to viewing syndromes as the focus (a shift whose impact
was to be explored earlier, and will be explored again later). This shift required a large
amount of persuasion before any trial of the new syndromic surveillance could begin, thus
delaying the revisions.
A second reason for the delay surrounds the measures that member states take in
response to an outbreak in another state. While member states desired the ability to
retain their sovereignty and choose measures to protect their borders (Fidler, 2005), these
measures inhibited response mechanisms (as was seen with China’s reticence to report
SARS in 2002). In other words, while states were impressed with how WHO handled
China’s actions during SARS, they were also nervous about WHO doing so to their own
actions should they deem it in their national interest to contravene IHRs - this is likely
why the ability to call a PHEIC and issue temporary recommendations (particularly on
travel and trade) require an Emergency Committee be convened (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
Additionally, the stepping down of WHO Director-General Nakajima in 1998 gave way for
Gro Harlem Brundtland whose agenda did not prioritise infectious diseases and further
delayed the revisions of the IHRs (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
By 2003, the IHRs encompassed three quarantinable diseases whose mere presence in a
country activated a chain of response mechanisms designed to protect global public health.
Over the previous 30 years, the HIV/AIDS pandemic had raged and eroded confidence in
WHO’s capacity to be a leader in global health. The process, initiated in 1995, to revise
the IHRs had a number of sticking points which mostly related to the lack of prioritisation,
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both on the part of the Director-General and the States. These sticking points were fast
unstuck by the emergence of SARS.
In many ways the IHRs themselves are modelled on the lessons learned from the SARS
response (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014). For example: the IHRs mandate that
states notify WHO of outbreaks within 24 hours; IHRs explicitly note a desire to limit the
impact of restrictions to travel and trade; and IHRs allow for the use of non-state sources
of information to verify outbreaks (World Health Organization, 2005). Each of these
changes are seemingly in response to the fact that China closely guarded its information
of SARS cases and refused to notify WHO because of fears of international travel and trade
restrictions which would cause virtual economic sanctions (Fidler, 2004, 2005): mandating
fast notification speaks to the delay in notification from China; the explicit desire to limit
the impact of restrictions of travel and trade speaks to the fear which motivated China’s
reticence to notify; and the ability to use non-state sources in verifying outbreaks speaks
to the fact that WHO used similar sources and the threat of release to coerce China into
revealing the extent of the SARS outbreak (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014; Fidler,
2004, 2005; Knoebler et al., 2004).
Three changes seen in the 2005 revisions have implications for our purposes. First,
the revisions eliminated the specific pathogens for which WHO must be notified (Cholera,
Plague, and Yellow Fever) and shifted to a holistic view of notification. This expansion
of the IHRs to cover non-specific and flexibly defined health risks represents a signi-
ficant expansion of WHO’s role in global outbreak response (Fidler, 2005). This picks
up, importantly, on the two major disease outbreaks which impacted the IHR revisions;
HIV/AIDS and SARS. Both of which were new diseases that took valuable time to find
the specific aetiological agent - time that could have been used for response, as well as
information gathering (Kamradt-Scott, 2015). The shift to syndromic surveillance, as ex-
plored previously with respect to SARS, reflects a broadening of the scope of IHRs to
all infectious diseases that fit a given syndromic type, rather than to specific diseases
themselves (Roberts and Elbe, 2017).
A second expansion of WHO authority is that WHO can now act upon non-state
sources of information. While WHO must offer to collaborate with the state first, if
the state refuses the offer “WHO may, when justified by the magnitude of the public
health risk, share with other States Parties the information available” (World Health
Organization, 2005, p.13). WHO, then, is not only now authoritative over a much more
broadly defined ‘syndromic surveillance’ regime (Roberts and Elbe, 2017) but it can do so
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outside of the reports of state apparatus. This expansion of WHO authority is not only
a reaction to a perceived lesson from SARS (Fidler, 2005), but it is an expansion of the
surveillance rationale typical of Global Health (Harman and Wenham, 2018).
Finally, WHO authority (and the authority of the Director-General) was further ex-
panded within the revised IHRs through the creation of the Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC) classification. A binary measure whose ultimate decision
authority is the Director-General herself, a PHEIC is an ’extraordinary event which is de-
termined .. (i) to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international
spread of disease and (ii) to potentially require a coordinated international response.’
(World Health Organization, 2005, p.9). The declaration of a PHEIC is designed as a
mechanism for attracting political momentum and allowing for the introduction of tem-
porary recommendations by the Director-General. In order to perform this function, IHRs
do mandate that the Director-General put together an emergency committee whose func-
tion is to make recommendations to the Director-General as to whether a PHEIC should
be called and what temporary recommendations should entail; the Director-General is
under no legal obligation under IHR to fully comply with the recommendations of the
emergency committee (World Health Organization, 2005). The PHEIC is an additional
example of WHO’s expanding authority because its binary nature implicitly raises certain
outbreaks above others in terms of political attention and response (Fidler, 2005).
This function has, in recent cases, caused some controversy for WHO (and Margaret
Chan, the only WHO Director-General to have called, or had the power to call, a PHEIC
to date); WHO was criticised4 for calling a PHEIC too early in response to 2009’s H1N1
Influenza epidemic (criticism which the 2011 IHR Review Committee dismissed (IHR
Review Committee, 2011)), in 2014 WHO was criticised for not calling a PHEIC sooner
for the onset of the Ebola Crisis, and again in 2014 WHO did not call a PHEIC in response
to the Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) epidemic in South Korea and various
states in the Middle East. In recent times, suggestions that the PHEIC’s binary nature
should be changed for a more progressive or graded scale have surfaced due to the varied
critiques (Moon et al., 2015). This would bring the PHEIC more in line with the Influenza
Phase scale which caused some contention in 2009 when a PHEIC was called, despite the
outbreak remaining at Phase 5 (not Phase 6, the maximum on the scale) (Kamradt-Scott,
4For examples of the European Union’s criticisms see Council of the European Union (2011); European
Parliament (2011), for reporting on the WHO response see Jack and Dombey (2009); Stein (2010); En-
serink (2010); O’Dowd (2010); Watson (2011a), and for broader examinations of the outbreak’s impact see
Kamradt-Scott & colleagues 2011; 2012; 2012; 2013.
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2015).
The counter argument to this is that the flexibility in the temporary recommendations
made as part of calling a PHEIC. This is evidenced by the difference in the temporary
recommendations made the Ebola Crisis declaration and the Zika Virus declaration in
2016 (World Health Organization, 2016b, 2014b); while the Ebola Crisis PHEIC called
for heads of affected states to declare national emergencies and implement exit screen-
ing at international airports (World Health Organization, 2014b), the Zika Virus declar-
ation called for no travel or trade restrictions, increased and standardized surveillance
for Guillain-Barre Syndrome & foetal microcephaly,5 and reducing the risk of exposure
through general mosquito-bite prevention (World Health Organization, 2016b). Though
these recommendations demonstrate fundamental, qualitative differences in the two out-
breaks and should rightly be different, they do also demonstrate a measure of flexibility
in the function that a PHEIC can have. This demonstrates a significant amount of dis-
cretion and authority placed in the Office of the Director-General, particularly when one
considers that the role of the EC in the IHRs is advisory and there is no need to follow the
advice given (although the publication of the emergency committee reports gives a strong
normative pressure to do so).
In addition to the expansion of WHO authority, the IHRs(2005) have guidelines and
regulations regarding notification and response. These capacities are arranged at three
levels (World Health Organization, 2005): at the community/ primary health level states
must be able to detect events of disease/death above expected levels in a particular tempo-
spatial location, report essential information 6 to the appropriate level of healthcare re-
sponse (depending on organizational structure), and immediately implement preliminary
infection controls. At intermediate levels, a state must be able to confirm the status of
reports and support/implement additional measures, and assess the urgency 7 of events to
report to the national level. At the national level, states must be able to assess all reports
within 48 hours and notify WHO immediately (through the National IHR Focal Point)
if deemed urgent. For response, national level capacities are; determination of control
measures required; provision of on-site assistance through specialised staff, lab analysis,
5The two syndromes whose incidence showed a marked increase in areas with Zika Virus transmission
and the main reason that increased Zika transmission became worrisome (World Health Organization,
2016b)
6clinical descriptions, lab results, risk profiles, morbidity and mortality statistics, conditions affecting
spread, and health measures implemented
7serious public health impact and/or unusual or unexpected incidence with a high probability of cross-
border spread
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and logistics; directly linked to senior health and other officials to approve and implement
containment and control measures, and direct liaison with other government departments;
establish robust communication between key operational facilities and WHO technical
guidance both within-state and between states; creation and maintenance of emergency
response plans to include multidisciplinary/multisectoral teams; all on a 24-hour basis.
These core capacities outline what a state must be able to do in order to detect, assess,
notify, and respond to an infectious disease outbreak. Fidler (2004) notes that this is a
much higher burden of capacity-building than had come before in the earlier ISRs/IHRs.
This expansion in the obligations that states have to one another now expands further
than simply notifying one another of outbreaks but to having the capacity to respond
fully, a burden many of the poorer states lack the financial and human capital to bear.
The revisions of the International Health Regulations, then, shaped global health by
increasing the central authority of WHO (through expansion in the scope of the IHRs,
granting authority to use non-state sources, and through the creation of the classification of
PHEIC over which the Director-General has considerable discretion), and by dramatically
increasing the obligations that states parties have to one another through large increases
in required core capacities.
Pandemic Influenza
Since the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic, an influenza pandemic has occupied the minds
of many policymakers, with Kamradt-Scott noting, “of all communicable diseases, pan-
demic influenza probably remains the most feared by politicians, policymakers, and health
practitioners alike” (Kamradt-Scott, 2012, p.90). This prominent position in the psyche
of the global health community led to the construction of the 2009 ‘swine flu’ pandemic as
a huge health threat. This, complemented by the recent introduction of the revised IHRs,
rapid detection and notification, and the rapid production of a vaccine made it the perfect
candidate for fully confirming the assumptions of the Global Health Security paradigm.
Beginning in Veracruz, La Gloria, Mexico, the 2009 pandemic of H1N1 (Swine) In-
fluenza was first confirmed by CDC’s notification of WHO (under the IHRs) on April
18th 2009 (Chan, 2009). By this point in time, the virus had already spread from Ver-
acruz to Mexico City, the US, and Canada. As part of its responsibilities under IHR,
Mexico openly shared epidemiological data with WHO and consistently reported its own
response measures. This allowed WHO to assume its role as a coordinator and technical
policy advisor by pooling and sharing epidemiological data and providing real-time policy
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recommendations (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
As in previous outbreaks, the IHRs were largely ignored in terms of travel and trade
bans; over 20 countries responded by placing travel and trade bans on pork and pork
products after WHO referred to the pandemic as ’Swine Flu’ in an attempt to cut off
any references to it as ’Mexican flu’ and cause undue damage to the Mexican economy
(Kamradt-Scott, 2015). Some countries (including Egypt whose importance we shall ex-
plore later) actually went so far as to cull all pigs in the country (The Telegraph, 2009).
The actions of these few countries were reminiscent of Director-General (DG) Chan’s own
actions in 1997 when all poultry in Hong Kong were culled in response to an outbreak of
H5N1 (Avian) influenza - a move which was largely lauded as successful in containing the
outbreak (Rosenthal, 1997). This made it difficult for DG Chan to criticise these countries
(among other factors).
Under the IHRs, DG Chan convened an IHR emergency Committee (EC) on 25th
April 2009 to assess the outbreak’s pandemic potential (Chan, 2009). The EC recommen-
ded an increase of the phase of pandemic alert be increase from phase 3 to phase 4 and
then, two days later, to phase 5.8 In response to the raising of the alert level to phase 5,
designed to indicate that a pandemic is imminent, many questioned the appropriateness
of this measure and whether WHO was simply blowing the outbreak out of proportion
(European Parliament, 2011; Council of the European Union, 2011; Watson, 2011b; Jack
and Dombey, 2009; Stein, 2010). The pandemic phase guidelines were subsequently pulled
from the WHO website and, late in 2009, Dr. Keiji Fukuda (then, Director of WHO’s
Influenza Programme, now Assistant Director General for Health, Security, and Environ-
ment) unveiled new pandemic phase definitions which included severity assessments (phase
5; multiple countries in one WHO region) as well as wording to describe a pandemic as
imminent (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012).
After this, two further ECs were commissioned by the Director-General on the 27th
of April and 5th June, respectively, the first of which did not approve a raise to phase 6
(full pandemic) but did note that there should be announcements of severity in the daily
briefings that WHO was holding (World Health Organization, 2009a). The second EC
was given information on the now 28,100 reported cases and advised that the DG take
8The phase alert system of WHO ascribes particular phases to outbreaks of influenza. Current guidance
(revised in 2009 in response to the events explained in this paragraph) places phases 1-3 as predominantly
animal infections and few human infections, phase 4 as sustained human-to-human transmission, and
phases 5&6 as widespread human infection where 5 is regionally located and 6 is cross-regional and a full
pandemic. (WHO, 2015a)
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the step to call the first ever Public Health Emergency of International Concern (World
Health Organization, 2009b). From this point, WHO continued to play its classical role of
intelligence coordination and policy advice and sought not to be overly prescriptive with
its advice, noting that measures should be implemented as opposed to directing activities
which it has the power and authority to do (through both its constitution and the revised
IHRs) (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
Largely, the IHRs are noted to have functioned successfully in the response to pan-
demic (H1N1) influenza (Katz, 2009; IHR Review Committee, 2011; Kamradt-Scott and
Lee, 2011; Kamradt-Scott, 2015). This view is largely in response to the epidemiological
success, however from a political perspective its success was marred by an investigation
by the British Medical Journal (Cohen and Carter, 2010) alleging that there was miscon-
duct occurring within the Emergency Committee (Kamradt-Scott and Lee, 2011). When
the emergency committee was first convened, DG Chan did not release the identities of
the members and the BMJ (Cohen and Carter, 2010) alleged that this was because EC
members had close ties and conflicts with pharmaceutical companies and thus were over-
stating the dangers of the pandemic in order to push states into stockpiling antivirals and
vaccines (Elbe et al., 2014a). These allegations were refuted by DG Chan and she released
the identity of the EC members (World Health Organization, 2010). This incident - in
addition to the confusion over phase 5 pandemic designations, removing the definition,
and then changing that definition mid-outbreak - levelled a large amount of criticism at
WHO’s openness and transparency in responding to the outbreak (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
This pandemic was not only the first test for IHRs but also the catalyst for the first
ever IHR Review Committee (Davies et al., 2015). Two further IHR Review Committees
have been convened: the second in 2014 as a review of the second set of extensions for
member states to implement IHR; and the third in 2016 reviewing the implementation of
IHR in the Ebola Crisis. The IHR Review of the H1N1 pandemic, chaired by Professor
Harvey Fineberg, was requested by the Executive Board in January 2010 and tasked with
assessing the response to pandemic H1N1 influenza, assess the functioning of the IHR,
and to identify lessons learned. Overall the comments of the committee were positive and
reflected a general commendation for the global response to H1N1 and WHO’s actions,
though some criticisms were made (IHR Review Committee, 2011).
The lessons identified fell under five main themes; global health’s core values, the
unpredictability of influenza, how H5N1 expectations shaped preparedness, WHO’s dy-
namic tensions between being a normative leader but also bound to its member states,
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and the limitations of the local systems in responding to a global event. The first point
of note is that the report effectively absolves WHO of the earlier accusation that the
EC decision was motivated by pharmaceutical company interests; noting that ’[a]lthough
confidentiality represented an understandable effort to protect the members from external
pressures, this paradoxically fed suspicions that the Organization had something to hide’
(IHR Review Committee, 2011, p.16).
The report is generally positive about the functioning of the IHRs too, its first summary
conclusion states that “IHRs helped make the world better prepared to cope with public
health emergencies” (IHR Review Committee, 2011, p.10). In spite of this, the first four
recommendations made by the committee relate to the global health norm setting by IHR
and how implementation is not sufficient:
1. Accelerate implementation of core capacities required by the IHR
2. Enhance the WHO Event Information Site
3. Reinforce evidence-based decisions on traffic and trade
4. Ensure necessary authority and resources for all National IHR Focal Points
The prominence of these four recommendations as the first set made by the committee
reinforces the perception that IHRs are important for the functioning of disease surveil-
lance and response and demonstrates the committee’s anxiety around IHR non-compliance
(Davies et al., 2015). In particular the recommendations suggest that WHO should do
more to engage states in building capacities to comply.
The second tranche of recommendations is aimed more at WHO’s response to the
outbreak as opposed to the function of IHRs (IHR Review Committee, 2011). Again,
the response is generally positive but some criticisms remain. Recommendations 5-11 in
this tranche focus on WHO internal response capacity (recommendation 5), Emergency
Committee appointments (recommendation 6), pandemic assessment, guidance, and doc-
umentation (recommendations 7-9), communications and transparency (recommendation
10), and vaccine distribution (recommendation 11).
Third, the committee recommendations focussed around the notion that “The world is
ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained,
and threatening public health emergency” (IHR Review Committee, 2011, p.23). In par-
ticular the recommendations suggested the establishment of a ‘public health reserve corps’
(p.24, recommendation 12), the creation of a contingency fund for emergencies (p.25, re-
commendation 13), create an agreement on sharing samples and accessing vaccines (p.25,
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recommendation 14), create a large scale influenza research programme (p.28-29, recom-
mendation 15). What is particularly interesting here are the parallels seen between these
recommendations and those of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel which equally calls for
the creation of a contingency fund (with a capitalization of US$100million) and a WHO
Centre for Emergency Response and Preparedness (World Health Organization, 2015e).
From its initial boosting at the January 2000 meeting of the UN Security Council
through to its confirmation by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, Global Health Security has
become the dominant framing for understanding health on a global scale. In the HIV/AIDS
pandemic it began its sharp upward trajectory by being cited as the cause for much
of the instability in the African continent. Then with SARS it entered the developed
world and over-shadowed sovereignty concerns to emphasis a globally interconnected world,
vulnerable to health threats from anywhere. The revisions of the IHRs in 2005 enshrined,
in international law, the language, logic, and means of Global Health Security. Then its
first test in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic demonstrated that it could not only be used to frame
threats effective, but also to respond effectively.
4.3.2 Implications of the Global Health Security Framing
Having demonstrated above how the Global Health Security (GHS) framing developed
over time, we can now turn to its implications. The discourse of GHS is not simply a
way of speaking, but it shapes the way we understand and think about disease outbreaks.
This section looks at the implications of the GHS framing for our understandings and
perceptions of disease outbreaks, looking towards its effects on the scale of problems (local,
national, global), its stigmatising effects, and its focus on a national means of response.
A useful example of the effects that securitization has on politics and governance comes
from a study on environmental security (Hameiri and Jones, 2013). In their study of
environmental security governance in Southeast Asia, Hameiri and Jones (2013) note that
by recognising an issue as a non-traditional security threat, the perspective (and therefore
governance) of that issue becomes recognised as trans-national in nature. Extending this
to health, one can see that the HIV/AIDS pandemic not only directly contributed to a
global perspective on health - as described above - but through its securitization, indirectly
pushed health onto the trans-national agenda.
This transnationalization, however, is not the sole reason that health security is an
important shift in outbreak responses. The securitization of health has led to a number of
other changes which have been studied and critiqued (Elbe, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011;
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Elbe et al., 2014a,b; Ingram, 2010; King, 2002; Peterson, 2002; Aldis, 2008; Rushton,
2011; McINNES and LEE, 2006; McInnes and Rushton, 2012, ). One key figure in the
development of theory with regards to the securitization of health is Stefan Elbe9 whose
work pertains to the global politics of disease and has focussed on the turn towards health
security since its beginnings. In particular, Elbe’s early work focussed on the HIV/AIDS
pandemic’s role in securitization (Elbe, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008). Many of his works point
out that securitization has played a role in attracting attention to global health issues,
including subsequent political power, and financial and materiel resources (Elbe, 2006).
Framing an issue as a security threat does, as Elbe notes, bring a number of challenges
along with all the attention (Elbe, 2005, 2006). These challenges occur on both a macro
and micro scale. One macro scale challenge is the increasing involvement of military and
security actors in outbreak response and planning. As an issue becomes more entangled
with the narratives and activities of security actors, Buzan et al. (1998) argue, so too do
those security actors become increasingly involved in the policy, planning, and operational
activities surrounding the issue. In the case of health, this is starkly apparent when one
considers that UNSCr 1308 directly stipulates the involvement of peacekeeping forces in
health activities (UN Security Council, 2000). This does not preclude the fact that those
peacekeeping forces would be in Africa regardless of their new health role, but does signify
an extension of the military repertoire to include civilian health action. This involvement
of military actors in health issues is not a wholly new phenomenon; the impacts of Spanish
Influenza in 1917 on the troops deployed in Europe led to the formation of surveillance
and epidemiology for influenza by the US Armed Forces (Watterson and Kamradt-Scott,
2015). However, as we look towards Ebola, we see a different pattern emerging where
militaries are called to aid overwhelmed civilian infrastructures. This is evidenced by
Medecins Sans Frontieres calling for the involvement of military actors in the response to
the Ebola Crisis (Liu, 2014), the first time in the organization’s history. Additionally in
Liberia, 3000 US Armed Forces troops were deployed to help USAID (the US Department
of States’ Humanitarian Aid agency) in their efforts, and in Sierra Leone the Minister of
Defence was appointed director of the National Ebola Response Centre (Kamradt-scott
et al., 2015).
A further macro-scale impact is the increased use of national logics for collective ac-
tion. Sara Davies (Davies, 2008) argues the origination of the securitization framing in the
United States - followed by the EU, Australia, and Canada - threatened the global nature
9Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Global Health Policy, School of
Global Studies, University of Sussex
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of WHO’s role by providing a rationale for states to protect their own borders and look
towards state-centric, protectionist solutions for disease outbreaks. This is evidenced by
Canada’s creation, in 1997, of the Global Public Health Information Network (GPHIN)
which is a web-based system that collates online information concerning outbreaks. WHO,
in response to the rising use of the securitization framing (and in the midst of revising
the IHRs) created the Global Outbreak and Alert Response Network (GOARN) (Davies,
2008). GOARN built on GPHIN between 2000 and 2002 to add verification and field re-
sponse mechanisms. Still, GOARN drew heavily on this national security model; not only
was GOARN built upon a Canadian surveillance mechanism for health security but full
funding for GOARN’s Strategic Health Operations Centre in WHO headquarters, Geneva
was provided by the United States (Davies, 2008), further reinforcing the perspective that
even so-called global efforts are state-focused. An additional action to regain authority and
control, as we shall see later in the chapter, was the revisions made to the International
Health Regulations which both revised a framework which was widely acknowledged as
failing but also re-emphasised WHO’s centrality to outbreak response.
According to Sarah Dry (2010), this logic of state security has had an impact on the
perceptions of causality for outbreaks and subsequently shifted the way responses are
mounted. The logic presented, largely by Western states, creates an acute interpretation
of causality which focusses on early warning systems and fast-twitch responses; this, Dry
(2010) posits, sits in opposition to a more long-term causality which focuses on the root
causes of zoonotic disease, long time-frame population and epidemiological tracking, and
the building of health systems resilient enough to treat patients as they come. What
the securitization of SARS saw, then, was an increased weight placed on surveillance for
response as opposed to data for health.
A third impact on this scale is the focus on epidemic diseases that securitisation can
engender. For many states, the most feared threats to national biosecurity are the acute,
high-impact diseases or pathogens that could be used as a bioweapon; diseases which
spread fast, cause fear and harm, and require rapid response (Elbe, 2011; Rushton, 2011).
On the other hand, many of the developing nations have large problems with endemic
disease, non-communicable diseases, and diseases of poverty; all of which gain less atten-
tion in policymaking when epidemic disease is elevated as a significant threat to national
security (Elbe, 2011; Rushton, 2011). Additionally, this focus on disease as a threat shifts
action towards surveillance, detection, and response as opposed to noting possibilities for
prevention or reducing risk of an outbreak occurring, such as; mapping animal and human
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migrations to detect risk zones and providing basic health infrastructure and services to de-
veloping countries (all-round health infrastructure as opposed to health systems designed
to detect and respond to an outbreak) (Davies, 2008; Dry, 2008).
Finally, the securitisation of health has also created some micro, social level issues
which have impacted the lives of those infected. One such example is the stigmatisation
of those infected (Elbe, 2011); particularly in Africa, the securitisation of HIV/AIDS has
painted those living with the illness as “dangerous ‘outsiders’ and a threat to society”
(Elbe, 2006, p.130). this has created difficulties for the NGOs in the region attempting
to engender tolerance and help sufferers of the disease. Additionally, in the case of the
Ebola Crisis, a cocktail of fear, government mistrust, and stigma led not only to healthcare
workers being attacked, but survivors of Ebola being ejected from their homes by their
landlord, rejected from their communities, and even being rejected by loved ones (Beyan,
2015; Wilkinson and Leach, 2015).
4.4 Responses to Insecurity
This section focuses on the attempts to ameliorate the insecurity constructed through the
Global Health Security framing. First, surveillance expansions govern global public health
through counting and locating outbreaks and syndromes, while reinforcing the containment
logic inherent in the GHS framing. Second, through expanding WHO authority and scope
to leverage the action of states for reporting and responding as well as coordinating and
directing collective action in responses. Finally, through the rapid production of biomedical
countermeasures (vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics) as fast, technological responses
to the social issues inherent in disease outbreak responses. This section takes each of these
pillars of the GHS paradigm in turn.
4.4.1 Outbreak Surveillance
Surveillance has become an important part of outbreak response (Youde, 2012). Its prac-
tice involves states, institutions, and doctors reporting incidence of disease to WHO and
labs so that the data can be compiled and outbreaks identified. The central utility of sur-
veillance in the Global Health Security paradigm is for rapid responses to contain disease
- as opposed to using surveillance for monitoring trends in migration, non-communicable
disease, and animal migration (all indirect social determinants of disease). The focus here
is on how surveillance has moved from a simple epidemiological tool to a global regime
(Youde, 2012).
91
In addition to the securitisation, we return to the reluctance of China to officially
notify WHO of the outbreak. According to Fidler (2004, 2005, 2007), the SARS outbreak
(and this incident in particular) signalled a change in something very fundamental about
the world order; post-Westphalian geopolitics. During the Thirty Years’ War (seen as the
bloodiest war to date at the time), 194 states organised a peace conference in 1644 to end
the violence and subsequently signed a treaty (after four years’ negotiation) in Westphalia,
Germany on October 24th 1648. What the treaty of Westphalia enshrined was, in effect,
state sovereignty; the affairs internal to a state’s borders were the responsibility solely of
that state and no other state could interfere. As described by Henry Kissinger (Kissinger,
2015) and Richard Haass (Haass, 2017), this Westphalian world order has been slowly
morphing over the last century into a world order where connectedness to internal affairs
of other states becomes a foreign policy objective as part of the maintenance of peace,
security, and human welfare.
This transformation became visible in the global health arena with the arrival of
SARS. A particular example used by Fidler (2004) to demonstrate this is the use of
non-governmental information sources as confirmation of an outbreak in China. In the
beginning of the outbreak, China was reluctant to officially notify WHO of SARS, viewing
the response as something which is part of the state’s internal affairs and fearing travel and
trade restrictions (as well as the resulting economic harm). WHO, however, was unable to
activate its response mechanisms unless incidences were officially reported. As such, WHO
used non-state information to pressure China into releasing data under the threat of other
states restricting travel and trade because of the outbreak. This leveraging of non-state
information is one example of this shift towards a disregarding of state sovereignty for the
common global benefit.
This move towards syndromic surveillance, as pushed forward by the three facets of
the outbreak described in the previous section, has been studied in the long-term by
Stephen Roberts and Stefan Elbe (Roberts and Elbe, 2017). Roberts and Elbe study the
evolution of three syndromic surveillance systems (ProMED, GPHIN, and HealthMap)
to demonstrate not only an increasing reliance on surveillance systems but an increasing
reliance on algorithmic data processing; in moving from state-only verification to using
non-state reporting sources, an excess of information is created and algorithms are re-
quired to process this data into formats that are usable for response. This move, the
authors argue, signified a shift in the role that knowledge plays in the governance of
health; shifting from knowledge that directly finds outbreaks (through diagnostic tests,
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virology/bacteriology/parasitology, and standard scientific measures) to a more ‘surface’
mode of knowledge which uses signs and proxies as the markers for potential outbreaks
(Roberts and Elbe, 2017). This systemic use of algorithms in surveillance, then, bolsters
Dry’s argument of early-warning and fast response as the focus of governance; algorithmic
syndromic surveillance creates a 24-hour, 7-days-a-week picture of where outbreaks may
crop up and allows for fast-twitch response.
Surveillance, then, has evolved from a simple epidemiological tool into a global regime
(Youde, 2012). First, through the progressive expansion in who can provide data for
surveillance through the revised IHRs allowing WHO to act upon information from non-
state sources. Second, through the subordination of state sovereignty under global interests
through leveraging surveillance data. Finally, through the expansion of what is monitored
by shifting from a taxonomy of diseases known to a taxonomy of syndromes, a much more
expansive definition of health which allows for multiple aetiologies for symptom profiles.
4.4.2 Expanding WHO Authority
Since its establishment in 1948, WHO has had a significant measure of authority in global
public health, imbued by its constitution to coordinate and direct international health
activities - particularly in health emergencies - and being an international organization
which can directly affect member states’ policy without ratification. In the latter half of the
20th Century, however, WHO’s leadership in outbreak response was in crisis. Its activities
(or lack thereof) in response to HIV/AIDS had spurred the creation of UNAIDS, and
outbreaks of Plague and Ebola in India and Africa, respectively, had shaken confidence in
WHO’s capacity and willingness to act (Cleves, 2008). In an attempt to recapture some of
its authority and to re-establish its legitimacy, WHO Director-General Hiroshi Nakajima
requested the WHA begin the process of revising the International Health Regulations in
1995.
This process of revising the IHRs took a full decade because of, among other factors,
a lack of expediency or sense of urgency on the part of members states (Kamradt-Scott,
2015). This friction however was soon unstuck by the onset of the SARS outbreak; sud-
denly a developed country, a global travel and trade hub no less, was infected with a
deadly virus which had never been previously encountered by modern science (Curley and
Thomas, 2004; Elbe, 2008).
In beginning months of the outbreak, a clear shift in WHO’s authority over outbreak
response became apparent. China was reticent to officially report SARS to WHO for fear
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of the economic and reputation damage that an outbreak could cause (Fidler, 2004). This
was in spite of WHO being fully aware of the outbreak, and impeded action on the part
of WHO (which was not empowered to act until an official report was made by the state).
WHO, however, was able to threaten with ’naming and shaming’ China in order to coerce
the state into releasing an official report. This use of non-state information and the power
to publicly normatively shame a state transformed the notion of state sovereignty and
allowed WHO to supersede a state’s sovereignty (Fidler, 2004).
Using non-state sources and shifting from specific pathogens to syndrome surveillance
were not the only changes that SARS spurred, however. SARS also created enough polit-
ical will for the IHR revisions to go forward (Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2014), and
so in 2005 the revised International Health Regulations were passed by the WHA (World
Health Assembly, 2005). These revised IHRs - enshrined in binding international law -
codified the authority extensions that WHO had performed in the SARS outbreak. Not
only this, but the revised IHRs gave WHO additional power in the form of constant con-
tact with National IHR Focal Points, mandated core capacities for each member state, and
the authority of the Director-General to call a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern and set emergency measures and recommendations (World Health Organization,
2005).
The IHRs entered into force in 2007, but did not face their first large scale pandemic
test until 2009 when pandemic of H1N1 influenza hit Mexico. According to the 2011 IHR
Review Committee 2011, the IHRs performed well in the H1N1 pandemic (Katz, 2009).
However WHO did have some problems with respect to suspicions that WHO’s Emergency
Committee had ties to pharmaceutical companies and thus overstates the extent of the
epidemic (Cohen and Carter, 2010; Kamradt-Scott and Lee, 2011). Furthermore, there
were member states putting into place measures which are over and above recommenda-
tions made by the Emergency Committee (The Telegraph, 2009). In this, the first real test
of WHO’s authority under the revised IHRs, the reluctance that WHO showed to fully
utilise its authority fundamentally undermined said authority (Kamradt-Scott, 2015).
In addition to WHO undermining its own authority, the IHRs - while symbolically ap-
proved by all member states - remains unimplemented in the majority. In 2016, the IHR
Review for the Ebola Outbreak noted that only 33% of states parties had implemented
the minimum IHR core capacities and that “many countries clearly have a long way to
go” (IHR Review Committee, 2016, p.18). In addition to this, only 3 of the 15 recom-
mendations made 5 years earlier - in the IHR Review of the Influenza Pandemic - have
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been implemented. This demonstrates that, while WHO has its authority to act imbued
through its constitution and the IHRS, its authority over states is muted.
These instances demonstrate how WHO has become a focal organization for the GHSp.
From demonstrating weaknesses in response to the AIDS pandemic, it became the central
organization in the SARS response, leveraging non-state information sources to influence
China into officially reporting SARS cases. This new found power was enshrined in the
revised IHRs, giving WHO full authority to declare a state of emergency above any state.
Finally, in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, WHO was widely noted to have not used all of its
authority and was mired in issues of transparency and communication.
4.4.3 BioMedical Countermeasures
The corollary to securitization of health, however, is that there is an increasing tendency
to pharmaceuticalise this security (Elbe, 2008).The pharmaceuticalisation of (in)security
came to the fore in the response to pandemic influenza because of an increasing scramble
by states to purchase flu vaccines and the antiviral drug, Tamiflu (Elbe et al., 2014a).
This pharmaceuticalisation is typified by the increasing use of technical fixes like vaccines,
antimicrobials, and other medical countermeasures in order to fix social problems. This is
often at the expense of other possible methods like basic sanitation, quarantine, contact
tracing, and preventative measures.
In addition to shaping the governance and policies of outbreak response, the pharma-
ceuticalisation of (in)security has also closed down discourse. In particular, we see the
use of ‘evidence-based medicine’ as a perspective supporting the use of pharmaceuticals
and medical products which are backed up by randomized-controlled trials, the supposed
gold standard for evidence (Kamradt-scott, 2013). This perspective closes down discus-
sions related to patients’ lived experiences and community knowledge which may not have
the required evidence base or be expressed in the medical lexicon (Lancaster et al., 2015,
2017a,b; Kamradt-scott, 2013).
Firstly - as with all the outbreaks explored in this chapter and demonstrating the gen-
eral dominance of the security framing in current global health thought - pandemic H1N1
influenza was framed as a security threat. In fact, pandemic influenza in general was noted
by WHO as “the most feared security threat” in the 2007 World Health Report (World
Health Organization, 2007, p.45). In general, the securitization of the H1N1 pandemic
itself is unremarkable given the near ubiquity of the framing and the fact that influenza
had been securitized many years prior (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012).
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Second, stockpiling demonstrates an increasing tendency to pharmaceuticalise the
(in)security of populations. In the 2009 H1N1 Influenza pandemic, we see this shift crys-
tallising through a specific drug; Tamiflu (Elbe et al., 2014a).10 After the onset of the
2009 H1N1 outbreak, states - particularly the developed ones in the European Union (Elbe
et al., 2014b) - rushed to purchase stocks of Tamiflu from producer Genentech in order to
ensure they were prepared for any oncoming outbreaks in their territory. This stockpiling
of medicines is not entirely new; the Clinton Administration created the US Strategic
National Stockpile in 1999 (Graham, 1998) and Project BioShield (O’Reilly, 2007) aimed
to add to the stockpile. This stockpiling, however, caused a shortage in the antiviral
drug which disadvantaged those developing countries who could not afford to buy them
(Kamradt-Scott and Lee, 2011).
Pharmaceuticalization is a subframe of the medicalization framing. The ’health se-
curity’ frame does not just frame health as a security concern, but it makes security a
medical concern (Elbe, 2010). In this medicalized frame, we see medical personnel be-
coming security actors, just as securitization saw security actors becoming medical actors.
In particular, there was a shift over the course of the early 2000s wherein bioterrorism
response became an ’all-hazards’ approach and increasingly the line was blurred between
the realms of biodefence (bioterror response) and public health (Congress, 2006). In par-
ticular, we see the responses to bioterrorism events and natural disease outbreaks being
differentiated less and less - including within the IHRs where the definition of a PHEIC is
that the outbreak can be deliberate or natural in origin.
This infiltration of medical actors into security is expressed in a more specific form
in pharmaceuticalisation. In this we find an increasing focus not just on medical actors,
metaphors, and solutions but a much more biomedical focus wherein solutions are phar-
maceutical in nature, be they drugs, vaccines, or medical countermeasures. This shift is
demonstrated by the US 2004 legislation, Project BioShield (O’Reilly, 2007) which appro-
priated US$5.6billion to fund the production of antimicrobials, vaccines, and diagnostic
technologies which are relevant for biodefence that would otherwise be unfunded because
they do not fulfil a broader public health need (O’Reilly, 2007). In effect, BioShield
demonstrated a strong push towards the provision of pharmaceutical resources for secur-
ity objectives.
Returning to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic we see a similar rush to purchase and stock-
pile pharmaceuticals as a means to ameliorate the insecurity of populations (Elbe et al.,
10Tamiflu is the brand name for oseltamivir phosphate, an antiviral drug which targets the neuraminidase
protein on the influenza virus (the N in H1N1).
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2014a). This pharmaceuticalization, like medicalization, has increased the participation
of medical personnel and particularly those involved in medical countermeasure research,
development, and production. The inclusion of pharmaceutical and medical actors has
opened up space for the privileging of knowledges that are specialized and provide such
representatives with even more political power to set preparedness policy (Kamradt-scott,
2013).
One well studied tool in part set up by the pharmaceuticalization of health security
is the prevalence of ‘evidence-based medicine’ which frames medical knowledge without
a particular evidence-base (namely large scale randomized controlled trials) as inferior
and promotes the use of ‘evidenced’ knowledge and tools like vaccines, antivirals, and
diagnostics. One example of this phenomenon is the research done by Lancaster et al.
(2015, 2017a,b) into Australian Drug Policy which finds that the ‘evidence-based medicine’
framing limits the space for discussion from patients with lived-experience and privileges
the views of those medical professionals who can back up their knowledge with peer-
reviewed studies. In addition, the very means of discussion, narratives, and arguments
employed can constrain the inclusion of non-medical knowledge because they were not ale
to frame these types of knowledge in the ‘medical’ lexicon or discourse.
Secondly, Adam Kamradt-Scott shows for Influenza Preparedness Policy how this
evidence-based medicine framing has perpetuated the pharmaceuticalization of health se-
curity and the stockpiling of medical countermeasures, and how this has shaped outbreak
response (Kamradt-scott, 2013). In particular, he notes that ‘within days of the WHO
Director-General declaring the outbreak in Mexico, attention had shifted to the capacity of
pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce a pandemic-specific strain, even though it was
acknowledged that such actions may inadvertently cause deaths’ (Kamradt-scott, 2013,
p.116). This reliance on pharmaceuticals, then, not only places high value on tools avail-
able only to rich countries but it also privileges those tools in further discussion, placing
constraints on the possible knowledges used.
In addition to the constraining of knowledges, pharmaceuticalisation has had a real
impact on policy; creating pushes to allocate funds for countermeasure production, giving
pharmaceutical companies legal cover for side-effects and injury compensation claims,
creating novel regulatory approval methods for low prevalence diseases, and allowing for
emergency use of pharmaceuticals without the necessary regulatory approval (O’Reilly,
2007; Elbe et al., 2014a). These policy interventions particularly came to the fore during
the Ebola Crisis; with no vaccines or medical countermeasures for Ebola approved by
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regulatory authorities, there was a scramble to provide emergency use authorisations and
ethical approvals for trials in order to produce therapeutics and vaccines (Gaffney, 2014).
In summary, the insecurity that the Global Health Security framing had helped con-
struct were understood as being ameliorated by three central tenets. First, global syn-
dromic surveillance allows for constant vigilance for health threats. This global surveillance
regime functions under the containment logic inherent in Global Health Security and aims
to understand where disease epidemics occur early in order to rapidly contain their spread.
Second, expanding WHO authority occurred through WHO’s centrality in outbreak re-
sponse and its participation in securitizing infectious disease. This shift of WHO authority
to being above the sovereignty of states is a central tenet of the GHSp. Finally, the pro-
duction of BioMedical countermeasures aims to rapidly provide vaccines, therapeutics,
and diagnostics to areas with infectious disease outbreaks. This fits the securitization
discourse’s affinity for technical fixes as opposed to political or economic solutions. Fur-
thermore the centrality of BioMedical countermeasures to response efforts privileges the
knowledge and expertise of those clinicians who fully understand their function and use.
4.5 Summary
This chapter has provided some context for the empirical argument of this thesis, high-
lighting how a historical trend towards a Global Health Security paradigm has occurred.
The chapter has, first, described the historical roots and positioning of the World Health
Organization as the central actor in outbreak response. It’s history as the world’s health
body has been punctuated with a number of successes and failures, notably the eradica-
tion of smallpox (success) and its response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic (failure). WHO’s
centrality in outbreak response has increased over the course of the 21st Century, despite
steady decreases in the funding it has available in order to play that central role.
Next we turned to the Global Health Security framing, noting its development as two
parallel discourses of global health and health security. Global health, here, refers to the
shifting understanding of health as a global problem needing addressing via high level
governance and surveillance mechanisms. Health security refers to the discursive turn
towards referring to health as a threat to international and national security. Under this
turn towards Global Health Security (GHS) we saw its impacts on how we conceptualise
and understand health: creating a highly trans-national governance understanding, despite
a national-level operational understanding; creating a situation where individuals and
states that are experiencing disease are stigmatised and penalised; and understanding
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disease outbreaks as a technical object that can be fixed with technological innovation.
Finally, we explored how these understandings have created the three central tenets of
the Global Health Security paradigm (GHSp). First, the global and trans-national under-
standing of health led to an increasing expansion of surveillance including expanding who
can survey and what is surveyed for. Second, the trans-national and technical understand-
ing of infectious disease led to an increasing centrality for WHO which gained authority
over states through the IHRs and is a highly technical agency responsible for coordinating
and directing outbreak responses. Finally, the technical and stigmatising understanding of
health led to an attention to the rapid development of biomedical countermeasures which
are both technical fixes but also activities which can frequently be done at a distance from
the site of outbreaks, in a laboratory, rather than actively treating patients in the field.
Having explored the fundamental narrative and tenets of the GHSp, the next chapter
we outlines the 2013-2016 west African Ebola Crisis and highlight that each of the tenets
of the GHSp were absent or ineffective, framing the crisis as a fundamental challenge to
the assumptions of the GHSp. Next the chapter looks at document and interview data to
ask the question who is learning what from the Ebola Crisis?
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Chapter 5
Embedding Case: The Ebola
Crisis of 2013-2016
5.1 Introduction
In December 2013 a threat was ‘lurking far from the watchful eyes of health authorities’
(Garrett, 2001, p.92). The commonly explained epicentre for what became the worst Ebola
crisis in history was a 2-year old child playing near a tree which was a nest for fruit bats,
the likely vector for Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) (Roberts, 2014). Just over 2 years later,
by the 17th of February 2016, the outbreak had a cumulative 28,603 cases and 11,301
deaths in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2016).
Clinical symptoms for EVD are: vomiting, headache, nausea, diarrhoea, difficulty
breathing, fatigue, abdominal pain, loss of appetite, muscle or joint pain, unexplained
bleeding, difficulty swallowing, or hiccups. Beyond these symptoms, although in many
cases because of them, EVD foments fear at a much deeper, societal level. This fear is not
simply a fear of infection but much broader anxieties; disgust sensitivity, body vigilance,
and a tendency to overestimate the severity of EVD (Blakey et al., 2015). The fear of the
outbreak led to excessive travel and trade bans from countries (Gulland, 2015; Rhymer and
Speare, 2017), and the three most affected countries were effectively ostracized from their
region with 47 African countries prohibiting entry (Rhymer and Speare, 2017, p.14). In
total, with loss of life and trade bans, the outbreak cost the three most affected countries
a total $2.2billion in GDP losses alone.1
Death statistics and economic losses alone, however, are simply the surface impact that
1according to World Bank GDP projections for each of the three countries (World Bank, 2017)
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the outbreak had on the three countries. The countries are some of the least economically
developed2 and had weak health systems to begin with, already stretched by HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, Malaria, and Lassa Fever, amongst other endemic diseases. The Ebola Crisis
further stretched these already strained health systems. Due to EVD’s disproportionate
impact on healthcare personnel, an estimated 8% of Liberia’s healthcare workforce was
reduced by the outbreak, infant and under-5 mortality increased by 20% and 28%, respect-
ively, and maternal mortality rose by 111% (Evans et al., 2015). Additionally, Parpia and
colleagues estimate a reduction in healthcare access of 50% and further estimate indirect
lives lost due to loss of HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and TB service provision at 10,623 (Parpia
et al., 2016).
In Chapter 2 we noted how knowledge accumulated in cycles, task experiences are
abstracted and transformed into knowledge which can then be used in similar task experi-
ences in the future (Kolb, 1984; Argote and Miron-spektor, 2011). This process, however, is
interrupted by the exceptional characteristics of crisis wherein event rarity, heterogeneity,
and ambiguity impede knowledge abstraction and use. Codified knowledge’s transferab-
ility allows it to overcome these rarity and heterogeneity barriers as well as the process
of codification allowing for an explanation of complexity and interconnections (Zollo and
Winter, 2002; Argote and Miron-spektor, 2011; Echajari and Thomas, 2015). This chapter
explores the embedding case of the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis, exploring the knowledge ac-
cumulation around the outbreak as a whole.
This chapter first aims to provide an account of the outbreak, drawing out similarities
to the Global Health Security paradigm detailed in the previous chapter. In this narrat-
ive, an argument will be made that the Ebola Crisis followed previous outbreaks and was
constructed, early in the outbreak, as a threat to global health security. Additionally, this
narrative will also argue that the methods by which that threat was to be combated – sur-
veillance, WHO authority expansions, and the production of biomedical countermeasure
– were absent in this outbreak. In this way, section 5.2 constructs the Ebola Crisis as a
crucial case: a case in which the dominant paradigm’s central tenets were insufficient for
response and from which extensive double-loop learning (assumption-challenging) is to be
expected.
Section 5.3 delves further into the right-hand side of the knowledge accumulation cycle,
looking at the codification of knowledge to abstract the experiences of the Ebola crisis. The
section will demonstrate first that, broadly, the lessons that were codified from the Ebola
2According to the Human Development Index in 2014 Guinea was 183rd with an HDI of 0.414, Sierra
Leone was 179th with an HDI of 0.420, and Liberia was 177th with an HDI of 0.427 (UNDP, 2015).
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outbreak fit the Global Health Security Paradigm: showing a deep analysis of medical
countermeasures, the failures of WHO’s authority, and lapses in surveillance. Second, the
section will show the emergence of newer lessons, explored in less depth but still prevalent,
on the community responses, health systems of the affected countries, and the need for
effective communications (both with the public and internal to response coordination).
This will set the stage for a more in depth analysis of two cases in the following chapters.
Section 5.4 moves over to the other side of the knowledge accumulation cycle, looking at
the use of knowledge. The section will discuss the results from the 23 interviews conducted
with report users. The results first show a scepticism about the implementation of the
recommendations from the so-called lessons learned reports. The results then show how the
positive aspects discussed by some interviewees are negative for others because of a limited
participatory process, lack of applicability of lessons, and weak use of relevant evidences.
Finally, the section will discuss the ways in which users learn and manage knowledge and
show how personal networks form a central basis for this, making participatory processes
and dissemination key and under-served aspects of report construction.
5.2 Outline of the Ebola Crisis
This section aims to provide an outline of the events that unfolded in the outbreak of
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in West Africa and the global response. The outline will
demonstrate two things: first, the Ebola Crisis was framed by WHO, Governments, and
the media as both a security threat and an unprecedented crisis. Second, that each of the
main methods for ameliorating constructed insecurity were not found in this outbreak;
medical countermeasures (despite 40 years’ of research into Ebola) were not available,
biosurveillance was delayed and warnings not heeded, and WHO’s expanded authority
was not used and subsequently undermined by the creation of the United Nations Mis-
sion for Ebola Emergency Response in September 2014. These sections broadly follow a
chronological account (overlapping in places), discussing surveillance in the early outbreak
phase, the failings of WHO into the mid-outbreak phase, and looking towards the medical
countermeasure clinical trials established in the later phase of the outbreak.
5.2.1 5.2.1 Ebola the Global Health Security Threat
In the previous chapter, we saw an increasing tendency over the last 30 years to frame
infectious disease as threats to security. The 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis was no different
to this trend: the Ebola Crisis was surrounded by fear, stigma, and a crisis narrative
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(Mcinnes, 2016). Additionally, Ebola has long been associated with bioterrorism as a
probable bioweapon which directly conflates outbreaks and security3. Securitization, as
defined and discussed in the previous chapter, is a discursive phenomenon which frames a
topic in such a way as to make them existential threats to national security (Buzan et al.,
1998). This section looks at the Ebola Crisis as an event which was securitized - both at
the global and the community level - to demonstrate that it follows the dominant, ’global
health security’ narrative of the 21st Century.
The securitized narrative emerged early in the Crisis with the description of the out-
break by Mede´cins Sans Frontie´res as ’unprecedented.’ In a report from Guinea on March
31st 2014, Mariano Lugli, MSF’s Conakry Project Coordinator commented that ”we are
facing an epidemic of a magnitude never before seen” (MSF, 2014b). The use of ’unpre-
cedented’ and describing the outbreak as ’never before seen’ exceptionalizes the outbreak,
framing it as an event which is outside of the norm. Importantly here, we are in no way
making the argument that the Ebola Crisis wasn’t exceptional - the use of the Crisis as
a case for this thesis rests on exactly the opposite premise - but that media and expert
narratives surrounding the outbreak constructed it as such (Mcinnes, 2016). Furthermore,
the framing Ebola as an exceptional crisis was ’determined less by levels of mortality and
morbidity ... but by the success with which a disease or condition can be constructed
as a global health threat’ (Mcinnes, 2016, p.380); thus fitting in with the ’global health
security’ narrative constructed throughout the 21st Century.
Three months later (June 2014) the response had yet to scale up, the epidemic had
spread from Guinea to Liberia and Sierra Leone, and Dr Bart Janssens, MSF Director of
Operations, stated that ”there is a real risk of it spreading to other areas” and that ”the
epidemic is out of control” (MSF, 2014a). Janssens further commented that MSF staff
had ”reached our limits” and were overwhelmed by the number of patients and number
of locations (MSF, 2014a). This sentiment was echoed by MSF’s 2015 review of its ebola
response entitled Pushed to the limit and beyond (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2015). This
frame of being ’stretched thin’ and the outbreak as ’unprecedented’ conforms to McInnes’
notion of the crisis narrative as focussing on huge numbers of people suffering and dying
(Mcinnes, 2016). Through focusing on phrases like ‘out of control’ and the high number
of fatalities, a sense of imminent threat was created which framed the 2013-2016 Ebola
Crisis as a danger to global health security.
3Even in the context of the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease
Director Anthony Fauci was asked whether Ebola could be used as a bioweapon by a journalist and
responded that ”nature is the worst terrorist” (Arter, 2014)
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Following through with this logic, we see the cost of response ratcheting upwards each
time a new estimate is released. Beginning with a WHO estimate on the 31st of July 2014
of USD100 million (World Health Organization et al., 2014), only four days later (3rd
August 2014) the World Bank pledged USD200 million (World Bank, 2014). A UN Office
For Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) resource requirements estimate a
month later, September 2014, placed needs at USD988million (UNOCHA, 2014). By 2015,
the lowest estimate of the impact on West African economies were losses of USD3.8billion,
higher estimates topped out at USD32.6billion (World Bank, 2015). To put these estimates
into perspective, the high estimates were 250% of the GDP of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and
Liberia combined (World Bank, 2017). This exponentially rising cost of the outbreak falls
in line with the linkages between health security and the economic logics employed therein
that were explored in the previous chapter.
Over the course of the crisis, further descriptions of the crisis as ’a threat to security’
and as ’unprecedented’ continued. One particular example is the statement made by WHO
declaring that the Ebola Crisis is a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
(PHEIC) which describes ”the largest EVD outbreak ever recorded” as constituting ”an
’extraordinary event’ and a public health risk to other states’” (World Health Organization,
2016b). This characterisation falls in line with prior framings as ’extraordinary.’ A further
move toward the perception of the Ebola Crisis as a security threat came at a UN Special
Briefing on Ebola led by UN Systems Coordinator for the Ebola Response Dr. David
Nabarro on September 2nd 2014. With a death toll of over 1000 persons already, Dr.
Joanne Liu - International President of MSF - made the organization’s first ever call for
the deployment of military resources and called for ’States [to] immediately deploy civilan
and military assets with expertise in biohazard containment’(Liu, 2014, emphasis added).
Two weeks later, US President Barack Obama pledged 3000 troops to assist in responding
to the outbreak.
The use of military force for support in responding to the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis was
not new at the time of the call. In a 2015 assessment of Civil-Military engagement in the
response Ebola Crisis, Kamradt-Scott and colleagues (Kamradt-scott et al., 2015) found
that the Sierra Leonean and Liberian militaries had already become involved; the Sierra
Leonean military had even taken control of the National Ebola Response Center (NERC).
What the MSF call did, however, was ratchet the crisis narrative up further and call
for foreign military deployment. This call for foreign military deployment reinforced the
narrative of the Ebola Crisis as an emergency requiring the use of all available international
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resources because of its global consequences. This fits into the dominant narrative of ’global
health security’ wherein massive resources are required to combat threats on a global scale.
Another discursive move to securitize the Ebola Crisis and fitting it into this ’Global
Health Security’ narrative came from the leaders of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.
On September 15th, over a month after a PHEIC was declared, the rising cost, expanding
complexity, and inflating case and death numbers led these leaders to submit a letter to
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. The letter spoke of the ’relative peace, security and
stability in the sub-region’ and stated that ’the epidemic has dealt a devastating blow
to our efforts’ (Conde´ et al., 2014). This letter stated that the epidemic threatened to
plunge the states back into the conflict that consumed them in the late-20th and early-
21st Centuries. This claim placed the very peace and stability of the three most affected
countries - a population totalling 24.4 million - in the hands of the response to the mounting
epidemic.
Three days later, the UN Security Council passed resolution 2177 which focussed on
the isolation of the countries and the travel and trade bans instituted by other countries
(UNSC, 2014). In addition to this, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UN-
MEER) was established. This mission was the first full UN Mission established in response
to an epidemic. As seen in the previous chapter, UNAIDS was the first UN organization
created for a disease outbreak. What is different here is the clear signal of emergency that
creating a full UN Mission sent. Historically, UN Missions had mostly been created for
peacekeeping and civil conflicts. This mission, however, was for the response to an epi-
demic. The linking of peacekeeping and failed states with an outbreak of infectious disease
signalled that WHO’s centrality and authority had failed in this outbreak.4 Additionally,
this epidemic had been raised to another level. UNAIDS, an organization created in re-
sponse to an ongoing pandemic spanning almost four decades wasn’t itself a full mission
linked to peacekeeping. The Ebola Crisis, however, had even greater response and impact,
pushing it even further up the agenda and warranting a full UN Mission.
This securitization was not just a discursive phenomenon at a global level. A large
amount of fear and stigma around EVD swirled around at the community level, both in
affected countries and around the world. In the affected countries, a large amount of fear
for personal safety and rumours that hospitals and clinics were locations where individuals
contracted EVD circulated reducing community proclivity to seek care (Wilkinson and
Leach, 2014). In addition to this, the fear and stigma created tensions and sparked a
4This is also a point made by Interviewee 041, a report author, and will be explored in a later section
of this outline.
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number of scenes of violence; including a team raising Ebola awareness in the village of
Wome in Southern Guinea being attacked and killed with machetes and clubs (BBC News,
2014). This explosion of violence was not an isolated incident and led His Excellency
Ernest Bai Koroma, President of Sierra Leone, to institute a three-day curfew during
which health teams went door-to-door to raise awareness, recruit community activists,
and provide advice on home-care (Koroma, 2014).
Community fear was not limited to the three most affected countries. In the United
States, fear of EVD created a number of difficulties as policymakers and officials acted
counter to public health rationales due to public pressure. In particular, a number of
states issued mandatory 21 or 42 day quarantines on Healthcare Workers returning from
West Africa (Brown et al., 2014) or even prohibiting entry altogether (The Guardian,
2014). This had at least two clear effects: first, it discouraged volunteers from going to
West Africa to help with the response because they were going to be placed in such a
mandatory quarantine and even risk losing their job (Garrett, 2015b). Second, it created
large questions around civil liberties and the quality of care inherent in quarantine5 -
particularly when the risk of transmission prior to becoming symptomatic was negligible
(Miles, 2015).
The policy and media debates surrounding the Ebola Crisis, then, ere dominated
by a narrative of global health security. First, through its initial characterisations as
an exceptional and ’unprecedented’ public health event; second, through the emerging
discursive response to the outbreak from the UNSC, WHO, MSF, and the Presidents of
the three most affected countries; and finally, through the community level responses to
the outbreak characterised by fear and anxiety both within the three most affected states
and in developed nations. The next section will demonstrate that, while the outbreak fit
into this dominant narrative, the three main methods for responding to outbreaks - WHO
authority, medical countermeasures, and surveillance - were absent, ineffective, and late
in the response to the Ebola Crisis.
5.2.2 Failing to ameliorate insecurity
As shown in the previous chapter, three methods have been lauded above all others as the
primary means by which the damage from outbreaks can be mitigated. First, the use of
surveillance allows for a fast-twitch response which can contain and eliminate a pathogen
in a population before it has chance to cause extensive damage. Second, empowering
5This was a particularly difficult conversation to have when the quality of care disparity between the
US and West African patients was already a contentious issues.
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WHO to coordinate and act on the behalf of states and to bolster country capacities to
respond allow for more comprehensive and more successful responses. Finally, the rapid
production of medical countermeasures - vaccines, therapeutics, and biomedical diagnostic
technologies - along with rapid production of data and information in order to develop such
technologies can allow for simultaneous treatment, containment, and prophylaxis against
a particular pathogen. The aim of this section is to elaborate further on the Ebola Crisis
and demonstrate that each of these three methods, lauded as solutions to global health
insecurity, failed in this context.
Surveillance
This section begins with surveillance because, in most outbreak responses, this is the first
step. To respond to an outbreak, it is first necessary to know the outbreak is there - even
if the causative agent is not yet known. The spike in a particular set of symptoms in
patients can indicate an outbreak. The index case for the Ebola Crisis, as above, was a
young boy in Meliandou, Southern Guinea who seemingly contracted Ebola from a hollow
tree in which fruit bats were roosting.6 In December of 2014, the boy died and in the
ensuring months the village of Meliandou buried 14 further residents (Garrett, 2015a). As
residents of Meliandou, along with healthcare workers treating the sick, moved throughout
the country to Monrovia (the Guinean capital) and across Guinea’s porous borders with
Sierra Leone and Liberia, the epidemic that would spiral into a full humanitarian crisis
had begun.
Although the story of the Ebola Crisis begins in December of 2013, it isn’t until
March of 2014 that the ebola virus is detected and a laboratory confirmation is made
for the first cases (Wilkinson and Leach, 2015). This gap of three months meant that by
the time an ebola case had been confirmed, the epidemic had already spread to Liberia
and Sierra Leone and would be laboratory-confirmed less than a week after (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). The reasons behind this are multifaceted because
surveillance requires multiple factors; diagnosis, detection, and reporting. In the first
instance, patients must be diagnosed with disease; clinical symptoms must be read and a
viral haemorrhagic fever needs to be concluded. In many cases during this outbreak the
early clinical symptoms of fever, aching, and lethargy were mistaken for malaria, a disease
which is endemic to the countries most affected by the outbreak. Some patients didn’t
present with symptoms at all (sub-clinical presentation). This becomes important later
6Although this now commonly held belief is not uncontested.
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in the epidemic when Ebola patients needed to be diagnosed quickly to isolate them away
from patients who have other, similarly presenting diseases.
For those cases which were diagnosed or progressed to the later stages of clinical
presentation (e.g., epistaxis, excessive bleeding, dehydration), a laboratory confirmation
of EVD is necessary. In the case of EVD, multiple similar viral haemorrhagic fevers
(VHFs) are possible diagnoses with different case fatality rates. Additionally, Marburg
fever also belongs to the same genus of viruses (filoviridae) so a microscopic analysis cannot
accurately differentiate the two. To positively differentiate between these different types
a reverse-transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction (rtPCR) test is applied to detect the
RNA-type and positively identify EVD (CDC, 2015). This was particularly difficult during
the Ebola Crisis for three reasons; lack of lab capacity, lack of human capacity, and lack
of basic infrastructure (Coltart et al., 2017). Firstly, rtPCR requires complex, expensive
technologies like a thermocycler7 as well as reagents; these existed in some laboratories
throughout West Africa but often patients and samples had to be transported to central
labs before they could be tested (Coltart et al., 2017).
This brings us to the next two issues with detecting EVD; insufficient human capacity
and lack of basic infrastructure. Not only must a laboratory have the technological capacity
and infrastructure but the personnel in that lab need to have the tacit knowledge and
technical expertise to prepare samples, use the technologies, and interpret the results.
This human capacity was overwhelmed in West Africa; as the flow of samples to limited
laboratories increased, backlogs built up and this limited capacity was quickly occupied,
creating a ”major bottleneck in the ability to respond to Ebola” (Whitty, 2017, p.3).
All of this, however, assumes that samples can get to the laboratory. A lack of basic
infrastructure hampered simply getting the samples and patients to the laboratories and
treatment centres (Koch, 2016a). During the outbreak, contact tracers (individuals tasked
with finding, interviewing, and monitoring people who have come into contact with ebola
cases) were hampered by roads that ”were at best minimally maintained” (Koch, 2016b,
p.292) and the IHR Review Committee noted that ”basic infrastructure, such as safe
running water, reliable electricity and roads, is often lacking” (IHR Review Committee,
2016, p.25).
Finally, the cases not only have to be diagnosed and detected but then must also be
reported for surveillance to work. In this case, EVD cases must be reported to national
7A thermocycler is used to vary the temperature in a controlled and ordered manner as well as intro-
ducing reagents and buffers at the correct points in the cycle such that DNA/RNA can be amplified for
further testing and sequencing.
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governments and WHO as per the revised International Health Regulations (World Health
Organization, 2005). In many cases, however, this was disincentivised by the fear at a
national level that reporting a major outbreak would cause states to issue travel and trade
restrictions as was seen in SARS (Fidler, 2004). This fear proved correct; by November
2014, over 27 countries had placed travel and trade restrictions on people and goods
coming from West Africa (World Health Organization, 2015e). In addition to the fear
of repercussions, the lack of basic communications infrastructure (reliable internet and
electricity) also imepeded notification of EVD cases (Fink-Hooijer, 2015; Forrester et al.,
2014; Cori et al., 2017). This lack of basic infrastructure, lack of human capacity, and
lack of technology, then, contributed to the almost three-month gap between the first case
and its notification - severely weakening the fast-twitch surveillance around which the
dominant response paradigm is arranged.
Reinforcing this, a comparison can be made between the initial notification of EVD in
March 2014, and the diagnosis of the first case on US soil in September 2014. Thomas Eric
Duncan had returned from Liberia on September 19th and began exhibiting symptoms
on September 24th. What is important about this story, however, is timing; Duncan
was admitted to Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital on September 28th and EVD was
laboratory confirmed two days later (Anderson-Fletcher et al., 2017). This was possible
because the US has basic infrastructure in order to transport and analyse samples, indeed
many hospitals in the US have their own laboratories in which to perform the necessary
analyses. This comparison illustrates the wild disparity between the global north and the
global south in terms of diagnostic and surveillance capacity - a disparity that continues
in response, treatment, patient care, and health systems in general (Wilkinson and Leach,
2015).
WHO Authority
As seen in the previous chapter, one of the central tenets of outbreak response in the 21st
Century has been a bolstering of WHO’s authority and centrality in response activities -
including in regard to surveillance and reporting. Through the revisions of the Interna-
tional Health Regulations in 2005 and normative authority building throughout the 21st
Century,there was an increasing expectation created that WHO would respond to major
outbreaks and provide support. This section will outline how this was not necessarily the
case during the Ebola Crisis.
As noted earlier, between March and June of 2014 MSF had been calling the ongoing
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outbreak ’unprecedented’ and ’out of control’ but WHO had not acted. This was primarily
because of a temporary reprieve in case numbers seen in early May of 2014 (Sack et al.,
2014) in which case numbers had been steadily declining and no new patients were seen in
Conakry for 10 days. With hindsight, this slump has now been attributed to a burgeoning
fear of health care centres and rise in home-care of cases rather than a reduction in
transmission rate (Wilkinson and Leach, 2015) but at the time cases appeared to be
abating.
As case numbers surged again in June and July of 2014, MSF’s International President
Joanne Liu urged WHO’s Director-General Margaret Chan to call a PHEIC. As reported
in The Guardian, ”’You have the legitimacy and authority to label it an emergency ... You
need to step up to the plate’” said Liu (Boseley, 2015b). Internal documents from WHO
would later reveal that calling a PHEIC was resisted because of the likely economic damage
it would create for the three most affected states, Dr Chan even noting that declaring a
PHEIC ”could be seen as a hostile act ... and could hamper collaboration” (Garrett, 2001,
p.95). Only on August 6th did DG Chan convene an Emergency Committee and a PHEIC
was finally declared on August 8th - five months after the first reported case. This late
reaction to an spiralling crisis came in the same month that the death toll crept up above
1000 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016).
The lack of WHO action led UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to address the mount-
ing crisis and outline three urgent steps to be taken in response (Ban, 2014). First, the
lack of capacity in the three most affected countries was to be addressed. Second, a hol-
istic UN System response was to be mounted, headed up by UN Systems Coordinator for
Ebola Virus Disease, Dr. David Nabarro. Finally, UNMEER was to be established; a full
UN mission to respond to the outbreak revealed not only the scale, scope, and magnitude
of the outbreak, but it cast significant doubts over WHO’s handling of it. As put by
David Fidler ”The UN stripped WHO of leadership in creating the UN Mission for Ebola
Emergency Response” (Heymann et al., 2015, p.1888). The Ebola Crisis, now, had grown
outside of WHO’s remit and become a full-scale humanitarian crisis.
WHO’s central authority, however, was not just undermined by its lack of action in
the early stages of the outbreak; it also extended to issues in the midst of the outbreak
with problems similar to that of the H1N1 outbreak prior. In a statement after its first
meeting on August 8th 2014, the IHR Emergency Committee recommended that states
should not institute travel and trade restrictions (World Health Organization, 2014b). In
spite of this, however, 27 countries issued restrictions on trade and travel, including the
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mandatory 21 day quarantine implemented by some US States (Thompson and Torre,
2014). Australia went a step further on the 28th October and instituted a freeze on
all temporary visas coming from West Africa and instituted a three week quarantine on
permanent-visa holders (The Guardian, 2014).
In addition to this, private companies also restricted their activities and private airlines
stopped servicing the area. This lack of private servicing of the area created issues with
importing foreign aid; few airlines would fly into West Africa and even fewer pilots would
fly for them despite the risk of contracting EVD as a pilot being negligible (Gomes et al.,
2014). The lack of transport also created issues for moving volunteers into and out of West
Africa as volunteers had very few options in terms of getting to the area to help patients
and if they were able to get there, few organizations would send them without a plan in
place for medical evacuation (Gomes et al., 2014).
This direct contradiction of the authority of the International Health Regulations was
an additional blow to the authority of WHO and further evidence that the expectation
of WHO’s centrality to response may not be the reality. Furthermore, the IHRs do not
extend to private organizations, only to states parties, and as such even if WHO had
exercised its authority to states it could not extend this authority over private organiza-
tions. This demonstrates that, while WHO’s central directing and coordinating role may
be normatively entrenched, in reality WHO lacks the organizational will and operational
capacity to fulfil the role expected of it.
Medical Countermeasures
From the start of the outbreak, the lack of medical countermeasures impeded response. No
vaccine for EVD had been approved for use, no therapeutic agent or antiviral agent was
available to treat patients, and the diagnosis was still done through clinical presentation
and an expensive rtPCR which takes time and human capacity (Roemer-Mahler and Elbe,
2016). Additionally, at the time of writing, no rapid-diagnostic, vaccine, or therapeutic
has been fully approved for use outside of clinical trials (WHO, 2015b). Throughout the
outbreak, clinical trials for all three of these categories had been implemented but their
absence in the beginning stages demonstrated a weakness in the Global Health Security
paradigm’s reliance on biomedical technologies.8
During the outbreak, a number of vaccines, therapeutics, and rapid diagnostics were
8In the words of Interviewee 003 (former UK Armed Forces, an Advisor recruited by the African
Governance Initiative) ”The way to deal with this from the very outset was never going to be a medical
response, this was going to be procedural”
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licensed for emergency use and a number of clinical trials began to test their efficacy
and safety. First, however, an ethical framework for running clinical trials in a public
health emergency had to be considered.9 In order to do this, WHO’s Ethics Working
Group met on three occasions (11th August 2014, 3rd September 2014, and 20-21 October
2014) and produced a document entitled Ethical issues related to study design for trials
on therapeutics for Ebola Virus Disease (WHO Ethics Working Group, 2014). The first
meeting of this group on the 11th August, just three days after the outbreak was declared
a PHEIC, demonstrates how immediate a need for pharmaceutical intervention is in the
current response logics.
This document outlined five areas for consideration10:
• the contextual site; in the context of a public health emergency, the emergency
use of unlicensed therapeutics had already been deemed ethical on the condition
that data from their use is shared. Additionally, the report mentions local context,
primarily the availability of human capacity and research personnel at the site as
an important ethical considerations; establishing a clinical trial should not usurp
resources (human or otherwise) that would be used for treating patients.
• the design of the study; most clinical trial designs were deemed ethical, but it
was noted that trade-offs exist between the generalizability and validity of the study
and the likely acceptance of a placebo-controlled study in affected communities.
• the community location; clinical studies need to engage with local ethics com-
mittees, review anthropological evidence, and liaise with local populations in order
to gain community acceptance and ensure ethical conduct.
• participants in the study; central to ethical conduct in this area is informed
consent, this is additionally important when concerning vulnerable populations and
in following up with participants - individuals in this context want to see the results
of their participation and how it can benefit their community.
• healthcare workers and researchers; the study design in the context of Ebola
should also recognise the risks posed by increased patient contact, particularly if the
trial places strain on resources and requires multiple uses of sharps which can pierce
personal protective equipment.
9It is worth noting that the Declaration of Helsinki and the Council for International Organizations of
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) have both produced international guidelines on the ethics of conducting clinical
trials.
10List adapted from WHO Ethics Working Group (2014)
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After this production of ethical guidelines, WHO began authorising the establishment
of clinical trials in West Africa. This authorisation of trials led to a great deal of public
attention as experimental treatments were lauded as ’miracle drugs’ (Ashton, 2014; Brown,
2014). This public narrative runs counter to the reality that few, if any, of the experimental
treatments would have been certified for widespread use during the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis.
Following this, two candidate vaccines were approved for emergency use: chimpanzee
adenovirus serotype 3 (Chad3) and recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus (rVSV). The
first, Chad3, was administered by GlaxoSmithKline to 10 US patients as part of a Phase
1 (safety) trial in early September 2014 - this was concurrent with a 60-person trial in
Oxford which began on 17th September 2014. The phase 1 trial demonstrated clinical
safety and its immunogenicity was on par with rVSV, whose trial results were published
earlier than the 2016 publication produced detailing this trial’s results (Ewer et al., 2016).
The rVSV vaccine trial was conducted in Guinea between 1st April 2015 and July 20th
2015 and immunised the contacts of confirmed EVD cases in two waves; one immediate and
one delayed (21 days). The results from the trial demonstrated a 100% efficacy, however the
data was weakened by limited case numbers in the unimmunised and delayed vaccination
populations (16/7651) despite zero cases in the vaccinated populations (Henao-Restrepo
et al., 2015).
These trials, although demonstrating at least some development towards the produc-
tion of medical countermeasures, were by no means rapid. The rVSV Phase 3 trial (large-
scale clinical efficacy and safety trials) began its pilot in March 2015 (?), by which point,
EVD cases had already been in decline for 3-4 months (Shultz et al., 2016).
The same can be said of clinical trials for therapeutics. The most prominent example
of an Ebola therapeutic is ZMapp, a monoclonal antibody therapy developed by Mapp
Biopharmaceuticals Inc. Results from the clinical trials were promising (a 40% reduction
in mortality) but the enrolment of 72 persons (36 in treatment and 35 in control groups)
means that results are not statistically significant nor are they generalisable. The primary
reason for this lack of enrolment is that the trial began in late 2015 during which time
Liberia (the location of the trial) was declared ebola-free by WHO (LeafBio, 2016).
On the diagnostics side, the ReEBOV point-of-care diagnostic kit produced by Cor-
genix, was tested in early February 2015 and found to be 100% sensitive (0% false negat-
ives) and 92% specific (8% false positives) from a sample size of 102 (Broadhurst et al.,
2015).
What many of these countermeasures have in common is that they took place as cases
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were declining. The reasons behind this are multiple and rooted in the complexities of
ethical clinical research in crisis. What these examples drive home however, is the lack of
availability of biomedical countermeasures for responding to the Ebola Crisis. Not only
were the countermeasures absent in the beginning stages but many clinical trials weren’t
set up until the peak of the outbreak had passed. As put by MSF International President
Joanne Liu ”Over the last few decades R&D has failed to save lives. It is not fit for
purpose.” (Boseley, 2016, p.861)
5.2.3 Summary
The Ebola Crisis, then, followed the dominant 21st Century framing of Global Health
Security (Mcinnes, 2016). It was constructed as a security threat through an initial char-
acterisation as ’unprecedented’, a discursive response from the UNSC, WHO, MSF, and
others, and through a community response characterised by fear and stigma. In addition
to this, the three methods of ameliorating insecurity that have dominated 21st Century
response - widespread syndromic surveillance, empowering and bolstering WHO author-
ity, and rapid production of biomedical countermeasures - were absent or ignored during
the outbreak. The surveillance was delayed due to weak health systems and then not
responded to, WHO did not exercise its authority or fulfil what was expected of it, and
biomedical countermeasures did not exist at the outset of the outbreak and were beset by
ethical constraints on their clinical testing.
Even in the dying days of the outbreak, on November 20th 2015, a case of Ebola was
confirmed in Liberia which ended the ’ebola free’ designation for the second time. This
case arrived haemorrhagic and contagious into a hospital in Liberia from which he was
moved to a Children’s ward and two days later was diagnosed with Ebola. This single case
produced 157 new contacts, all of which had to be monitored for a further 42 days before
Liberia could be declared ’ebola free’ again. This came primarily because the patient
did not present with a fever and so Ebola was not suspected at first - this limitation to
diagnosis often seen early in the outbreak reflecting how little of the ramped up response
had remained in-country for use in development and bolstering the health system.
In short, despite being framed as exceptional, the Ebola Crisis fit into the trend de-
scribed in the previous chapter; a threat to security to be dealt with in the traditional
manner. These traditional methods of response, however, were found wanting during the
crisis. The next section explores the document analysis performed in order to delineate
the lessons codified in the academic literature, grey literature, and a set of 40 documents
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identified by WHO as informing policy. This document analysis will attempt to answer
the question of ’what knowledge was codified from Ebola?’
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5.3 The Ebola Crisis: Lessons Learned
The previous section demonstrated how the Ebola Crisis challenged some of the central
tenets of the Global Health Security paradigm that was argued in Chapter 4. As we saw
in Chapter 2, a paradigm establishes directions to pursue and neglect as well as creating
an exclusion effect on certain types of evidence (Dosi, 1982). Furthermore, paradigmatic
knowledge production was seen as establishing a base of assumptions upon which partic-
ular avenues can be pursued (Kuhn, 1970). This section will demonstrate that codified
knowledge produced in the wake of the Ebola Crisis was broadly focused on Communica-
tion, Community Involvement, and Health Systems Strengthening. This section will also
show, however, that lessons in these three areas were relatively superficial and that lessons
within the Global Health Security paradigm (GHSp) were examined in much more depth.
This supports the argument that the GHSp filters knowledge accumulation and primes
GHSp-centred lessons for development, while lessons outside the GHSp remain less deeply
understood.
As described in Chapter 3, a total of 267 documents were analysed in three samples:
Academic (n=161), Operational (n=62), and Policy (n=34). Each of these samples was
designed to represent the lessons that each of the three different samples had identified
from the Ebola outbreak. This section presents the findings from these data to try and
examine who is learning what from the Ebola Crisis.
5.3.1 How the most referenced lessons are discussed
As we saw in Chapter 2, the who of a paradigm is just as important as the what - the
community which shares the ideology, values, or assumptions are an equally important
factor of a paradigm as the ideology, values, or assumptions themselves. This section
explores not only the what of the knowledge codified but also who is codifying them.
This section begins by describing the knowledge codified across all three samples, then
the section will analyse the various samples’ codified knowledge to demonstrate who is
codifying what?
The entirety of the first-pass inductive analysis produced 151 distinct categories of
lessons. The second iteration then consolidated these into 146 categories. Once aggregated,
these 146 categories were sorted into 54 parent categories. The ten most frequent lessons
are presented in table 5.1 and the ten least frequent lessons are presented in table 5.2.
In analysing these documents, functional lessons learned11 were identified and clustered
11See chapter 3, page 53 for full details.
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together into similar epistemic categories. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate, in Dosi’s
Ten Most Codified Lessons by Number of
Times Cited (n= number of times a lesson
was codified)
Ten Most Codified Lessons by Number
of Documents Citing (n= number of doc-
uments codifying a lesson at least once)
Communication (n=39) Communication (n=33)
Community Involvement (n=33) Community Involvement (n=28)
Health Systems Strengthening (n=28) Health Systems Strengthening (n=25)
Lack of Compliance with IHRs (n=28) Vaccines (n=22)
Coordination (n=26) Training (n=22)
Training (n=24) Surveillance (n=20)
Vaccines (n=23) Coordination (n=18)
Personal Protective Equipment (n=21) Health Emergency Reserve Force (n=18)
Surveillance (n=21) Infection Control (n=18)
Health Emergency Reserve Force (n=19) Early-warning Surveillance (n=18)
Table 5.1: Table showing the 10 most frequent ’lessons learned’ across the sampling frames based upon
the total number of references to the lesson and the total number of documents referencing a lesson.
Ten Least Codified Lessons by Number of
Times Cited (n= number of times a lesson
was codified)
Ten Least Codified Lessons by Number
of Documents Citing (n= number of doc-
uments codifying a lesson at least once)
Structural Transformation (n=1) Structural Transformation (n=1)
Outbreak Risk Assessment (n=1) Outbreak Risk Assessment (n=1)
Epidemiological Mapping (n=1) Epidemiological Mapping (n=1)
Epidemiological Modelling (n=1) Epidemiological Modelling (n=1)
Treatment (n=1) Treatment (n=1)
WHO Accountability to Civil Society
(n=1)
WHO Accountability (n=1)
IHR Review Conference (n=1) IHR Review Conference (n=1)
Reporting Smaller Outbreak (n=1) Reporting Smaller Outbreaks (n=1)
WHO Engaging Member States (n=1) WHO Engaging Member States (n=1)
Zoonotic Risk (n=1) Zoonotic Risk (n=1)
Table 5.2: Table showing the 10 least frequent ’lessons learned’ across the sampling frames based upon the
total number of references to the lesson and the total number of documents which reference a lesson.
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(1982) paradigm terms, the directions pursued and neglected by those codifying knowledge.
Looking at the lessons themselves, we can see that Communication, Community In-
volvement and Health Systems Strengthening are the most often referenced lessons. We
proceed to explore each of these three lessons in terms of what they are and how different
samples explore them in different ways.
Communication
Communication is a frequently cited lesson across most crisis types (Pollock, 2013). Les-
sons categorised under communication can range from the messaging of public communic-
ation (“it is crucial to examine what the public knows about Ebola and how the media’s
choice of terminology affects the public” (Gesser-Edelsburg et al., 2016, p.672)) to lessons
on the infrastructure of communications in-country (“Knowledge of prevailing commu-
nications network coverage and use ... particularly in countries where network coverage,
phone ownership and electricity supply are not universal” (Assessment Capacities Pro-
ject (ACAPS), 2015, p.4)). At first this may seem broad, but considering that this is
compared to categories with the breadth of covering all lessons pertaining to WHO it is
comparatively small.
What is more interesting is the divergence among the ways in which communication
is discussed in the three samples. In the first instance, we can note that the discussions
around communication is heavily weighted towards the academic and policy samples. The
academic sample has 20 references over 17 documents , and the policy sample has 13
references over 10 documents, compared to the operational sample’s 5 references over 5
documents. This demonstrates a clear focusing by the policy and academic samples on
Communication despite the operational sample’s relative apathy.
This is further reinforced and clarified by the co-occurrence network data which demon-
strates a broad citing of communication lessons with a variety other lessons. Figures 5.1,
5.2, and 5.3 show co-occurrence networks for each of the three samples. In these diagrams,
each node is a category of lessons and each arc represents the number of times that lessons
occur together in the same document. These networks are ego-networks for communica-
tion, meaning that they include only the Communication node and the nodes directly tied
to it. This demonstrates the lessons that occur with communication in the three different
samples.
Beginning with the academic sample, Figure 5.1, we can see communication at the
midway point between the densely connected top layer and a more sparsely connected
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bottom layer. The first point of note is the large number of lessons which the academic
sample connects to communication. Second, the thickness of each connection between les-
sons is proportional to the number of times in which they co-occur. Looking at the thicker
lines in Figure 5.1 we can see that the academic sample often connects communication
with Community Involvement and Public Engagement/ Education.
Figure 5.1: Communications Ego-Network for the Academic Sample
Figure 5.1 shows us that the academic sample frequently discusses communication in
context with other lessons. One example from the academic sample states:
“Understanding cultural values and traditions is an essential component of
infectious disease risk communication. Anthropologists, sociologists, psycholo-
gists, and other social scientists may play an important role” (Jacobsen et al.,
2016, p.209).
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Communication in this case requires multiple facets including cultural awareness, risk
assessment, and the inclusion of social scientists in responses. This demonstrates a com-
plexity of understanding communication in the academic sample.
Next, looking at the Policy document sample in Figure 5.2, we can see a sudden and
sharp drop in the number of lessons with which communication co-occurs. Here we see
that communication for the policy sample is linked with training and with risk frameworks.
This indicates two things: the high importance of communication for training and risk
assessment in policy documents; and that communication is often a stated aim in and of
itself in the policy sample.
Figure 5.2: Communications Ego-Network for the Policy Sample
One example of communication being an aim itself is this lesson from a policy document
below:
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“Starting health promotion efforts early and linking them to local communic-
ation directly improves programme effectiveness.” (Adams et al., 2016, p.12)
Making communication a stated aim was also part of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel’s
report, an embedded case that we will see in the next chapter:
“Although an emergency media team was put in place to manage WHO’s
messaging and content, the communication strategy was not able to counteract
the very critical reporting on the work of the Organization.” (World Health
Organization, 2015e, p.21)
Next, turning to the operational sample, we see communication again has very few con-
nections. In this case we see social media as the sole connection to communication for this
operational sample. This again shows us the limited ways in which operational documents
refer to communications, either commenting on social media as a tool or commenting on
communications more generally.
One example of this type of lesson in an operational text is below:
“Many communities in these counties reported a lack of telephone coverage,
making it difficult for community leaders to notify county health teams about
suspected Ebola patients, to arrange a clinical evaluation, or to receive labor-
atory test results in a timely manner. Because of poor connectivity, workers
in Rivercess County reported driving 6 hours round-trip to the next county to
send surveillance reports to the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare over the
Internet.” (Summers et al., 2014, p.1202)
In this, we can see the very practical focus of operational lessons as compared to the
abstract focus of the academic sample. This highlights the general view of academic
documents versus that of policy and operational documents’ goal-orientation.
Community Involvement
Community Involvement generally refers to lessons which discuss the role that local pop-
ulations and communities play in response efforts. These lessons ranged from notions of
bottom-up community engagement where communities are participating in organising,
planning and leading response efforts to communities being discussed as a barrier to
‘proper’ public health techniques. For example, one bottom-up recommendation discusses
how local communities found their own means for infection control:
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Figure 5.3: Communications Ego-Network for the Operational Sample
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“Most of those ways, in fact, are best found not by foreign experts but by
people living in their own communities. One woman in Liberia who treated
many of her sick neighbors was able to protect herself using plastic bags and
other household items. Villagers and urban slum dwellers have found ingenious
ways to enforce self-quarantines. In one village, guests were warmly welcomed
and then instructed to sit in a chair near the road, while the friend or relative
they came to see sat on another chair a few feet away.” (D’Harcourt, 2015)
On the other hand, one document discusses communities in a more top-down manner:
“In Monrovia, for example, sociocultural traditions and beliefs hampered im-
plementation of safe burials and of the order for cremation of all cadavers that
was in force for several months. Tragically, community resistance resulted in
death or injury for some responders in Guinea” (Lo et al., 2017, p.364)
This distinction between the bottom-up and top-down methods of is a source of debate
when it comes to the Ebola crisis because, as above, some see communities as barriers to
‘proper’ containment and response while others saw communities as a source of knowledge
and capacity (Wilkinson and Leach, 2014). This is not necessarily a new debate, however.
As Leach and Scoones (2013) note, communities are often left unacknowledged or viewed
as a barrier, despite their role in controlling many Ugandan and Congolese ebola outrbeaks
in the past (Hewlett and Hewlett, 2008).
The differences across the three samples here is similar to that for communication. We
see much more instrumental and goal-oriented community involvement lessons in policy
and operational documents compared to much more evaluative and discursive lessons from
the academic documents.
This is again reinforced and clarified by the co-occurrence network data which demon-
strates a broad citing of community involvement lessons with a variety other lessons.
Figures 5.4, 5.5., and 5.6 show the ego-networks for community involvement in the three
samples.
Looking first to the academic sample in Figure 5.4, we can see again that a great
number of different lessons. Looking at connection thickness (proportional to frequency
of connection) we see that the most common connection for community involvement is
anthropology (at the bottom of the network). This makes sense given the strong alignment
between anthropologists’ involvement in the response and the need to engage communities
during the Ebola crisis.
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Figure 5.4: Community Involvement Ego-Network for the Academic Sample
Looking next to the policy sample in Figure 5.5, we see more connections here than we
did with communications. Notably we see a strong linkage between community involve-
ment and health systems strengthening in the policy sample. We also see linkages with
patient isolation, surveillance, sanitation, and a dearth of healthcare workers in-country.
What this may mean for our purposes is, first a general acknowledgement of the role that
communities play in strengthening their own health systems, or second a general superfi-
ciality to lessons discussing communities and health systems strengthening. Looking at an
example of this connection made by the European Parliament, we can see how community
involvement is invoked as part of a crisis-response vision for health systems:
“building a resilient health system over the long term requires, inter alia, (i)
investing resources in basic public health services, (ii) ensuring safe and qual-
ity care by increasing resources to train, supervise and pay health workers
adequately and by giving access to safe drugs, (iii) engaging local stakehold-
ers and communities in crisis response and development planning” (European
Parliament, 2015)
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Figure 5.5: Community Involvement Ego-Network for the Policy Sample
Moving to the operational sample we can see that community involvement is tied
mainly to early-warning surveillance and rapid response. This again provides us with the
same options; community involvement is often discussed in the abstract or is tied to these
two particular concerns of the operational sample.
Looking to an example of this, we can see how community involvement in response is
linked to faster detection and containment.
“Active surveillance was combined with outreach and community education
from surveillance officers regarding the importance of reporting deaths and
raising alerts. The faster response to alerts resulted in early isolation of patients
and initiation of quarantine, which limited community spread. Increasing the
number of district surveillance officers made early detection and containment
possible” (Sandi et al., 2017, p.91)
While in the operational example we see the linking of communities within the direct,
operational response, we can see much more wide-ranging community involvement benefits
from the academic examples. Again, we see policy and operational documents being much
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Figure 5.6: Community Involvement Ego-Network for the Operational Sample
more directed and goal-oriented, whereas academic texts are more focused on the linkages
across type or domain.
Health Systems Strengthening
Finally, Health Systems Strengthening (HSS) became a key concept in the lessons from
the Ebola Crisis, largely because the outbreak took place in locations with such weak
healthcare overall. HSS generally refers to development activities which improves the
function or functions of a health system.12 In the document data, however, it is clear that
health systems became a ‘buzzword’ for lessons from Ebola. Although HSS is discussed
frequently, it is rarely discussed in much more detail than to simply say ‘health systems
should be strengthened.’ For example:
12HSS, as defined by WHO, is “(i) the process of identifying and implementing the changes in policy and
operational in a country’s health system, so that the country can respond better to its health and health
system challenges; (ii) any array of initiatives and strategies that improves on or more of the functions of
the health system and that leads to better health through improvements in access, coverage, quality, or
efficiency” (World Health Organization, 2011).
126
“A major issue for all three countries was the extensive and substantial ef-
fect of the epidemic on basic health care services.” (Dahl et al., 2016, p.19)
(Operational Text)
“Poor management of cases and ineffective outbreak responses, resulting from
weak health systems in countries previously riven by civil war, with inadequate
healthcare personnel and ineffective healthcare funding systems, further fuelled
the epidemic, especially in the most affected countries.” (Oleribe et al., 2015,
p.54-55) (Academic Text)
“The Ebola crisis has shown that enhancing capacities and building resilient
and sustainable health systems, combined with strong and functioning do-
mestic and international governance are fundamental to ensure effective pre-
vention, early detection and warning, as well as response for public health
emergencies” (G7, 2015, p.7) (Policy Text)
Each of these examples discusses health systems in various ways but each uses the term as
a catch-all for “poor country” effects like a lack of personnel and funding, or poor capacity
to manage patients.
As we can see from the above examples, there is also seemingly an effect stemming from
the sample itself. While the operational texts sticks to HSS as an end in itself, the academic
text focuses on HSS as a means to more effective outbreak response. Further to this, the
policy text refers to HSS as needing to be “resilient and sustainable” for “preventions,
early detection and warning, as well as response” (G7, 2015, p7). This shows that while
there is no real detail to lessons surrounding health systems strengthening, there is a
variation in the rationales for what a health system should be strengthened towards.
This variation is seen also in the co-occurrence network data which demonstrates a
broad citing of HSS lessons with a variety other lessons. Figures 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 show
the HSS ego-networks for the three samples.
Looking first to the academic lessons in Figure 5.7, we see a much smaller density of
co-occurrence than in the other lessons. This is likely down to the fact that HSS is much
more frequently referred to on its own as a single, overarching lesson.
HSS connects most strongly with development, likely due to the frequency with which
HSS is referred to a development opportunity to allow for the strengthening of health
systems in ‘developing’ nations. For example, this academic commentary discusses a
necessity to develop the region (west Africa) to be prepared for other outbreaks:
127
Figure 5.7: Health Systems Strengthening Ego-Network for the Academic Sample
“there is a need to move beyond the current crisis and be prepared to support
the affected countries and the entire region to strengthen capacity to detect
‘the unknown’ and build a health infrastructure in which early warning systems
are functional.” (Timen et al., 2015, p.87)
This is an example of a development lesson that refers to HSS but that subsumes these
under the GHSp’s priorities towards rapid response and surveillance. Thus, this suggests
that even lessons outside of the GHSp are constrained into the frames provided by the
GHSp.
Next, looking at the policy lessons in Figure 5.8, again we see connections between
HSS and community involvement. We also, however, see connections between HSS, devel-
opment, and surveillance.
Again, looking at an example of a policy sample document we can see how HSS is
instrumentalised to serve the purposes of the GHSp:
“The Ebola outbreak exposed health system fragilities: poor infection con-
trol put health workers at risk and dissuaded patients from seeking treatment;
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Figure 5.8: Health Systems Strengthening Ego-Network for the Policy Sample
community-based health workforces were insufficient, and therefore unable to
detect unusual symptoms or patterns, educate the community, or trace con-
tacts; and public distrust reinforced rumours, impeding behaviour change.”
(Gostin and Friedman, 2015, p.1903)
Again we see how HSS is operationalised to mean developing GHSp-framed capabilities
in countries with stretched resources. We also see the same happening to community
involvement as above, even discussing how public distrust ‘impeded behaviour change’
rather than addressing why there was public distrust (Wilkinson and Leach, 2014).
Finally, looking to the operational lessons in Figure 5.9, we can see that there is a mix
of lessons with which HSS co-occurs. The primary rationale for this seems to be that HSS
is simply not a lesson that the operational sample refers to. In total there are only four
documents out of a total of 64 that refer to health systems strengthening in any defined
way.
This does not mean to say that the operational sample does not deal with the need
for HSS, but that to state that HSS is needed in these countries is to state the obvious for
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Figure 5.9: Health Systems Strengthening Ego-Network for the Operational Sample
operational personnel13 and therefore that a more nuanced understanding of the country-
context requirements is thought out.
HSS indicates something wider that is suggested across the document sample: the
diverging priorities between academic, policy, and operational discourse surrounding the
Ebola crisis and outbreak response more broadly. When we look at how the academic
and policy samples discuss HSS, we find how they narrow and constrain lessons down
into serving GHSp priorities, while the operational understanding of HSS is much more
nuanced. Additionally, we also see again that the academic understanding is intercon-
nected with other lessons whereas the policy and operational priorities are much more
goal-oriented.
13This is corroborated by a quote we will see later from a report user interviewed for this thesis: “anybody
who’s spent like a month here would be like what are we going to do with this?” (Interviewee 058)
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5.3.2 Differences across samples
Returning to the broader lessons, we find that the lessons shift when we split the data
into the three separate samples. In this case we see the top lessons shifting to display
interesting priorities for each sample. Looking to table 5.3 we see how the top lessons for
the academic sample is generally concerned with a broad range of lessons including medical
countermeasures, communities, and the health systems of the countries affected. We
also see that community involvement, communication, and health systems strengthening
are missing from the academic sample, but more specific lessons take their place. This
demonstrates the broad priorities of the academic sample with specific characterisations
of those priorities.
Ten Most Codified Lessons from Each Sample
Academic Sample Operational Sample Policy Sample
Weak In-Country Health Sys-
tems
Training Coordination
Diagnostics Communication Communication
Rapid Response Health Emergency Reserve
Force
Accountability
Community Trust of Respon-
ders
Community Involvement Health Systems Strengthen-
ing
Patient Isolation Personal Protective Equip-
ment
Training
Research and Development Early-Warning Surveillance WHO Regional Office Struc-
ture
Clinical Trials Bottom-Up Community En-
gagement
WHO Human Resources
Training Vaccines Collective State Action
Development Sample Transport Community Involvement
WHO Financing WHO Financing Civil-Military Response
Table 5.3: Table of the ten most codified lessons in each of the three samples for document analysis.
Looking at the operational sample, we see much more operational concerns displayed.
Looking at the top three, training is often concerning the ways in which local healthcare
workers are trained - “Hiring and training local staff members can enhance local capacity,
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creating a pool of trained personnel who can respond in the aftermath of another public
health crisis” (Purpura et al., 2016, p.965). Furthermore, the operational lessons also
concern the creation of a cadre of personnel which can be rapidly deployed in an emergency.
Both of these examples demonstrate operational concerns of the operational sample.
For policy, the priorities are much more governance-oriented. The top three for the
policy sample concern the coordination of the various agencies and actors who are in-
volved in the response - “The Ebola epidemic has resulted in the interaction between
public health, humanitarian aid, civil protection and development and cooperation sec-
tors. Identifying and understanding the main challenges to cooperation among sectors is
paramount” (European Union, 2015, p.13). Additionally, the governance focus is displayed
when we look at examples from communication (“Define and communicate clear decision
making mechanisms for a response. Ensure that staff in key management positions are (i)
aware of Oxfam’s humanitarian mission (ii) take the right steps to build capacity and (iii)
if they do not have the experience required are aware that decisions may need to be made
elsewhere with them working alongside an emergency lead.” (Adams et al., 2015, p.8))
and from accountability (“A second precondition is a legal and policy foundation to guide
the response and establish accountability” (Kruk et al., 2015, p.1910)). This distinction
in the priorities makes sense: the academic sample explores many things in depth, the
operational sample is focused on on-the-ground response priorities, and the policy sample
focuses on lessons for governance.
What we see when we look at the co-occurrence networks is in some ways similar
and in others very different. Looking at figure 5.5, in the first instance, what we see is
very similar. The academic sample provides a broad base, focusing on linkages across
multiple types, whereas the policy and academic clusters tend to focus on governance
(coordination, collective action, and accountability) and operational (training, personal
protective equipment [PPE], and isolation) priorities, respectively.
However, when we look at the lessons from which multiple pathways can be discerned,
we see more of what was seen previously in this chapter: varying priorities and connec-
tions for the same lessons. For example, the lessons on coordination are linked in different
ways depending on the sample: the academic sample links coordination with community
involvement and early-warning surveillance, while the policy sample strongly links co-
ordination with collective action. This shows how coordination for the academic sample
can be broad based, while coordination for the policy sample is narrowly focused on the
governance aspects of coordination.
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Accountability
Collective Action
Lack of Compliance with IHR Core Capacities
Coordination - General
Communication
Community Involvement
Trust Between Communities and Responders
Contact Tracing
Emergency Operating Centre
Health Systems Strengthening - General
Diagnostics
Therapeutics
Vaccines
PPE
Poliomyelitis
Rapid Development
Public Engagement -or- Education
Clinical Trials
Public Education through Social Media
Social Science - General
Animal Resevoir Surveillance
Early-warning Surveillance
Training
Lack of HCWs in Country Health Systems
Isolation
Surveillance - General
Rapid Development of MCMs
Figure 5.10: Network Graph representing how frequently lessons co-occur. Blue arcs represent the academic
sample, red arcs represent the policy sample, and green arcs represent the operational sample.
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5.4 The Ebola Crisis: Knowledge Used
What has been learned allows us to understand the level to which particular aspects of
knowledge are developed from events, but what about the other side of the cycle? As we
conceptualised in Chapter 2, knowledge accumulation operates in a cycle of experience
abstraction and knowledge testing (Argote and Miron-spektor, 2011). The previous sec-
tion observed the knowledge abstraction process, now this section observes the knowledge
use process. This section examines the results from the 23 interviews with report users
to understand the role that these codified knowledge documents play in learning from
outbreaks.
5.4.1 How are reports viewed?
Given the exceptional and paradigm-challenging nature of the Ebola Crisis demonstrated
above, we would expect to see that codified analyses of the outbreak’s characteristics
are useful. This is because the exceptional and complex nature of the crisis necessitates
an equally complex learning process (Comfort and Kapucu, 2006). The utility of these
reports stem from their ability to represent multiple voices and knowledges at once (Zollo
and Winter, 2002) and transfer across time and space (Echajari and Thomas, 2015). These
characteristics make them important for situations where common knowledge is ineffective
or inapplicable (Booth, 1993).
When discussing so-called lessons learned reports with users, the general views on these
reports were mixed but generally weighted towards negative views rather than positive.
While there were 23 positive comments from 13 interviewees, there were 36 negative com-
ments from 21 interviewees. Comments discussing the positive aspects focus on the value
of the output itself for advocacy purposes, the value of participating in report processes,
and the consensus across the reports pointing to gaps in responses or knowledge. The neg-
ative aspects converge, generally, around accessibility, performativity, and implementation
of the reports themselves.
Implementation
In general, the main frustration with so-called lessons learned reports is the lack of im-
plementation of the recommendations made by panels. In total, 21 comments were made
about implementation by 12 interviewees. For some, the issue of implementation is simply
lamented:
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“I don’t think we’re learning the lessons which is quite frustrating because a
lot of time and energy goes into and they just end up on a pile of [reports].”
(Interviewee 006)
“So lessons identified is something that I’ve used for about the last ten years
because I got fed up with going to lessons learned/after event discussions to
hear that ‘oh well communications was a problem’ because I’d heard it for so
many years before but nothing had ever happened. So you can’t describe it
as a lesson – you’ve identified it as a lesson, [but] what do you do with it?”
(Interviewee 010)
For others, it is much more about the lack of political will for implementation of the
recommendations:
“If you really have the wherewithal to go through all of these reports you can
see certain common threads and you can see that certain mistakes are repeated
over and over and you ask why after this report didn’t this fundamentally
change why didn’t this fundamentally change. And you realise that there are
certain political and economic forces that need to change before you can expect
that the nature of epidemic response can change” (Interviewee 036)
“It’s almost in some ways just having written documentation of what went
wrong and what happened next and I think that there’s very little value to
the actual reports beyond that if they’re not used in more of a policy oriented
way which is why we’re targeting WHA, trying to use leadership, putting out
a course, trying to not just have this be a piece of paper that sits on the shelf
but actually inform political input.” (Interviewee 041)
“I think that at a big political level, the world, major governments, and mem-
ber states and WHO tend to be reactive to problems. So you can somewhat
see why, there are a million reports that come out everyday that say some
problem’s going to end the world and as a policymaker it’s very hard for you
to separate the wheat from the chaff in that.” (Interviewee 042)
Furthermore, even if political will is there, interviewees note that it is often difficult to
put into practice either due to a lack of access or inherent difficulty:
“I always think there’s a value in lessons learned as long as they don’t turn into
what we call ‘lessons forgotten.’ One of the challenges that we tend to have
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is that we do a lot of data collection post-event and it gets archived and then
no one ever looks at it because the human condition is one in which we tend
to value the less of history as we do the in situ intuitiveness of the moment.”
(Interviewee 061)
“The issue is the actual implementation of the recommendations. With any-
thing, with any guidance, with any observation, okay we look at the problem,
we identify what the problem is but how do we make it better next time? I
think its in the – the answer is in the implementation. How everybody is going
to take these recommendations and put them into practice.” (Interviewee 065)
The essence of the negative comments on the whole surround these issues of implement-
ation, interviewees don’t find that reports are useful if the recommendations are not im-
plemented. This view is understandable and consistent with the cyclic view of knowledge
accumulation wherein knowledge must be used to be accumulated (Argote and Miron-
spektor, 2011).
Output, process, and consensus utility
Looking towards the positive aspects of these so-called lessons learned reports, however,
we find three main uses which give them value. First, the reports themselves are viewed
as useful outputs. Their utility is seen in tools for advocacy:
“once a report is out then the others they have their own ideas but they don’t
start out from scratch; they know what has been proposed by the others. So
yeah they are useful in terms of advocacy, in terms of making the political
case.” (Interviewee 027)
The report allows for individuals advocating for change to make an evidence-based argu-
ment, backed by the report’s narrative and recommendations. Additionally, the reports are
useful to share knowledge and recommendations which can subsequently be implemented:
“We know that all of these panels were discussed by the WHO Executive Com-
mittee. We know that WHO is making changes that were recommendations
from some of these panels. So I think that’s where it has more direct impact.”
(Interviewee 027)
“The reports are useful and in some cases the reports do share gaps that
the actors that are meant to be the sort of change agent weren’t aware of.”
(Interviewee 002)
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This fits with the notion, put forth by Zollo and Winter (2002) and Echajari and Thomas
(2015), that the codified knowledge is useful for transferring a particular piece of knowledge
across time and space.
Second, the processes of panels themselves are seen to be useful as learning opportunit-
ies for those involved and as opportunities to ‘make sense’ of what happened. Participating
on panels allowed for understanding and reflecting on ones own personal experiences:
“its participatory, it allows me also to reflect on I the past what has been done,
what I was doing, what it was like, what were the issues. I think we got it, for
me I found it very useful.” (Interviewee 015)
Furthermore, it is useful for gaining the perspective of others on experiences to collectively
understand what happened:
“many of the individuals there hadn’t been directly involved in dealing with
the outbreak at all, which was quite useful because it brings perspective that
those who were involved in it might just gloss over.” (Interviewee 010)
“To be honest I think there’s some value in that because when you’re in an
experience, objectivity is at best subjective and being removed from those data
you can look at it through somewhat of a different lens more parametrically
to compare and contrast your variables to make sure that they’re grounded
in such a way that if you were actually participants in such an event may be
harder to do.” (Interviewee 061)
More abstractly, one interviewee posed the what happened question as the central function
of the report:
“At its most basic level, it is to try and piece together in a coherent way the
chronology of events and to understand the way events unfolded and what the
reasons were for that in order to be able to understand analogous events in the
future.” (Interviewee 007)
This understanding of the process of reporting being useful for ‘making sense’ of what
happened is consonant with Gephart et al. (1990) and Brown (2000, 2004) who argue that
a report’s function is to create a narrative of what happened to re-establish trust and
authority for social institutions. Furthermore, personal reflexivity as part of the processes
of a report’s construction align with the reflexive understanding of codification processes
put forth by Zollo and Winter (2002) and Echajari and Thomas (2015).
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Third, moving from a view of single reports’ functions, some interviewees noted how
the consensus across multiple documents gave the recommendations credence:
“I think power of the different reports was the consensus across them.” (In-
terviewee 041)
“I think that the number of reports is a reflection of how profound the exper-
ience was and that it motivated so many different organizations to rally, put
resources, put names on the line, and try to move things forward. So while it
looks like there were too many and they were redundant and there’s a certain
kind of silliness to this, it really wasn’t silly it was a reflection of the profundity
of what happened ” (Interviewee 044)
“It’s the same recommendations for everybody, I would be surprised if people
came up with completely different lessons because it was clear what happened,
you can’t really come up with completely different or opposite recommenda-
tions on how to make it better.” (Interviewee 065)
For these interviewees, then, the utility of reports here stems from the consensus across
them. Through a demonstrable consensus across many of the main reports, at least, it
becomes ‘obvious’ what ‘the lessons’ were and gives a discrete problem set to fix. In
theory, if the recommendations across all reports were each the result of a “thorough
and careful investigation” (Birkland, 2009, p.149), this consensus would then provide a
cohesive platform for agenda-setting and policy change (Birkland, 1998, 2009).
Exclusive, superficial, and inapplicable lessons
These are not wholly positive aspects, however. Many of these aspects flip to being
negative when one shifts the view to more specifically looking towards whose knowledge
the consensus privileges and why. The most negative group among those interviewed
were those whose role was operational and whose discipline was disaster/ crisis response.
Issues here did hit upon implementation but were more focused on issues like a lack of
participation, a lack of applicability and access, as well as finding the consensus across
reports problematic, not positive.
This flip can be seen quite clearly when we take one academic and one operational
view:
“The outcome has been, again, the most important one in my view is the
country-level activities.” (Interviewee 005, academic)
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“the actual rich details around donor flexibility, community response, like self-
help and self-care and self-intervention by the hospitals . . . none of that ever
came out, it was never part of the debrief. I feel like any of the lessons learned
type stuff was all just superficial, like duh, anybody who’s spent like a month
here would be like what are we going to do with this?” (Interviewee 058,
operational)
Looking at these quotes we can see how the academic interviewee considers country-level
important, the operational interviewee notes how country-level lessons were insufficient.
While the academic interviewee is confident that “country-level activities” have been high-
lighted as “the most important” aspect of knowledge produced from the Ebola Crisis, the
operational interviewee notes that these outcomes are “limited” and “superficial” for their
purposes. This lack of examination of issues important to operational responders made
the lessons derived either too broad to be applicable or obvious to these individuals.
As one explanation for this, interviewees cited a lack of operational responders’ and
community participation in lessons learned processes for reports’ lack of engagement with
operational issues:
“At best a couple of Africans at a continental NGOs like Africare, eHealth,
and others all of which have their pros and cons . . . other than that, no organ-
izations were never really involved in any of these [lessons learned exercises]”
(Interviewee 058, operational)
“The proportion of these things being written by people who were not there
is quite extraordinary and so I think to some extent probably some of us . . .
when people external are writing things and you’re there you’re thinking what
would they know that I don’t know already?” (Interviewee 062, operational)
“I’m very sceptical about that because I think that the general weakness of all
these reports is that they don’t involve the stakeholders. In the panel was the
former Minister of Health from Nigeria, and Mosoka Fallah – it was cosmetic.
Not necessarily Mosoka, but most of the people who had to respond to it with
the tools they had on the ground and the structures they had. They were
not there. The same for the USAID report about civil mobilization. They
interview the same usual suspects over and over and over.” (Interviewee 034,
academic)
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“The problem is that it is still a community of practice, and a small community
of practice or community of interest where we don’t tend to see people outside
the pandemics realm and that will probably include emergency responders in
that, being interested in this.” (Interviewee 061, academic)
This exclusive participation ensured that decisions around audience, issues explored, and
final report were made by those invited. This is particularly salient when one considers
that interviewees above cited discovering ‘what happened’ as a primary function of the
lessons learned report, as well as Gephart et al. (1990) and Brown (2000, 2004) who
note that these reports play a role in cultural sensemaking around crisis. Given a lack
of participation and the ‘making sense’ function of these reports, this raises the question
whose sense is being made.
This sentiment is echoed further by interviewees noting the consensus across the lessons
learned reports. While consensus for some interviewees was a positive, others have found
it to be limited in its scope:
“I think overall there have been too many reports that have almost identical
recommendations ... Almost all focusing on WHO, there were so many people
who messed up this response. You cannot just blame WHO, although they
certainly do deserve some blame.” (Interviewee 062, operational)
“I think it’s very worrying, it shows that we’re unable to think out of the box.
It shows that the global health community is . . . these reports are made by
the same usual suspects all the time. Some of the diagnosis, it’s scary because
it produces the same recipes that are responsible for the failures” (Interviewee
034, academic)
For these interviewees, the consensus is not a sign of ‘the lessons’ being learned but an
indication of how closed learning has been to knowledges outside of the dominant narrative.
This further indicates the way in which the sense that was being made was limited to only
certain viewpoints, excluding other knowledges, and limiting the usability of lessons.
In terms of utility, the central value of these reports, then, is derived both from the
report itself being an advocacy tool but also from the process allowing for participants
and readers to ‘make sense’ of ‘what happened’. This view is consonant both with the
views of sensemaking scholars (e.g. Gephart et al., 1990; Brown, 2000, 2004) and of know-
ledge management scholars (e.g. Zollo and Winter, 2002; Argote and Miron-spektor, 2011;
Echajari and Thomas, 2015). Reports, however, are perceived to be weak in terms of
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their implementation due to a lack of buy-in and political will. Additionally, reports were
perceived to be performative objects whose lessons were likely inapplicable and whose pro-
cesses were exclusive and superficial. This also follows the work of Gephart et al. (1990),
Brown (2000, 2004), and Birkland (2009) who argue that the reports produced are often
performative objects whose lessons are not implemented.
5.4.2 How are reports used?
Given these perceptions of reports, with the sceptical value assigned to them by inter-
viewees, it is useful to explore how the reports are actually used by operational respon-
ders, academics, and policymakers. With variances in the views of when and where reports
have utility, we describe here how interviewees use the reports or processes in their own
knowledge activities but also the limits of report/ panel process utility. Primarily we
saw previously a split in who finds reports useful: policymakers use them to make policy,
while operational responders don’t find them useful. As we shall see in this section, one of
the central reasons for this split is that operational responders’ knowledge processes are
generally tacit and reliant upon personal networks whereas policymakers’ knowledge pro-
cesses are generally more diversified and include a number of different processes including
so-called reports.
In the first instance, the use of codified knowledge is limited for some users because
of its accessibility and searchability. If responders cannot find or access knowledge that
is codified, then its knowledge is not transferred to where it needs to be. One interviewee
told a story about how the inaccessibility of knowledge made them feel as if they were
re-inventing the wheel:
“one colleague who was 27 and had a law degree and spent her evenings looking
up decontamination techniques for ambulances and these sorts of things ... it
was really remarkable, we felt like we were doing this stuff for the first time,
like no-one in the world had ever decontaminated an ambulance ... it was like
Ed from DfID [sic] had invented safe burials” (Interviewee 062)
The interviewee then went on to note:
“A couple of months later, she finds that there’s whole textbooks on this but
the availability of that technical information, that how-to information was sur-
prisingly inaccessible given that we’ve had loads of, not just Ebola outbreaks,
but similar outbreaks.” (Interviewee 062)
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In this case knowledge which should have been reasonably well established and common
knowledge was unavailable to those who needed it because finding such information was
difficult.
We can also see from the interviews the importance of personal/professional networks
in finding and using knowledge in response. For example:
“It is pretty much, because I work with WHO on a lot of things, I get mainly
WHO documents. The school of hygiene, being an ex alumni I get invited to
a lot of the lectures so I went to a lot on EVD. But other things outside of the
UK its pretty much if they come my way.” (Interviewee 010)
Additionally, one interviewee noted how
“[we have] 2500 staff members of which 1800 are overseas and they all have
their own little networks and people have contacted us with ‘I know someone
at CDC and I’ve contacted him”’ (Interviewee 066)
Often knowledge input into responses comes down to professional networks both from
education and from cooperative projects. These professional partnerships are difficult and
expensive to maintain, however, but worth the effort in some instances as one interviewee
noted:
“Simply having a partnership allowed us to routinely have meetings and travel
to fancy capital cities for the meetings and many people ask why? it’s a waste
of resource? But in reality it is those meetings, which did allow for shared
best practice, [that] built real trust and trust where, during Zika one country
called me in the middle of the night and we were able to do something which
probably saved both governments lots of money, headaches and was good for
public health.” (Interviewee 002)
During the response itself, some interviewees noted it was also useful having members of
their teams have different skills:
“we didn’t know how to do operations so we hired someone to do it for us.
But importantly when we had problems that person knew where to look, we
needed with a very limited budget we tried to make every dollar go as for as
we could for as many hospitals as we could.” (Interviewee 058)
“You need people who are closer to that kind of information maybe because
they’re specialists or whatever, you need them to come and maybe be available
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to give presentations in National coordination and people like me could make
that happen. I was constantly coming across people who I thought knew stuff
that I thought we could use for the broader response and I would drive them
along to the coordination meetings and I would say now this person is going to
present to us on thing X but that was such an arbitrary process and there were
a lot of times when I wouldn’t run into that person in the lobby” (Interviewee
062)
This use of team members as a source of knowledge is much more tacit in nature and
involves being responsive to needs rather than preparing specific knowledge for responses.
Furthermore, personal networks themselves are important for gathering knowledge.
Interviewees described how their knowledge would come from personal e-mails from indi-
viduals:
“if I see something I’ll copy and shoot e-mails to people that I think would
be interested so we have a sort of informal way and we do keep each other
informed that way” (Interviewee 066)
One interviewee noted how responders from the clinical or public health sphere tended to
have more well refined questions and better access to knowledge:
“we still knew startlingly little about Ebola. This outbreak posed us so many
new challenges and we knew maybe even less at the community level but there
were very useful books that none of us were reading ... The second part, is that
their networks were just tighter. If you look at some of the people working
with WHO, their day job is likely with a University, their day jobs are just
immediately tighter, they just happen to come from that sort of academic,
operational. So before the research was even published, people would already
have seen or heard about it.” (Interviewee 062, emphasis added)
In this we see the value of personal networks in allowing individuals to understand de-
velopments in a broader field before publication. Additionally, knowledge of publications
already out there that could have informed responses but didn’t reinforces the idea that
dissemination is paramount of a report’s success in knowledge transfer. Interviewee 062
asserted that “there were very useful books that none of us were reading” refers to Ebola,
culture, and politics by Hewlett and Hewlett (2008) which details a medical anthropolo-
gical account of an Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo and includes
details of the value of community involvement in responses that was not utilised in the
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response. On the other hand, public health and clinical professionals in the response were
embedded in universities and thus had access to publications as they were being written,
providing more immediate access to knowledge.
These professional, team, and personal network examples demonstrate the importance
of transactive knowledge in complex settings and responses. Transactive knowledge is not
about knowing what but about knowing who - who knows the answers to questions you
have? (Brauner and Becker, 2006). For our purposes, however, it shows that the knowledge
value of the report is not isolated to the codified output but the tacit knowledge held by
the authors. The accessibility of a report’s recommendations is therefore a function of the
accessibility of the authors as well as the report text.
Returning to the availability of knowledge, this point on transactive knowledge is
particularly salient given that interviewees often turned WHO and CDC to for knowledge
because of their reputations as expert actors in this space. As one interviewee noted:
“We tried to get WHO to help, that would have always been my instinctive
approach. Would not have been a google search but these are the guys with
the mandate ... I would always have been going on to ‘who are the experts on
this and they should be telling us what’s what.’ This was one of my mistakes
in the response because I should have been looking at it but I was like they’re
the right people to be telling us things.” (Interviewee 062)
Additionally, when asked where they search for knowledge if problems are encountered,
one interviewee answered:
“A combination of things, including going on websites like the WHO, there’s
Massachusetts General here that has a department called the Global Response
Group and we’ve been in contact with those people.” (Interviewee 062)
Another interviewee answered:
“Coming back to your question, where do you go when problems arise in re-
sponse, where do you look for a solution, when it came to technically what do
we implement, the experts; CDC and WHO” (Interviewee 058)
Knowledge availability and the use of reports is not, therefore, simply about whether
recommendations are presented in a clear and implementable way but that these recom-
mendations come from a reputable and readily available source. The users of a report
must trust the source, authors, and motives of the report - preferably through personal
and physical engagement with the panel members themselves.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed the embedding case for this thesis, the 2013-2016 Ebola crisis.
The first part of this chapter established the paradigm-breaking nature of the ebola crisis.
First, demonstrating that the GHSp’s conceptualization of a crisis was matched by the
ebola crisis through high death rates, potential (then actual) economic chaos, and a dis-
cursive securitization of the crisis. Given these characteristics, the three tenets of the
GHSp’s response to insecurity should have been seen in full force but were not.
As we saw, the surveillance designed to provide early-warning of an outbreak did
not notify the world of ebola cases until three months after the index case had died.
Furthermore, in the face of mounting panic, the WHO that was supposed to lead and be
authoritative did not respond and didn’t even declare a PHEIC until five months after
the first reports and after the death toll had reach triple figures. Finally, the medical
countermeasures that were supposed to be rapidly produced to protect responders and
treat patients was absent, despite ebola being known to science and a frequent outbreak
for the last 40 years.
Establishing the ebola crisis as a crucial case allowed us to motivate examining the
production and use of codified knowledge in this context. Recalling Kolb (1984), Argyris
(1999), and Argote and Miron-spektor (2011) we define knowledge accumulation as a
recursive cycle characterised by abstracting knowledge from experiences and using that
knowledge in new, similar experiences. This chapter was therefore designed to examine
both sides of this cycle in the context of the ebola crisis.
Given the paradigm-break nature of the ebola crisis, we should have expected to see
a number of ‘new’ lessons that were not part of the GHSp being produced and codified.
Through an analysis of 267 different documents detailing lessons from the ebola crisis
we saw that, on the whole, this is indeed true. We saw that, broadly, the main lessons
codified from the ebola crisis concerned communication, community involvement, and
health systems strengthening.
When we looked deeper at these lessons, however, we saw that each sample discussed
them differently. The academic lessons were generally highly interconnected and abstract
while the policy and operational lessons were much more goal-oriented in nature. This
indicated an intuitive idea that different authors and audiences produce different lessons
in different ways and for different reasons.
As we began to explore how the lessons were codified, however, we found two dis-
tinct phenomena: first, the new lessons on communications, community involvement, and
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health systems strengthening were often re-framed often into terms and conceptualizations
amenable to the GHSp. For example, we saw how HSS was re-framed to create a develop-
ment framing of building in-country capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks
rapidly. This is as opposed to building health systems more broadly in line with the needs
of the country. This suggested that lessons codified are viewed through the lens of the
dominant paradigm, even if they are outside of this paradigm’s main narrative.
Second, we saw how the GHSp,as a lens, shapes the depth of analysis for certain
lessons. As shown, the lessons surrounding communication, community involvement, and
HSS were often superficial and loosely defined whereas lessons pertaining to the WHO’s
authority or to the rapid production of medical countermeasures often had much more
detail and depth of analysis associated with them.
Both the re-framing of new knowledge into the existing paradigm and the high depth
of analysis for certain knowledge in the paradigm are consistent with Kuhn (1970) and
his notion of a paradigm-guided investigation. Additionally, the development of some
knowledges and not others is indicative of the path-dependent nature of paradigms that
both Dosi (1982) and Hall (1993) refer to. We can therefore infer that the production of
knowledge from the ebola crisis, despite the paradigm-challenging nature of the event, was
informed and shaped by the Global Health Security paradigm.
As we explored the other side of the knowledge accumulation cycle, we queried the
utility of codified knowledge in outbreak responses. Our motivation here was to explore
how, if at all, the lessons codified like those in section 5.3 are translated into practice.
We explored this using 23 interviews conducted with various types of report users to
understand how they use reports and their normal knowledge practices during outbreaks.
The first thing we noted with these interviews was the difficulty in implementing the
results from so-called lessons learned reports. Owing to the political and financial chal-
lenges of introducing sweeping reforms or of massively reconfiguring health systems, many
of the interviewees were concerned about the implementability of report recommendations.
Furthermore, interviewees were concerned that reports would simply ‘end up on a pile’
and never be looked at again.
Interviewees were positive about some aspects of reports. In particular, the consensus
across the reports from the ebola crisis for some interviewees indicated a clear set of the
lessons to be implemented and gave a clear agenda. These interviewees found that the
reports themselves allowed for a clear articulation of priorities and were a useful advocacy
tool. Operational and disaster response interviewees were, on the other hand, critical of
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this consensus, describing it as a lack of ‘thinking outside the box’ and noting that these
lessons were often superficial or inapplicable to them.
Looking at interviewees’ normal knowledge sources and processes it was clear that
participation and ease of access were paramount in the use of knowledge. Interviewees
were highly dependent on their personal and professional networks to provide them with
knowledge. This is often ad hoc and highly dependent upon transactive knowledge (Brau-
ner and Becker, 2006) about who knows what. Interviewees here also noted how a lack
of applicability, trust in the reports, and of capacity to find knowledge inhibited them
from using prior knowledge and thus required them to effectively re-invent a number of
standard practices anew.
We found, effectively, that the GHSp had constrained the lessons produced from the
ebola crisis. This was either by re-framing novel lessons like health systems strengthening
or community involvement into instruments for GHSp priorities, or by reducing the depth
of analysis for extra-paradigmatic lessons. We also found that the use of these reports is
highly dependent upon the applicability of the lessons, participatory nature/dissemination
of the report, and the ability of users to know who knows the answers to questions they
have.
Returning to Birkland (2009), we can refer back to his ideal-type model of event-based
learning in Figure 5.11 and the notion of a ‘thorough and careful investigation’ that leads
to policy change. In viewing this we can ask what are the characteristics that make an
investigation thorough and careful and what leads to agenda attention, group mobilization,
and policy change?
According to the results of this chapter, a thorough and careful investigation that
will lead to agenda attention, group mobilisation, and policy change has the following
characteristics:
1. The process is participatory - this ensures that stakeholders are aware of the results
as well as who understands the results and can be approached with questions of
problems
2. There is a strong evidence base - this allows users to trust the report’s conclusions
and gives users a rationale for advocating policy changes
3. The report is disseminated well - this creates both attention and awareness of the
report whilst also making the authors and the knowledge more easily accessible
because users will know that it exists and is applicable to them
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Figure 5.11: An ideal model of event-related policy change
Source: (Birkland, 2009, p.151)
The exact nature of these three characteristics will vary depending upon the investigation’s
audience, purpose, and event in question but these three factors seem to determine how
well a report is implemented.
The next two chapters take these three characteristics and map them onto two report-
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construction processes: the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel and the Harvard-London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s Independent Panel on the Global Response
to Ebola. In examining these, we shall first show two examples of where these three
characteristics were absent. We shall then also demonstrate, by taking the two together,
that a focus on the process of report-construction as well as the inputs and outputs is
important.
149
Chapter 6
Embedded Case 1: The Ebola
Interim Assessment Panel
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have described outbreak response as focused on the production of med-
ical countermeasures, the empowering of WHO to respond, and the use of early-warning
surveillance systems. This dominant paradigm of outbreak preparedness and response was
challenged by the 2013-2016 Ebola crisis’ initial lack of countermeasures, weaknesses and
delays in WHO action, and a surveillance system lacking capacity. The lessons which have
been codified in the wake of the Ebola crisis demonstrate a recurrence of this paradigm
with the addition of community engagement and public communication. Furthermore, the
policy and operational literatures were found to be the elements of the sample which focus
the broad academic base into clusters.
This chapter focuses on a case of a lessons learned document; the Ebola Interim As-
sessment Panel (EIAP). The aim is to understand how, from such a broad possible base
of knowledge, the final documents were constructed through the work of the panel. To
answer to question ”how was codified knowledge produced and used in the Ebola Crisis?”
this chapter will ask: what lessons were codified in the report of the EIAP? What narrative
justifies these codified lessons? What processes were used to arrive at these conclusions?
What evidence was considered in arriving at these conclusions?
The panel was commissioned on 25th January 2015 in a Special Session of the Executive
Board of WHO. Over the course of the Panel’s work between commissioning and final
publication of the report (July 7th 2015), four main phases appear to have occurred. First,
a scoping phase in which the external context, narrative, and individual agency forms a
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definition of purpose for the panel and initial thoughts on recommendations and lessons.
Second, an evidence gathering phase collects data, evidence, and perspectives under the
scope from the initial phase. Third, a closing-down phase settles on a final narrative
and recommendations, ensuring evidence supports the recommendations made. Finally, a
dissemination phase occurs through which the recommendations made are disseminated
to the wider community. This section explores what occurred in each phase and how it
impacted the final report.
What we can see with the recommendations is a clear alignment with the priorities of
policymakers. In table 6.1 we have the top recommendations of the three samples seen
previously in chapter 5. In this table, each of the recommendations that appear in the
report of the EIAP are highlighted. While 2 of the top operational lessons appear in the
report of EIAP, 4 out of the the top policy lessons and all of the top academic lessons
appear in the report. This is not necessarily surprising as this is a policy document and as
such its alignment with policy priorities is expected, but its direction at academic priorities
does not necessarily follow.
Table 6.1: Five most codified lessons stratified by sample. Lessons in bold appear in the report of the
EIAP.
Five Most Codified Lessons from Each Sample Appearing in EIAP
Academic Sample Operational Sample Policy Sample
Weak In-Country Health
Systems
Training Coordination
Diagnostics Communication Communication
Rapid Response Health Emergency Reserve
Force
Accountability
Community Trust of Re-
sponders
Community Involvement Health Systems Strength-
ening
Patient Isolation Personal Protective Equip-
ment
Training
# of lessons: 5/5 # of lessons: 2/5 # of lessons: 4/5
Source: Author’s elaboration
Looking at the composition of the panel (table 6.2) we find that the panel is balanced
in terms of expertise between humanitarians, health experts, and global governance ex-
perts as well as institutional and geographical backgrounds. This is interesting given the
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Table 6.2: Table of Panellists and Backgrounds
Panellist Expertise Institutional
Background
Geographical
Background
Dame Barabara
Stocking
Humanitarian NGO United Kingdom
Jean-Jacques
Muyembe-
Tamfum
Health Government Democratic Re-
public of Congo
Faisal Shuaib Health Government Nigeria
Carmencita
Alberto-Banatin
Humanitarian International Or-
ganization/ Con-
sulting
The Philippines
Ilona Kickbusch Global Gov-
ernance
Academia Germany
Julio Frenk Global Gov-
ernance
Academia/ Gov-
ernment
Mexico
Source: Author’s elaboration with data from World Health Organization (2015e)
discrepancy in the lessons themselves: why is there not a balance of all three categories?
This chapter explores the process of producing the report of the EIAP, highlighting its
accountability aim and need to be seen to be ‘doing something’ context. This context will
be followed by a series of sections of various phases of report construction which identify
key processes and highlight how they related to lessons stated in the report. Generally,
this chapter will demonstrate how the process of producing the report of the EIAP had
very little scope or time to be able to fully examine the Ebola Crisis and to be able to
learn the lessons. This led to a report which broadly adhered to the GHSp and produced
lessons that reinforce the systematic failures that led to the Ebola Crisis.
6.2 Report Context
The Ebola Interim Assessment Panel was convened at the behest of the WHO Executive
Board during its Special Session on Ebola. This Special Session, held on in Geneva on the
25th of January 2015, was convened to discuss the Ebola crisis and the WHO response to
it. This section outlines the context in which the report was produced, noting its broader
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intention outside of a simple evaluation of WHO’s response to the Ebola crisis and the
external outbreak context over the period in which the report was authored.
From its request on the 25th January 2015, to its first reporting at the 68th World
Health Assembly between May 18th and May 26th 2015, the authors had less than four
months to gather data, discuss, and draft the conclusions. A further 6 weeks were then
taken (during which time the panel met for a third and final time) to finalise the report
which was published on July 7th 2015. In the five months from 25th January 2015 to
July 7th 2015, the response and outbreak contexts changed significantly. The report was
commissioned after a series of response failures, a mounting crisis of increasing infections,
and a scaling up of response efforts. The report was published when case and death report
rates had fallen rapidly, recovery efforts were being put into place, and the response was
scaling down.
Additionally, during the EIAP’s process, other panels were convening and being com-
missioned. Figure 6.1 (overleaf) shows the case and death rates mapped onto the period
of each of the five major report processes. This shows how the EIAP was established and
conducted as the outbreak was winding down. Furthermore it shows how the EIAP is
the shortest of the five major reports, was published first and, as we shall see later, had
common panel members or communication with all four of the other panels. As we shall
argue when looking at the process, this context is important because the EIAP set the
tone for the other reports.
Looking at the case and death reports for the outbreak, a significant fall can be seen.
On 21st of January 2015, a total of 368 new cases and 169 deaths were reported from
the previous week (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). By July 8th, the
total new cases and total deaths were down to 69 and 15, respectively (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, 2016). WHO declared Liberia free of Ebola on May 9th 2015,
not for the last time during this crisis (McKie, 2015).This reduction of case load by 81%
and of death rate by 91% shows the drastic improvements made between the report’s
commissioning and its publication.
Looking at the WHO situation reports from the outbreak, it is clear that the response
was winding down as the report was being authored. Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) are a
good indicator of the scale-up and scale-down evident at inception and publication of this
report. At inception, 44 ETUs were open and 17 were under construction (World Health
Organization, 2015c), whereas at publication 24 ETUs had been closed and 24 were to
remain open (World Health Organization, 2015d). Similarly, the laboratory capacity shows
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a scale up and then back down. In January of 2015 27 laboratories were actively performing
Ebola diagnostics, with a further 5 planned (World Health Organization, 2015c) whereas
in July 2015 24 laboratories were active and a further 16 had been closed (World Health
Organization, 2015d). This demonstrates a scaling down of the response in addition to
the decreasing case reports.
In addition to the on-ground realities, there was also a clear external narrative sur-
rounding WHO at the time of the report’s commissioning. This narrative, promoted by
both media sources and academic communities, placed blame on WHO. For example, a
BBC report of leaked internal documents and comments from WHO Director-General de-
tailed how they “signal growing concerns about the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts
against Ebola” (BBC, 2014). This narrative of blame may have put WHO in a defensive
posture as it calls for an analysis of its own actions in the response.
A further BBC report focuses on the Executive Board Special Session which convened
the EIAP and headlines that WHO Director-General admitted that WHO was “too slow”
(BBC, 2015). Further to these, a news feature in the British Medical Journal in October
2014 commented on WHO’s delayed response and quotes MSF International President
Joanne Liu saying “I am running out of words to convey the sense of urgency” (Arie,
2014). The narrative surrounding the EIAP then, was one of blaming WHO for the state
of the Ebola crisis, requiring an intense accountability performance to restore faith in the
institution.
In the aftermath of the report, the coverage was similarly blame filled. One feature
by Radio France International called the report of the EIAP “too little, too late” on the
part of WHO, citing Liberian and Sierra Leonean officials (Bagnetto, 2015). The MSF
response to the report queried how the recommendations will “translate into real action
on the ground in future outbreaks” and discussed how “we went from global indifference,
to global fear, to global response and now to global fatigue” (Liu, 2015a) demonstrating a
wider, more global view. And an article in The New Yorker focused on the West and how
politics delayed the response, saying that “this negligence would be unforgivable in any
instance, but it is not the first time” (Specter, 2015). This contextual focus on who the
report blames is important because it reveals the success of the report in shifting blame
from WHO to the political institutions which created and continue to fund it.
The report of the EIAP, then, was established in the height of the outbreak but was
conducted as the crisis was slowly lifting. In the early context of the report it is clear
that the focus was on blaming WHO for the Ebola Crisis and that EIAP had a task of
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providing accountability for WHO. In the aftermath of the report, it is clear that the
report was successful in diffusing blame across not just WHO but its Member States as
well, focusing criticisms on the political barriers placed on WHO by member states. The
next sections explore how the processes of the EIAP produced the report itself.
6.3 Phase 1: Scoping, Terms of Reference and Panel Selec-
tion
In this first scoping phase, the WHO’s newly created Evaluation Office was tasked with
identifying panel members according to various factors like expertise, institutional back-
ground, and geographical background (Interviewee 057, see Table 6.1). First, Dame Bar-
bara Stocking was appointed as panel chair in February with an expectation for a report
by May1.
This request that was quickly rebuffed as “impossible” (interviewee 009) given that it
was mid-Feburary by the time the chair had been recruited. The deadline was then revised
to July, just two months later, and a presentation of a draft report to the 2015 WHA (sitting
in May of 2015) instead. As we shall see later this effectively kept the timetable, especially
given that very little changed between the draft report and the final report. This limited
timetable for the panel, then, was clearly geared toward WHO accountability to member
states.
Limited time for the panel also limited the amount of knowledge that could be produced
and accumulated in the panel’s processes. As put by interviewee 009 “I think that what
they thought was that they might put a bunch of people in a room for a day, and have them
- as a set of experts - just say what they thought of it.” This limited a priori understanding
of the panel’s process is suggestive of the performative accountability intended from the
outset.
Additionally, keeping the final report deadline at June allowed the panel’s report to
feed into the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on the Global Response to Health
Crises (interviewee 009). This acknowledgement that the panel would need to feed into a
wider set of reports is interesting from a knowledge accumulation perspective. On the one
hand, the acknowledgement allows for a flow of knowledge and lessons from one level to the
next. On the other hand, as we shall see in the following sections, knowledge from those
on the ground were limited in their inclusion in the EIAP’s processes, so this continuity
1This was set out in the resolution establishing the panel which requests that the report “be presented
to the Sixty-eight World Health Assembly” (WHO Executive Board, 2015, p.10)
156
of knowledge is limited solely to policy documents.
In the recommendations here, we see the impact of this with a number of recommend-
ations made for other panels to explore issues. Three recommendations give advice to
the upcoming (mandate determined by the reviews IHRs (2005) and was established in
May 2015) IHR Review Committee; to consider incentives for countries notifying WHO,
to consider disincentives for countries taking excessive traffic and trade measures, and to
consider a possible intermediate level of a PHEIC. Additionally, the panel recommend
that the United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on the Global Response
to Health Crises (UN High-Level Panel) “put global health issues at the centre of the
global security agenda” (World Health Organization, 2015e, p.6) by creating procedures
for taking health matters to the UN Security Council. Not only was the panel limited in
time and in scope, then, but the recommendations it makes are limited commensurately.
The panel’s first meeting occurred over March 30th to April 1st 2015 in Geneva. It’s
agenda was first to explore the implications of its obejctive set out in the resolution which
established the panel:
“an interim assessment, by a panel of outside experts, on all aspect of WHO’s
response, from the onset of the current outbreak of Ebola virus disease, in-
cluding within the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, in
implementing the WHO’s Emergency Response Framework, and in coordina-
tion, including resources mobilization, and functioning at the three levels of
the Organization” (WHO Executive Board, 2015, p.10).
The Terms of References, as set out in the report of the panel, are as follows:
• “assess the roles and responsibilities of WHO at all three levels of the
Organization in responding to the outbreak and how these evolved over
time;
• assess the implementation of the tool at WHO’s disposal (in particular
the Emergency Response Framework, and the International Health Regu-
lations [2005]) to carry out its mandate before, at the onset of, and during
the outbreak;
• assess WHO’s role within and its contribution to United Nations-wide
efforts (within UNMEER);
• assess the strengths and weaknesses of those actions, determine lessons
learnt that could be applied to the existing ongoing situation and for the
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future (including capacity, tools, mechanisms including coordination and
communications, structure, ways of working, resources);
• provide recommendations to guide the current response and to inform
future work, including with regard to the strengthening of organizational
capacity to respond to outbreaks and the establishment of a contingency
fund.” (World Health Organization, 2015e, p.27)
In interpreting the terms of reference, interviewees noted that WHO leadership kept a light
touch approach. Interviewee 009 noted that boundaries were clarified and that they were
not tasked with examining the whole of the UN approach, while Interviewee 056 noted
that “there was a lot of freedom for us.” Interviewee 057 noted how the Evaluation Office,
similarly, as secretariat to the panel had very limited interference from WHO leadership.
Scoping the inquiry, then, formed the first moment where the panel began shaping the
report.
In the first instance, this scoping of the inquiry gives us evidence of individual agency
in the knowledge codification process. The report of the EIAP discussed WHO as both the
Secretariat and its Member States. This framing of WHO as not simply the Secretariat but
its Member States (and therefore criticizing the Member States, not just the Secretariat)
came directly from one interviewee: Interviewee 056 noted that “most of the discussion
... had been pretty much centred around highly personalised accounts of incompetent
bureaucracy” but that the interviewee’s “main contribution was to note that WHO was
not just the Secretariat but also the Member States.”
This acknowledgement of Member State responsibility is referred to in the report itself
with a discussion of Member States’ development of core capacities. The report discusses
Member States’ necessity to develop IHR core capacities and how “many have failed to do
so” (World Health Organization, 2015e, p.10). Additionally, the report claims that it is
“irresponsible for countries with the resources to build these capacities not to have done
so” (World Health Organization, 2015e, p.11) and that states without the resources “need
support from the Secretariat and other Member States” (World Health Organization,
2015e, p.11). Further, the report discusses how “weak health systems, poor surveillance,
little early awareness of population mobility, spread of the virus in urban areas, poor
public messaging” (World Health Organization, 2015e, p.13) complicated the declaration
of a PHEIC - one of the central criticisms of WHO in the outbreak. This focus on
Member States, including placing a large weight of the blame on national health systems
and national responses, fits squarely into the logic of global health security. Furthermore,
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it shifts blame from WHO and to the Member states which is a part of this reports
accountability performance.
Additionally the report’s discussion of Member States’ taking actions beyond those in
the temporary recommendations of the Emergency Committee is also suggestive of this
acknowledgement of Member States’ responsibilities. According to the report, these travel
recommendations “significantly interfered with international traffic” (World Health Organ-
ization, 2015e, p.11). The report goes further than this, though, and says that “Member
State behaviour threatens the response to the crisis” (World Health Organization, 2015e,
p.12) and calls for “a procedure to take this matter to the United Nations Security Council”
(World Health Organization, 2015e, p.12). This raising of Member State non-compliance
to the level of the UN Security Council further added to the security narrative and further
adds to the blame shifting.
Next on scoping, interviewee 009 notes that “We didn’t have to deal with the whole
UN response, it was WHO specific. Nevertheless I said in the beginning we’re going to
have to look at what other people are doing.” In making recommendations as to how WHO
should engage with the wider health and humanitarian systems, the panel finds a distinct
lack of understanding across the health emergency and medical humanitarian actors. The
panel also cites problems with emergency grading levels and the differences between the
UN Cluster System and PHEICs - not dissimilar to the problems seen in 2009 with the
confusion across PHEIC declaration and the WHO’s own Influenza grading system. In
addition, the panel noted the role that UNMEER had and its duplication of many of the
functions of the Inter Agency Standing Committee, UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), and other UN agencies.
This set of recommendations requests that WHO staff and partners gain a better
understanding of the humanitarian system. In concert with this, it is requested that WHO
considers how to coordinate its emergency grading systems and PHEIC declarations with
the wider humanitarian system’s. The panel then goes on to recommend that the UN
High-Level Panel should emphasize ”the special nature” of health emergencies and that
understanding this within the humanitarian system should be led by UNOCHA.
That the panel tried to expand their view outside of the terms of reference demonstrates
further how the time and scope constraints affected their ability to learn more broadly.
While the panel tried to expand beyond the terms of reference, the recommendations and
discussions stuck to a very particular understanding of disease outbreaks as a “special
case” which requires specific responses and thus a centrality of WHO. Further to this, the
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recommendations include setting objectives for other panels and their reports, indicating
a lack of time and scope to fully investigate certain avenues.
We can also see how an external narrative shapes the frame with which the panel
understood the outbreak. Interviewees frequently made comments about the problems
being obvious or about knowing broadly what had happened before the panel had started
its work. Interviewee 009, for example, noted that the report “was probably the easiest
report I have ever known to write because the situation was so blatant.” This clarity from
the beginning guided the questions asked and the evidence gathered as well as motivating
the performative ‘being seen to be doing something’ aspect of the report.
Additionally, Interviewee 056 explained that “as soon as we met the first time some
things were clearly going to be very important ... the diagnosis of how bad the response
was had been done before, criticisms were loud and clear.” This was linked back to external
narratives by Interviewee 056 who said “we are all experts and had obviously been reading
the news and following developments, so we all had some ideas about what had gone on.”
Clearly, then, the narrative playing out before the panel was convened had an impact on
the understanding that panellists brought with them into the report process and impacted
the outcomes.
In terms of the dominant paradigm and the lessons established in the previous chapters,
this set of recommendations is particularly informative. Primarily, the entire swathe
of recommendations based around re-establishment of WHO as the “directing and co-
ordinating authority” (World Health Organization, 2014a, Article 2(a), p.2). This follows
the dominant paradigm’s reliance on WHO as a central actor. In addition, the call for a
“culture that accepts its role” emphasises that WHO does not only require new response
capabilities, but that its internal culture is reluctant to perform its role envisaged by
global health security.
Furthermore, the specific recommendations of bolstering WHO authority in country
offices and as the definitive communicator during health emergencies further establishes
WHO as the envisaged central coordinating actor. This is compounded by the recommen-
ded creation of a WHO Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response which envisages
WHO not just as a coordinating actor but as a response actor.
Additionally, the recommendations for the UN system to recognise and understand
health emergencies’ ”special nature” further embeds this narrative of WHO centrality.
Describing health emergencies as having a ”special nature” places the global health security
paradigm in a silo which cannot be responded to with standard humanitarian techniques,
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but only by those techniques that are ”special” also; like centralising preparedness and
response in a separate agency.
6.4 Phase 2: Evidence Collection
Additionally, the first meeting between 30th March and 1st April 2015 saw a number
of briefings and interviews, arranged by the chair (Dame Stocking) and the secretary to
the panel. Briefings included scoping issues (including WHO mandate and finances, the
2011 IHR review, and WHO’s relationship with UNMEER) and interviews with prominent
figures in the global response such as Tony Banbury of UNMEER, David Nabarro the UN
Special Envoy for Ebola, and John Ging the Director of the Coordination and Response
Division of UNOCHA. The requirement to report to the 2015 WHA in May meant that
even as the panel was scoping their inquiry, they already had to be assimilating knowledge.
Further to this, they had not defined their methods of work (see below) which means that
these briefings were chosen before the panel had decided on what they were investigating,
further limiting scope for learning.
The first meeting also concerned the methods of work for the panel. In this decision, we
see yet more individual agency for the chair. Interviewee 056 notes that “Dame Barbara
was insistent that we do some on the ground fact finding” and interviewee 009 said that
“[Dame Barbara] was not prepared to do a report when we hadn’t visited the countries.”
This extension to the methods of work - especially given interviewee 009’s earlier comment
“I think what they thought was that they might just put a bunch of people in a room for
a day” - demonstrates how the panel clearly wanted to collect more information and do
more than what WHO expected of them.
The second meeting took place on the 19th April to the 21st April 2015, just 18 days
after the first. This meeting was a further set of presentations on the Global Health
Emergency Workforce & Contingency Fund, and Communications for Ebola Response
as well as meetings with MSF, IFRC, International Organization for Migration, and the
Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, the International Council of Voluntary
Agencies, and Save the Children. While the first meeting’s evidence was arranged by Dame
Stocking and the panel’s secretary, this second meeting had evidence arranged according
to what was requested by the whole panel.
Subsequent to this the Panel went on site visits to the three most affected countries
as well as to the site of the WHO African Regional Office (AFRO) in Brazzaville, DRC.
During these visits, the Panel spoke to WHO Country Officers, partners, UN staff, and
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MoH staff (Interviewee 057). Interviewee 009 noted that “at country level, I don’t think
we saw quite as many people as I would have liked ... but we got what we needed from
each country.” Interestingly, then, while the panel did not get the data it ‘wanted’ it did
get what it ‘needed’ - suggesting that more would have been useful for answering some
questions but that their central narrative was already agreed upon before they collected
data and that confirmation bias played some role in evaluating the evidence.
On this, we see a sparing use of evidence in the report, with an intense use of evidence
in its section on community involvement. Outside of the community involvement section,
the report begins with what Andrew Brown calls ”claims regarding its comprehensiveness”
(original emphasis Brown, 2004, p.100). In the first paragraph of the main report text,
the panel says how it ”reviewed many reports and met with key people within and outside
WHO, including senior WHO staff, representatives of the United Nations Mission for
Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), international nongovernmental organizations and
Member States” (World Health Organization, 2015e, p.9). Additionally, the report makes
a number of references to what ”The Panel heard” on ”country offices’ frustration at
the lack of response from headquarters and regional levels” (World Health Organization,
2015e, p.19) and on how ”WHO’s role in research and development for potential Ebola
therapies and vaccines was a distraction from the response” (World Health Organization,
2015e, p.21).]
Over the entire report, the panel references its evidence directly only eight times.
Three of these eight occur in consecutive paragraphs in the ”community engagement”
section. The report makes statements like ”during the Panel’s visit there, it was clear
that communities still have not been fully engaged” (World Health Organization, 2015e,
p.20). There are also quotes from a Medical Anthropologist and a Liberian community
leader to demonstrate how ”engagement with local community leaders is essential” (World
Health Organization, 2015e, p.20) and the ”absolute necessity of community engagement
in a public health emergency” (World Health Organization, 2015e, p.20).
When asked about this, Interviewee 009 explained that the Panel “were concerned to
make sure the community had a voice.” On the sparse direct evidence for other aspects
of the report Dame Stocking noted that these were areas “where voice had been or would
be heard in other ways.” This explanation hints at a need for additional evidence when
it comes to topics outside of the Global Health Security Paradigm. This will be explored
later in the section on report process.
A large effort was made to get country visits into the methods of work for the panel,
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but then the information and evidence gained form these were only cited in one section.
Further to this, while the country visits were fought for, they proved useful only up
to what was necessary from them - suggesting a limited use of evidence to inform the
learning process. This is particularly important given the limited time scale and scope for
the collection and evaluation of the evidence.
6.5 Phase 3: Solidifying a Narrative
The third phase began prior to the Panel presenting its preliminary findings to the 68th
World Health Assembly (WHA68). This, again, underscores the absolute time-pressure of
this panel. The 68th World Health Assembly was held from the 18th to the 26th of May
2015, and the panel was created on the 25th of January 2015. This meant that in four
months WHO had to convene the panel, the panel had to meet, country visits had to be
arranged and conducted, and a draft report had to be written. That highly compressed
timetable limited the scope and capability of the panel to do an in depth learning process.
At the point of drafting the first report for the WHA in May, according to interviewee
009, the Panel were broadly in agreement about the shape of the report and its recom-
mendations: “we were more or less there already, it was more the details.” In particular,
the interviewee notes that “it was that second phase where the debates happened because
the clarity over what went wrong was agreed upon so early that it was more about what
the detail of the solutions would be.” The consensus and clarity that was felt early on
in the first phase of the report process, then, translated to a consensus during this third
phase despite a phase of gathering an array of evidence from various actors. This demon-
strates how the limited scope, limited time, and low use of evidence seems to have led to
the recommendations of this report.
This third phase included a third and final meeting on June 24th-25th, during which a
draft report was reviewed and discussions were held about recommendations. Comparing
the first report presented to WHA68 with the final report of the panel, two things can
be highlighted. First, we see some initial shapes of the narrative carried over into the
first report as seen in the second. This includes exceptionalising the outbreak through
explanations of what made the outbreak “particularly challenging” like “the characteristics
of the virus” (a virus known about for over 40 years) and ”underlying mistrust within
communities, highly mobile populations, and porous borders” (World Health Organization,
2015a, p.3) (a phenomenon which had also been known for many years (Hewlett and
Hewlett, 2008)). This further performs the accountability function of the report by shifting
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balme to the situation itself.
Further to this, we can see a focus on the role of the Member States, including the
very similar sentences:
• “Health is considered the sovereign responsibility of countries, however, the means to
fulfil this responsibility are increasingly global.” (World Health Organization, 2015e,
p.5)
• ”Health is primarily the sovereign responsibility of countries, but the means to fulfil
this responsibility are increasingly global.” (World Health Organization, 2015a, p.5)
These considerations show a clear line through to the panel’s early thoughts to its final
narrative, demonstrating the limited shifting of narrative from one phase to the next.
It is clear that the thoughts of the panel and the narrative they had became more
refined and confident between the two. The first report’s recommendations are spread
across 6 separate sections and buried within paragraphs of text, whereas the final report’s
recommendations are much more explicitly laid out and justifications clearly placed before
recommendations under only 3 umbrellas. This signals a refinement of the recommend-
ations into a cohesive set. Additionally, the first report notes ”It is still unclear to the
panel why early warnings, approximately from May through to July 2014, did not result
in an effective and adequate response” (World Health Organization, 2015a, p.4). This is in
contrast to the box on page 13 of the final report which details explicitly the multitude of
rationales behind a lack of simply declaring a PHEIC (World Health Organization, 2015e,
p.13). The panel, then, became much more refined and solidified its narrative over the
course of this third phase.
When talking about the construction of this report, interviewees supported this notion
of the third phase being a consensus building phase. This was, however, not always easy
given the severe time constraints within which the panel were working. In discussing the
final writing of the report, interviewee 009 said “WHO were pushing very hard to get the
report out before the UN High Level Panel to inform the UN” and noted that they were
“more worried about the timings [the Panel] were being pushed towards. I didn’t feel
we were ready and because the people were hard to get hold of, I didn’t want the report
to be me and Ilona Kickbusch.” Despite support from the secretariat, the writer/ editor
of the report “was sent to MERS in South Korea and it was ridiculous with myself and
Ilona doing the report writing” (interviewee 009). Time constraints, then, created a large
limitation to the involvement of some of the panellists in the solidifying of the narrative
and final wording of the document.
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6.6 Phase 4: Dissemination and Engagement
It is clear from the interviews and from the previous chapter’s exploration of the types
of lessons that are codified, that there is some level of interaction between the various
reports and their authors. This final phase concerns the open-ended period from a report’s
publication, and includes all the elements by which the members of the panel (and the
document itself) disseminate the findings and engage with other panels/ practitioners/
policymakers.
On engagement with other panels, the Ebola outbreak was heavily studied and written
about. Interviewee 057 notes how, after the EIAP, many others seem to produce their own
reports that followed a similar narrative and made similar recommendations. Interviewee
056 notes a similar phenomenon and expands upon their common membership: “if you
look at the set of 4 [the National Academies Report, the Harvard-LSHTM Independent
Panel, the Interim Assessment Panel, and the UN High-Level Panel] there is a lot of
overlap in membership ... there was a very small group that actually dealt with this
global governance and IHR.” So some cross-talk between the panels is to be expected,
particularly given the frequency of member overlap.
In engaging with other panels, the recommendations that the report of the EIAP
makes for the IHR Review and the UN High-Level Panel are a direct link where one panel
interacts with another. Dame Stocking and Ilona Kickbusch both gave formal evidence
to the IHR Review as part of their inquiry (Dame Stocking). This is where the panel’s
involvement ended.
The bigger difference was the UN High-Level panel which interviewee 009 lamented
“they really didn’t know enough to get to grips with it.” Over the process of the UN
High-Level Panel, Dame Stocking met with the panel a total of three times including “a
second session [where Dame Stocking] came in with a group of outside experts to help
them try and write a first initial draft.” This high level of involvement gave the EIAP a
large amount of influence over how the report of a completely separate panel was framed
and written. Interviewee 009 also notes that one panellist from the UN High-Level Panel2
said to them ”I don’t really know what there is for us to do there.” This seeming lack of
direction from one panellist, gave Interviewee 009 input over not only the evidence but the
scoping of the UN High-Level Panel. Interviewee 009 stated “I tried to say look, you’ve
got the power do to do those things at the UN level” indicating a clear input of the EIAP’s
recommendations and framing being spread to another panel’s discussions.
2Formally titled the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises
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In disseminating the panel’s thoughts and recommendations to the broader policy/
operational community, the official engagement activities were a media event in London
and a presentation of the report at the 68th and 69th World Health Assemblies.
“the only time I felt there was a conflict of interest with WHO was in the press
day ... the press person of course had to be assigned from [WHO] which itself
is a bit odd ... At the beginning of that day one of the journalists phoned and
said ‘What’s WHO’s response to [the report]?’ and I heard her start saying
something and I said ‘you’re not to say. They’ve got to phone Geneva and
find out from WHO what the response is, you’re working for me on the panel
today.’” (Interviewee 009)
Additionally, Interviewee 009 noted that “they think things just self disseminate ...
there’s something more that could have been done.” This lamentation of not fully engaging
the results with the wider system was compared with Interviewee 009’s experiences with
other organizations where “a report was the beginning of what we did, not the end of
it.” Interviewee 042, a member of the Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for
WHO’s Health Emergencies Program (formed as a direct result of the recommendations
from the EIAP) notes how “it’s not enough to have an accurate diagnosis, you also have to
generate the political will to do something.” In the case of other organizations, generating
political will to implement the recommendations required that the report be used “as a
public display of what the issues are. Prior to a report coming out ... there’s the whole
development of a campaign with a complete analysis of political interests” (interviewee
009). Interviewee 009 further notes that “it was odd doing all of this work with WHO
because there was no support behind me for dissemination as there was for writing the
report.”
Interviewee 056 notes that the fear-apathy cycle (high political will during an outbreak,
slipping away afterwards until the next event) is a clear barrier to the implementation of
recommendations. However, Interviewees 009 and 042, both professionals in high-level
humanitarian action and politics, note that this political will is not simply a passive and
ephemoral phenomenon but something which individuals involved in a report can generate.
For these two interviewees, it is incumbent on report authors and their institutions to
create the political will to act upon the recommendations. However, as we see from the
above the time, resources, and space to do so were not given to the EIAP by WHO.
Combined with a dissemination to member states at WHA which was heavily pushed for
by WHO, we can conclude that the primary purpose of the EIAP was not learning but
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accountability to member states.
6.7 Summary
Having detailed the processes by which the report of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel
was constructed, we now return to the characteristics of a report that users desire:
1. The process is participatory - this ensures that stakeholders are aware of the results
as well as who understands the results and can be approached with questions of
problems
2. There is a strong evidence base - this allows users to trust the report’s conclusions
and gives users a rationale for advocating policy changes
3. The report is disseminated well - this creates both attention and awareness of the
report whilst also making the authors and the knowledge more easily accessible
because users will know that it exists and is applicable to them
This summary shall interrogate each of these characteristics in turn to examine how well
the EIAP concurs.
Participatory
We have multiple examples of a lack of participation in this case. In the first instance, the
report was heavily determined by the chair who pushed hard for country visits and spent
a large amount of time drafting and disseminating the report. When one considers the
influence that this report (and Dame Stocking herself) had on other panels and reports,
it is striking that one person could have such a large amount of influence on ‘the’ lessons
from an outbreak.
Second, when country visits were being performed, the panel members themselves
admitted that they were unable to see as many people as they had liked because of the
high time-pressure. In addition to this, not all panel members actually attended the
country visits so the voices of those interviewed in-country were not heard by all members
of the panel. That being said, the efforts of Dame Stocking to have country visits at all
was an important factor in increasing the participatory nature of the report process.
From a participation point of view, the central failing here was not the panel’s but
the Executive Board’s (EB). The panel frequently overrode the prior expectations of the
EB on time frame, style of inquiry, and country visits. This improved the participation
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somewhat but still created a report which had difficulty challenging GHSp which had
dominated the narrative surrounding the ebola crisis.
Evidenced
The evidentiary access that this panel had should have made their use of evidence highly
compelling. Instead, the methods of work are detailed in annex 2 of the report on page
27, and subsumed under a brief description of the panel’s timeline and process. As noted
by interviewee 009, they had a lot of access to the Director-General of WHO, to actors
in-country, and to closed-door discussions with WHO staff.
This level of evidence access is not used in the report. In particular, the only area
where evidence is used is when detailing lessons about community involvement, to justify
a lesson that is outside of the GHSp. This indicates that evidence for lessons within the
GHSp was unnecessary and that an assumption was made that these lessons were ‘obvious’
enough to not require backing.
This lack of real use of evidence, despite a large amount of access, is indicative of both
the scope and time limitations presented to the panel. With only four months to prepare a
draft report and a heavily WHO focused scope, the definition of what was useful evidence
shrank. Evidence had to be WHO-relevant and needed to be compiled and assimilated
into an already established narrative. The very use of evidence in this case was constrained
and shaped by limited process and the GHSp.
Disseminated
Dissemination was admitted by interviewee 009 to be incredibly poor. As noted by the
users and by interviewee 009, the report is not the end of the process, but a part of it.
The dissemination is the point at which interviewee 009 felt the most conflict of interest
and the most strain.
Dissemination was seemingly limited to Dame Stocking’s influence on the Secretary-
General’s High-Level Panel, a press event in London, and the presentation of a draft report
to the WHA in May 2015. Each of these dissemination events were incredibly high level
and governance focused, with very little attempt to fully engage or advocate for operational
or even country-level reform.
What the EIAP demonstrates is how the GHSp constrained the process of report-
construction to limit knowledge accumulation outside the paradigm. The actors allowed
to participate fully were only those who the GHSp values most, the only evidence that was
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able to be used was the evidence already fitting a GHSp narrative, and the only actors
to whom the results were disseminated were high-level actors that the GHSp considers
important. Any knowledge, actors, or communities that exist outside of the GHSp were
left unserved by this panel and report.
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Chapter 7
Embedded Case 2: The
Harvard-LSHTM Independent
Panel
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explored in detail the context, recommendations, narrative, and
process of the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel (EIAP). This chapter performs a similar
analysis on the Harvard-London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Independent
Panel (HLIP). The aim of the chapter is to understand what the report of the panel
recommends, how these recommendations are justified, and the processes by which the
report came into being. This can be compared to the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel to
understand how institutional context and process differences reached the same or different
conclusions.
The rationale behind comparing these two cases is the highly different institutional
contexts yet the highly convergent recommendations. As will be shown later in the chapter,
while the processes by which the two panels came to be and the institutional structures
within which they operated are different, their recommendations have similar themes.
In particular a consistent fit with the Global Health Security paradigm established in
Chapter 4. In exploring the convergence of these two reports to the dominant paradigm,
it is therefore possible to make an argument as to how and why such a paradigm has
remained dominant, despite the 2013-2016 Ebola Crisis challenging the central pillars
upon which the paradigm rests.
Looking to the authors of the report, we see how it differs from the EIAP: first, we
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can see that it is highly dominated by authors from the USA; second, it is a highly
Academic and NGO authorship; and third, only 3 of the 22 authors come from a human-
itarian background as opposed to an international relations, global health, or governance
background. Comparing this to the EIAP which was balanced in terms of expertise, in-
stitutional background, and geographical background, the two are indeed very different
panel compositions.
Panellist Expertise Institutional Background Geographical
Background
Suerie Moon Global Governance Academia USA
Devi Sridhar Global Governance Academia USA
Muhammad Pate Health Government Nigeria
Ashish Jha Global Governance Academia USA
Chelsea Clinton Global Governance NGO USA
Sophie Delaunay Humanitarian NGO France
Valnora Edwin Humanitarian NGO Sierra Leone
Mosoka Fallah Humanitarian NGO Liberia
David Fidler Global Governance Academia USA
Lauria Garrett Health Journalism USA
Eric Goosby Health International Organization USA
Lawrence Gostin Global Governance Academia USA
David Heymann Health Government USA
Kelley Lee Global Governance Academia Canada
Gabriel Leung Health Academia Hong Kong
J Stephen Morrison Global Governance NGO USA
Jorge Saavedra Health NGO Mexico
Marcel Tanner Health NGO Switzerland
Jennifer Leigh Global Governance Academia USA
Benjamin Hawkins Global Governance Academia UK
Liana Woskie Global Governance Academia USA
Peter Piot Health Academia/Government Belgium
Table 7.1: Panellists on the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel according to the authors of Moon et al.
(2015).
Further to this, as we shall see in the next section, the HLIP was not an official ac-
171
countability exercise, it was not mandated to hold institutions or organizations to account
for their actions. It was also not necessarily a performative report - it did not need to be
seen to be doing something in order to re-legitimate a social institution.
These very different institutional and compositional contexts, however, somehow led
to very similar recommendations coming from both panels. Using the same table from
chapters 5 & 6, we can see in table 7.2 that the lessons hit upon by the HLIP are less
expansive than those of the EIAP but that it is at the expense of lessons typical of the
operational documents and the academic documents. Somehow, given drastically different
contexts, and an apparently ‘independent’ mandate, the priorities of this panel have ended
up very similar to those of the EIAP. This chapter explores process from this angle, looking
at how processes of report construction lead to this phenomenon.
Five Most Codified Lessons from Each Sample Appearing in EIAP
Academic Sample Operational Sample Policy Sample
Weak In-Country Health
Systems
Training Coordination
Diagnostics Communication Communication
Rapid Response Health Emergency Reserve
Force
Accountability
Community Trust of Re-
sponders
Community Involvement Health Systems Strength-
ening
Patient Isolation Personal Protective Equip-
ment
Training
# of lessons: 3/5 # of lessons: 1/5 # of lessons: 4/5
Table 7.2: Five most codified lessons stratified by sample. Lessons in bold appear in the report of the
EIAP. Lessons in italics appear in the HLIP.
The chapter proceeds in much the same way as the previous chapter; beginning with
an exploration of the context of the HLIP, it’s slightly larger time-frame and wider insti-
tutional context as compared to the EIAP. Next is an exploration of the recommendations
and narrative codified in the report of the HLIP, comparing it to that of the EIAP. Finally,
the chapter moves on to explore the processes and evidence used to reach the narrative
and recommendations, comparing the extensive use of primary data and testimony in the
EIAP with a great reliance on written evidence and peer review which functioned as the
justification for the HLIP.
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7.2 Report Context
This section explores the context within which the report of the Harvard-LSHTM In-
dependent Panel on the Global Response to Ebola (HLIP) was produced. The section
examines the outbreak context and the public media context, comparing it to the EIAP’s
context. The section then examines the other reports produced during the creation of
this report, looking at the synergy between each of the various reports. This contextual
discussion will then pave the way for the discussion of report content and process in the
following sections.
The epidemiological and media context for the HLIP is very similar to that of the
EIAP. Looking to figure 7.1 it is clear that the instigation of the report occurred at the
peak of the Ebola Crisis and that it was published as the crisis was waning. In particular
discussions surrounding the creation of the HLIP were taking place as official case and
death reports were in an exponential growth phase. Indeed, this peaking crisis, as we will
see later in this chapter, formed the impetus for the panel’s establishment.
Crisis as an impetus for forming a panel, particularly forming an independent panel,
places a very reactionary and fast-paced frame upon the process of the panel from the
very beginning.
”it was in the heat of the crisis [and] we felt it was important to put in place
an effort that would be able to take a step back and assess how things got so
bad and what went wrong” (Interviewee 031, emphasis added)
This impetus of crisis immediately frames the panel as responsive and focused on the
dominant issues at the time of establishment.
Again as with the EIAP, there was a significant amount of negative press levelled
at WHO around the time of the HLIP’s instigation. One CNN report discussed how
”WHO missed opportunities to stop the spread of the disease after it was first diagnosed
... WHO experts also failed to recognize that traditional containment methods wouldn’t
work” (Sanchez, 2014). Even then-Director-General Margaret Chan admitted to Time
magazine that WHO ”did not match the scale of the outbreak ... all of us underestimated
the complexity” (Walt, 2014). This negative media attention fuelled the panel to take up
review work that would be independent of WHO’s institutional influences.
This can also be seen in the coverage of the panel’s report, once published. The
report was characterised in different ways by multiple sources: one article notes how the
report describes how WHO ”mishandled the crisis” (Ap, 2015), another describes WHO’s
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”catastrophic failure” (Boseley, 2015a), and another quotes the report as calling WHO’s
response an ”egregious failure” (Plucinska, 2015). This follow through with a narrative
that is highly critical of WHO highlights an overarching contextual atmosphere that was
hostile to WHO during the production of the report of the HLIP.
Finally, the context of the report of the HLIP included a number of other reports.
Looking again at figure 7.1, four other major panels can be seen concurrently working
and compiling their own reports. Later, the chapter will examine how panel cross-talk
and member crossover may have contributed to consensus across the the reports. Here,
however, it is key to note that each of the panels were aware of one another. This is
because awareness of one another gave each panel impetus to find their own niche.
”We wanted to make sure that we were addressing what we saw as most im-
portant from a global governance perspective but also where wasn’t it being
addressed.” (Interviewee 040)
This awareness of other panels, then, allowed the HLIP to focus on areas that other panels
were not going into detail about.
Contextually, then, the HLIP was established at the height of the outbreak, a short
time after the PHEIC declaration. During this early period of the HLIP, media attention
was highly critical of WHO’s response. Additionally, much of the media attention upon
publication of the report focused on the panel’s criticism of WHO’s early response. The
panel was also operating an a context in which multiple other panels were putting together
their own reports which allowed the HLIP to focus on some areas that were not being
examined by other panels.
7.3 Phase 1: Scoping and Panel Selection
As in the previous chapter, the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel can be split into
four phases: Scoping & panel selection; evidence collection; solidifying a narrative; and
dissemination. This section will explore the scoping & panel selection phase of the HLIP.
The story of the HLIP begins in late 2014 with the Ebola Crisis at its peak: death rates
had exceeded 1000, a PHEIC had only recently been declared, and media attention was
replete with the failures of WHO. The early part of this panel began with a conversation
between Suerie Moon and Julio Frenk wherein it was noted:
”it was clear that the Ebola crisis had exposed and illustrated I think many
of the fault lines in the global health system - as we conceptualise and call it
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- that we had been studying and writing about previously.” (Interviewee 031)
This initial discussion guided the construction of the report. In particular the decision to
create a panel that was independent was motivated by
”a frustration with the coordination with the response and timeliness with a
number of different things” (Interviewee 041)
. This reveals two things about the origins of the HLIP. First it reveals the desire to do
something as the motivator - note Interviewee 041’s use of the word ’frustration’ - which,
as Birkland (2009) notes not only elevates the crisis but also ”the manifold constructions of
the issue on the agenda” (Birkland, 2009, p.148). Second, the ”manifold constructions” in
the case of public health emergencies are revealed by Interviewee 031 to be subsumed under
a vision of ”the global health system.” This singular vision, as has been demonstrated
above and in previous chapters, is the Global Health Security paradigm. This emergency-
mode desire to do something, then, elevates and consolidates the GHS paradigm in the
case of the HLIP.
The first part of this theme focuses on creating a Global Health Committee for the
UN Security Council. The panel first note that ”[in] recognition of health as an essential
facet of human and national security, the UN Security Council should establish a Global
Health Committee” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2215). This committee would also be responsible
for ”alleged non-compliance with International Health Regulation provisions on trade and
travel measures” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2215). This framing of health as ”an essential facet
of human and national security” is not new, however, a Global Health Committee on the
UN Security Council would ensure that global health was permanently securitised.
In discussing WHO, the panel note that ”WHO is an essential hub in the global
system” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2216). The panel then outline four core functions for WHO:
”support governments in building national core capacities ...; assess and provide rapid early
response to outbreaks ...; establish technical norms, standards, and guidance; and convene
actors to set goals” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2215). The panel then moves on to discuss how
”WHO’s failings on these core functions during the Ebola outbreak have now produced an
existential crisis of confidence” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2216). This representation of WHO
as central to the global health system is a standard facet of the GHS paradigm.
This standard facet of the GHS paradigm is extended by the recommendations made
by the panel. The panel first recommend that WHO ”substantially scale back its expansive
range of activities to focus on core functions ... member states should shift most of its
financing to assessed and non-earmarked voluntary contributions” (Moon et al., 2015,
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p.2216). Asking for a refocus of WHO onto its core capacities (all focused on disease
outbreak response) by providing a substantial boost and shift in the way in which WHO is
financed implies that the central rationale for WHO not acting was financial. As the panel
has already noted, however, the reasons for the lack of action were not financial; ”several
reasons for the delay including concerns about political opposition from west African
leaders, economic ramifications, and a culture within WHO discouraging open debate”
(Moon et al., 2015, p.2210). This increase in financing - and given its un-earmarked
nature, autonomy - for WHO, along with its refocus on epidemic disease extends further
the WHO centrality pillar of the GHS paradigm.
Recommendation eight, the first under this theme, securitizes infectious disease out-
breaks further. The recommendations calls for ”the creation of a Global Health Commit-
tee as part of the UN Security Council” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2205). The creation of this
committee would consistently raise the profile of health emergencies to the UNSC which
implicitly securitizes the emergency.
The second recommendation under this theme (recommendation eight) asks that WHO
focus on four core functions for outbreak response ”supporting national capacity building
building through technical advice; rapid early response and assessment of outbreaks ...; es-
tablishing technical norms, standards, and guidance; and convening the global community
to set goals, mobilise resources, and negotiate rules” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2205). This
is notably at the expense of WHO’s non-outbreak functions as the recommendation re-
quests that WHO ”maintain its broad definition of health but substantially scale back its
expansive range of activities to focus on core functions” (Moon et al., 2015, p.2205). This
focus on infectious disease outbreaks is a hallmark of the securitization of health (Elbe,
2005, 2006, 2011) which fits it directly in the Global Health Security paradigm.
The final recommendation made in the report concerns ”good governance reforms” for
WHO including a freedom of information policy, an Inspector General’s office, and human
resources reform. The recommendation further asks that ”governments should finance
most of the budget with untied funds in a new deal for a more focused WHO” (Moon
et al., 2015, p.2205). This recommendation requests extensive reforms to WHO but in
response, WHO gains a large amount of autonomy through untied funds. While made
with a caveat of good governance reforms, this recommendation still expresses a desire for
more WHO autonomy to perform what is perceived as ’core functions’, and as such fits
with the Global Health Security paradigm.
Next it was incumbent upon the instigators of the panel to choose panel members.
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The first step, as put by Interviewee 041, was to approach Peter Piot1 to chair the panel.
”we wanted to engage in a high level leadership and partnership role ... [Prof.
Piot is] a known and respected clear thinker” (Interviewee 041)
After this, other panellists were chosen based on being leaders as well as diversity of
academia, think-tank, and civil society interests (Interviewee 041).
”Definitely one of the criteria we have for choosing the panel members were
not only people who had a certain level of expertise but I think whose names
carried weight and who would be listened to because of their reputations.”
(Interviewee 031)
When asked about how they were recruited and why, however, the theme of personal
networks came to the fore with panellists being selected by knowing other panellists or
by being aware that work is going on in this area. Additionally, many were already big
names in global health;
• Laurie Garrett has won a Pullitzer Prize, a Peabody Award, and a Polk Award for
her journalism on global health and 9/11
• David Heymann had been a prominent member of the IHR revisions
• Eric Goosby was UN Special Envoy for AIDS
• Lawrence Gostin and David Fidler had written extensively on the legal side of the
IHRs
• Devi Sridhar was involved in a prominent project on the World Bank and its in-
volvement in Global Health
• Chelsea Clinton brought her prominence as Vice President of the Clinton Foundation
While this personal network and prominence connection ensured that the panel operated
smoothly and gained a great deal of attention, the choosing of panel members who are
already entrenched in the GHS paradigm, and in particular the global health governance
community that supports it, further entrenched the GHS paradigm in the panel’s report.
The organisers of the panel did, however make an attempt to have west Africans on the
panel to introduce an on the ground perspective.
1Professor Peter Piot is the Director of the London School of Hygeiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM),
a renowned advocate and leader in HIV/AIDS, and - most importantly here - was a member of the Institut
Pasteur team which responded to the very first outbreak of Ebola Virus in Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of Congo) in 1976.
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”We faced a challenge identifying experts from the west African region partly
because they were really busy with the actual response, and partly because
frankly those networks are not as well developed. (Interviewee 031)
In an attempt to allow for west Africans to participate while respecting their time for the
response, panel members were allowed to participate remotely. We will return the the issue
of remote participation later in this section when we explore the meetings themselves. In
total only 3 panel members (of a total of 22 authors, 14%) were west African: Mosoka
Fallah, Valnora Edwin, and Muhammad Pate.
Finally, one key issue raised can be demonstrated with Julio Frenk’s recusal from
the HLIP: panellists do not necessarily sit on only one panel. Additionally, as we shall
see later when discussing dissemination, each panel also is in communication with other
panels. What we see, particularly looking at figure 7.4, is the extent of the panel crossover:
the HLIP, the EIAP, and the NAM panel all shared membership with Julio Frenk being
involved in some way with all three of these panels. This phenomenon is particularly
worrying given the consensus across the reports demonstrated by Moon et al. (2017) and
Gostin et al. (2016).
”Yeah is created it [consensus], it helped I suppose. It also helped create
confusion because ... you couldn’t serve on two or three of these panels and be
totally consistent.” (Interviewee 044)
”I hope we’re not sort of coordinating, like we were supposed to be different
groups although there’s clearly cross-membership so that mights have influ-
enced it ... I guess what happens is you know you move in the same circles
and people start thinking the same way or that there is a pure truth out there
that somewhere that we’ve all gravitated towards.” (Interviewee 007)
In the view of some report authors, then, this phenomenon of individuals serving on
multiple panels - particularly given that those individuals doing so were not the west
Africans - may have been a factor in causing the consensus across the reports. This
beginning phase, then, saw the instigation of the panel which was explicitly scoped under
an emergency-mode mentality. This desire to do something then elevated a singular vision
of the global health system. The choosing of panel members was motivated by their
prominence and a desire to remain independent. The choosing of panel members was also
dependent upon personal networks which limited the number of west Africans offering
perspectives on the outbreak. Finally, a number of the panel members served on, or gave
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evidence to, multiple commissions. This may have contributed to the consensus across the
various panel reports.
7.4 Phase 2: Gathering Evidence
The gathering of evidence came from a number of sources: first, Suerie Moon and Liana
Woskie produced a great deal of background material before the first meeting; second, the
panel relied on the knowledge and experiences of the panel; third, after the first meeting,
additional content was produced alongside a first draft of the report. This section details
these evidence gathering steps surrounding the first meeting.
In the first gathering of background information, the first aim was to compile a timeline
of the outbreak ”to equip the panel members at that first meeting with a clear and detailed
picture of what had been happening” (Interview 031). Following this Suerie and Liana
”earmarked a couple of high-level topics that seemed to be issues” (Interviewee 041). This
initial constraining of the agenda may have led to a focusing on particular facets of the
response, as well as into a particular frame of understanding. Evidence for this, however,
is mixed. While one interviewee describes the below:
”One of my main worries was that this group was prisoner to a bunch of
academic constructs ... just a bunch of ’oh this just confirms what we knew
before which is a, b, c, and d’” Interviewee 044
On the other hand another interviewee notes:
”I think what the organising committee was trying to do was to elicit from the
panel what they thought the key issues were but also to set some parameters
around what it was we were going to focus on” (Interviewee 007)
So on the one hand, this narrowing down of frames sets parameters on discussions and
allows for a more efficient production of recommendations. On the other hand, the con-
straining of debate a priori makes it difficult to escape these pre-set frames and discuss
topics outside of a particular scope. Additionally, evidence was collected on these key
topics, so topics outside of these areas would have required a significant level of effort to
reshape and introduce.
In further adding evidence to the panel, the membership themselves were considered
a major source of experience and evidence.
”we ended up relying quite heavily on the panel members themselves, their own
knowledge, their background knowledge, their personal networks ... there are
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pros and cons to that approach but that’s one of the reasons why we could not
look at certain questions such as what happened on the ground” (Interviewee
031)
In justifying this gap in the HLIP, however, the interviewee notes:
”I think the Stocking Panel [EIAP] that was their role. To investigate what
happened inside the organization ... that’s something we were not in a position
to do” (Interviewee 031)
This constraining of evidence, and acknowledged limitation in the report’s process is made
with the implicit knowledge that other reports will fill in the gaps elsewhere.
Another interviewee, also noted the utilisation of panel members as a major evidence
source.
”are we just going to sit around and talk? to me I just thought what are
we going to get that’s hard and fast data? .... Although it was quick in
some ways, I don’t think it was dirty ... The people together with their vast
experience and drawing together. So it wasn’t as if we were starting from
scratch.” (Interviewee 006)
Again, there is an acknowledgement of the limitations to relying so heavily on panel mem-
bers as sources of evidence. However, it must also be acknolwedged that the composition
of the panel was oriented towards diversity of experience and did have many renowned
experts and knowledgeable individuals.
For example, a recommendation on promoting early reporting of outbreaks is remin-
iscent of the 2003 SARS outbreak. As seen in chapter 4, the SARS outbreak was a locus
around which the Global Health Security paradigm crystallised. In particular, the re-
sponse to SARS became the model around which the International Health Regulations
were revised in 2005 (Kamradt-Scott, 2015) as well as providing the impetus for the ac-
celeration of revisions that had been taking place for the better part of a decade. China’s
early reticence to report the outbreak’s full extent led later to WHO leveraging its know-
ledge (gained via non-governmental sources) to pressure China into officially reporting the
outbreak (Fidler, 2004). This links the lessons from the origination of the GHS paradigm
with the knowledge codified by the HLIP.
However, given that the legal side of the IHRs are a core part of two panel members’
academic portfolios (Lawrence Gostin and David Fidler), it is clear to see a link between
the panel members’ prior knowledge and the recommendations that get laid forth.
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Furthermore, this process of using panel members as sources of evidence, however,
assumed two things: panel representativeness and panel engagement. As we have seen
in the previous section, panel representativeness was not necessarily an assumption that
could be made. One interviewee noted that
”you had people who were really coming from a domestic perspective and
trying to bring everything to congress this and president that, versus people
who have never set foot here and wondering why we kept talking about the
United States when the epidemic was in west Africa”
This lack of representativeness, then, clearly transformed the way in which the discussions
progressed.
On panel engagement, a similar situation exists, particularly when it comes to inequit-
ies produced through teleconferencing.
”For the folks in Liberia and Sierra Leone who were trying to be involved and
you know 8 hours of Skype with their poor cell phone signals and their poor
internet, intermittent attendance, I can’t imagine how difficult it must be for
them, one side communicating and often sending messages, well when your
signal cut out that was when Peter Piot said XYZ” (Interviewee 036)
What is also interesting is the comment below:
”a few people on the phone and the chair trying to be inclusive, including
them in the conversation. It was handled well, I don’t think anybody felt they
couldn’t contribute if they wanted to.” (Interviewee 037)
Not only was it difficult for those teleconferencing in - and in particular the west Afric-
ans teleconferencing in - but some panel members were unaware of the inequity in panel
engagement that had been occurring. As put by multiple interviewees, there is no re-
placement for in-person discussions and engagement (Interviewee 036, Interviewee 037,
Interviewee 039, Interviewee 041).
Gathering evidence, then, is constrained by multiple factors. First, the initial gathering
of documentary evidence introduced subjective judgements from Suerie Moon and Liana
Woskie in what the overarching areas of focus were. Second, an unrepresentative panel
meant that gather evidence via a panel’s experience biased the evidence and results gained
from the panel. Finally, panel engagement was unequal because of teleconferencing panel
members as opposed to having all members in person.
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7.5 Phase 3: Solidifying a Narrative
In formulating a narrative both meetings played a key role in setting priorities. In par-
ticular, the two meetings were used to set priorities: the first was used to give broad
indications of themes and the second was used to give comments on a first draft that had
been prepared by Suerie Moon, Jen Leigh, and Liana Woskie. Each of these meetings
were plagued by the same inequalities of representativeness and of engagement discussed
earlier.
One of the earlier decisions that was taken by the organizing members of the panel
was the decision to publish in the Lancet.
”it was good to have it in the Lancet because then it required peer review”
(Interviewee 005)
This borrowing of legitimacy from the notion of peer review and the Lancet as a leading
medical journal was, however, something that some report authors were reticent towards.
”from the very beginning they had the goal of publishing in the Lancet ... it
was a group of academics and they already had an academic goal” (Interviewee
034)
”no one was thinking through very clearly who cares whether the Lancet puts
it out? What is the price going to be of putting it out through the Lancet? ...
this thing is shipped around to a bunch of anonymous peer reviewers. That’s
an academic process that was completely inappropriate for this particular pur-
pose.” (Interviewee 044)
On the one hand, some members (like interviewee 005 above) thought that the Lancet
and peer review was a useful tool for establishing legitimacy. On the other, the cost of
having editors and peer reviewers, whose names are not cited as authors of the piece and
therefore unaccountable was recognised by other interviewees.
Additionally, publishing in the Lancet created an artificial limit on the length of the
article that significantly constrained the writing of the report.
”it just became very hard to figure out a succinct way to talk about all these
and navigate the word count limits imposed by the Lancet” (Interviewee 036)
”the report had to be cut by about half, it was 8000 to about 3000 or 4000
words” (Interviewee 040)
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”The Lancet was quite strict on when they decided to accept it. They gave us
a word limit, so same thing, you have to be short and sweet” (Interviewee 031)
”We first had them in the London meeting so Pamela Das [Senior Executive
Editor, The Lancet ] and Richard Horton [Editor-in-Chief, The Lancet ] both
came by and observed the meeting. The goal of that was so that they could get
a sense of what shape this might take because at this point it wasn’t entirely
clear what the final message would be. The Lancet broadly has been quite
active in the global health space and there was a lot of potential for it to be
politically sensitive and ... I think it ended up in a relatively moderate place”
(Interviewee 041)
Publishing in the Lancet did have some problems with keeping the report under a strict
word limit as well some possible input from Editor-in-Chief Richard Horton, another
renowned name in global health but not an explicit author of the report.
The decision to publish in the Lancet also seems to have been taken almost unilaterally
in the earlier stages of producing the report.
”it was like there was a decision made at the front end of this process that
somehow it was terribly important that this thing bear the imprimateur of the
Lancet” (Interviewee 044)
”from the very early stages the Harvard folks had gained a publication com-
mitment from Richard Horton and the Lancet, and that was where the report
was going to end up” (Interviewee 036)
This highly controversial and impactful decision had clearly been taken without a full
consultation with the panel.
Finally, some members of the panel were given the remit to write and edit large sections
of the report.
”You’ve got to defer. These guys have written extensively on the subject ...
a few of us had written on WHO and I was given the task of drafting that
section so Suerie and I worked together” (Interviewee 006)
”it would be for very limited sections of text but you know ’okay you’re more
of a subject matter expert, rewrite this’ and then we’ll send that to the group
and they would just approve or not approve” (Interviewee 040)
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This practise on the one hand allows for a more expert writing on a particular subject,
however, it also precludes others from making comments, simply providing an ”approve
or disapprove”. This is also a particularly unequal practice given the expertise of the
west Africans has no specific section in the report and thus these individuals did not pen
sections of the report.
In solidifying a narrative, then, the HLIP’s decision to publish in the Lancet formed
a significant barrier to detailed examination of many topics. In addition a lack of focus
on the expertise provided by west Africans, the act of giving whole sections of the report
to subject matter experts amplified the effect of the lack of representation on the panel.
As this and previous sections have shown, representation on panels is not solely about
choosing individuals but also about allowing for meaningful engagement in equal ways for
each panel member.
7.6 Phase 4: Dissemination and Engagement
This final phase discusses the ways in which the members of the HLIP disseminated and
engaged the recommendations and findings of the panel and its report. In particular,
the phase will explore engagement with global health pedagogy by the panel’s Principal
Investigators and a presentation given to WHO’s Executive Board in January of 2016.
Suerie Moon and Ashish Jha were both invited by the WHO Executive Board to
present the panel’s findings.
”They had invited us, NAM, I think European Commission ... to come and
present during the EB meeting which I was surprised by ... at the EB in
particular we focused on the WHO-related recommendations of which there
were four, and we only had five minutes” (Interviewee 031)
Presenting at the Executive Board gave the panel the opportunity to directly influence
policy at a level they had been aiming.
In addition to engagement with the level of policy that they had aimed at, the Prinicipal
Investigators of the HLIP also engaged with the teaching of global health and students
of global health. This was done through multiple events which engaged students and
the media at the Center for Strategic International Studies (the institution of one of the
HLIP’s members, J. Stephen Morrison), as well as an event organised at the Graduate
Institute in Geneva (at which Suerie Moon now teaches).
Additionally, the Principal Investigators produced a free online course as part of the
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EdX platform (HarvardX, specifically) which allowed for engagement of students and the
public outside of traditional pedagogical structures. This course included not just members
of the panel (Devi Sridhar, Chelsea Clinton, Lawrence Gostin, David Fidler, Muhammad
Pate) but other individuals involved in the response who were not on the panel like Paul
Farmer, a noted medical anthropologist, Allan Brandt, a medical historian, and other
frontline personnel. This course allowed for a deeper engagement of the panel’s content
and a deeper explanation of the background. It also allowed for the panel to incorporate
the findings of the HLIP into teaching global health students, further entrenching the GHS
paradigm into knowledge accumulation.
7.7 Summary
Having detailed the processes by which the report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent
Panel was constructed, we now return to the characteristics of a report that users desire:
1. The process is participatory - this ensures that stakeholders are aware of the results
as well as who understands the results and can be approached with questions of
problems
2. There is a strong evidence base - this allows users to trust the report’s conclusions
and gives users a rationale for advocating policy changes
3. The report is disseminated well - this creates both attention and awareness of the
report whilst also making the authors and the knowledge more easily accessible
because users will know that it exists and is applicable to them
This summary shall interrogate each of these characteristics in turn to examine how well
the HLIP concurs.
Participatory
Participation in the HLIP on the surface seems positive. In particular we see three west
Africans and a good deal of civil society actors - all actors typically underserved by the
GHSp. Furthermore, the independence of the panel from influences of WHO, UN, and
other international organizations did give the panel scope to be much more critical than
other reports may have been.
In practice, however, the participation of the west Africans and the civil society actors
was limited by their capacity to physically attend the meetings. Poor internet and phone
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connections, no travel bursaries, and the ongoing outbreak itself severely limited the ca-
pacity of these actors to fully engage with the rest of the panel and have their voices be
heard.
In addition to this, and linking with the evidence characteristic, individuals outside of
the panel were not given an opportunity to provide evidence or comment. On the ground
actors were not interviewed and community groups were not engaged by the panel. Actors
outside the GHSp framing were, again, left unheard.
Evidenced
Evidence for the HLIP derived primarily from news and academic publications as well
as the experiences of the panel themselves. The presentation, unlike the EIAP, is highly
evidenced due to its publication in the Lancet medical journal which had a peer review
process and requirements for citations to back-up claims.
The kinds of evidence used, however, are somewhat superficial. As described above,
the engagement of those panel members actually on the ground was poor which means
that evidence from the ground was limited. Furthermore the lack of community groups
meant that the data and experiences from communities were absent.
In addition to this, evidence used by the panel was highly criticised by users at a policy
level (the audience for the report) because it did not engage with the realities of UN and
WHO operations. The authors of the report relied heavily on news articles and academic
publications which both have their own standards of evidence for reporting which limits
the possible uses therein. This lack of access to in-depth sources at the level to which
they were aiming their recommendations had an effect on how well the report itself was
received.
Disseminated
Dissemination for this report took the form of a presentation to the Executive Board of
the WHO in January 2016, its publication the Lancet academic journal, a number of press
events, and a HarvardX course about the Ebola Crisis. Each of these was aimed at various
audiences.
The publication of the report in the Lancet was primarily a move to give the report
some weight and authority. It’s publication in an academic journal, however, means that
its impact can be directly measured through citations and impact factors. Additionally,
the Lancet is a journal which is read by a large proportion of medical professionals and so
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the report had a large reach.
The presentation to the Executive Board at WHO was to brief them on the findings
of the report. This direct feed-in to policy was exactly the aim of the report and it has
been cited by WHO as one of the drivers for its reformed Health Emergencies Programme
(Abdulla et al., 2015).
Again, however, we can see how dissemination is limited to those within the GHSp
framing: the Lancet is regularly read by a great deal of clinical and public health practi-
tioners - although others do read the journal, it is primarily a medical journal; and briefing
the EB is directly linked to WHO authority strengthening, a core tenet of the GHSp.
Throughout the process of the HLIP, opportunities to cahllenge the GHSp were seem-
ingly missed. By committing to publication in the Lancet medical journal; an audience,
evidence-base, and peer review process was set in stone early in the process. Through a
lack of full engagement with constituencies outside of the GHSp, evidence and framings
from outside the GHSp were lost. While superficially different to the EIAP - in terms of
panel size, membership, and scopes - the HLIP faced very similar challenges in terms of
the Globa Health Security paradigm constraining and shaping knowledge codification.
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Chapter 8
Discussion and Conclusions
8.1 Introduction
Over the course of this thesis it has been made plain that the accumulation of knowledge
from disease outbreak responses is mired in problems. Outbreaks are never exactly the
same as one another - different times, different places, different contexts, different patho-
gens. There are myriad dimensions on which one could possibly map any single outbreak
on, assuming agreement on the boundaries of an outbreak.
As has been shown throughout this thesis, these problems seem to have led to the de-
velopment of a path-dependency in how outbreaks are conceptualised and discussed. This
Global Health Security paradigm is focused heavily at the global level, often privileging
national level policies aimed towards a common global good. The three key, response
tenets of this paradigm are: (i) a global surveillance regime, aimed at producing rapid,
containment-oriented responses to disease outbreaks; (ii) a central, authoritative World
Health Organization with the resources and will to act; and (iii) a research and develop-
ment system capable of rapidly identifying a pathogen and producing vaccines, diagnostics,
and therapeutics ready for deployment in a crisis.
Theoretical understandings of learning and knowledge accumulation have allowed us
to conceptualise knowledge processes as cyclical (Kolb, 1984; Argyris, 1999; Argote and
Miron-spektor, 2011). In each cycle we see that knowledge is created from task experience
and knowledge is re-used in new task experiences (Kolb, 1984; Argote and Miron-spektor,
2011). Disease outbreaks tend to break this cycle because of their lack of continuity,
complexity, and stability; they do not occur sequentially one straight after the other
(Kouzmin et al., 1995), they do not occur for the same people (Moynihan, 2008), and they
are not necessarily reducible to simple factors (Comfort and Louise, 2004). However, the
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production of reports and papers (i.e. the production of codified knowledge) is theorised
as a means to overcoming these barriers due to their transferability across time, space,
and persons (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Echajari and Thomas, 2015).
These so-called ‘lessons learned’ reports have been studied previously. They are noted
to perform three main functions: holding individuals or institutions accountable (Gephart
et al., 1990), re-establishing the social order & restoring trust in social institutions by being
seen to be ‘doing something’ (Brown, 2000, 2004), and as a tool for learning (Birkland,
2009). While their role in accountability and restoring trust has been explored by other
authors (Gephart et al., 1990; Brown, 2000, 2004; Birkland, 2009), their full role in learning
and knowledge production has not been. Although Birkland (2009) discusses them as
‘fantasy documents’ he does not theorise this as a knowledge product but a performative
product.
To explore the production and use of these lessons learned documents in knowledge
accumulation from disease outbreak responses, The thesis focuses on the 2013-2016 west
African Ebola Crisis. This was because of its three-fold exceptionalism: the outbreak
crossed borders and killed unprecedented numbers of people (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, 2016); the outbreak infected individuals from the US and western Europe
(Anderson-Fletcher et al., 2017); and the outbreak challenged the Global Health Security
paradigm which has dominated global health thought for 20 years.
In order to explore the knowledge produced and used from the Ebola Crisis, this
thesis took two approaches. The first was a content analysis of 267 different lessons
learned documents, from three separate samples, aimed at understand the question of
who is producing and using what knowledge. The academic sample (161 documents) was
collected to understand the breadth of academic knowledge being produced from the Ebola
Crisis and used a Scopus literature review methodology for collection. The operational
sample (62 documents) focused on particular, well-known practitioner publications for
understanding what lessons those at an operational level had been learning. The policy
sample (34 documents) was collected through a published list of documents that can be
said to have directly informed policy and aimed at understanding the breadth of lessons
that policymakers had integrated into their understanding of the Ebola Crisis. Each of
these samples was explored to understand who was codifying what lessons.
This analysis showed that the main lessons from the Ebola Crisis concerned commu-
nication (either with publics or between responders), involving communities in various
aspects of response, and boosting health systems in countries to better prevent and re-
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spond to outbreaks. These lessons, however, differed depending on the sample: academics
were much more focused on the health systems of the affected countries and the capacity
to detect/ respond to an outbreak, policymakers were more focused on the governance
and coordination challenges in outbreak response, and practitioners were more focused on
the practical elements of response like training and personnel. What is more, the depth of
the analysis of each lesson further revealed that while lessons surrounding communication,
coordination, health systems, and community involvement were frequently cited, the level
of detail for the lessons was much less than the level of detail for lessons on the WHO,
surveillance, and biomedical countermeasures. These trends indicate that codification is
not only a question of who chooses what focus but also to what extent do they focus on
particular lessons.
To explore this further, a series of 36 interviews were conducted with individuals who
could be said to be either report authors or report users. 23 report-users were interviewed
over the course of 3 months to understand what they had learned from the Ebola Crisis,
how they had used knowledge in the Ebola crisis, and what use they had for codified
documents like reports. 13 report authors were interviewed - 3 for the EIAP, 11 for the
HLIP (approximately 50% of each panel) - in order to understand how the two reports
were constructed and to what extent the process affected the outcome. These interviews
allowed us to gain an understanding of not only how reports are constructed but how they
are used, gleaning insights into the motivations of report authors and report users.
Interviewing report-users found that different types of user have different levels of
utility for reports: policy users find the reports useful because they inform policy and
focus on the priorities that they focus on (governance and coordination); academics view
them as useful analytical objects or summations of events despite their performativity
because they offer insight into the priorities of policymakers; practitioners find them less
useful because they do not focus on the lessons which they would prioritise. Given that
many of the reports are written by academics and policymakers this would make sense,
however, practitioners were members of the two case panels and still they provided lessons
which were very focused on policymaker and academic priorities.
This phenomenon extends to our two case reports and beyond. In the EIAP we see a
report that is heavily influenced by a need for accountability and a need to be seen to be
doing something; the HLIP on the other hand attempts to present itself as ’independent’
and not apportioning blame or needing to be seen as doing something. Despite this there
are very high levels of overlap between the lessons of these two, and the lessons of the other
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reports. In general, both of these reports focus on academic and policy priorities rather
than practitioner priorities. It is therefore clear that simply looking at these reports as
objects with inputs (authors, evidence, etc.) and outputs (recommendations, narratives,
etc.) is insufficient in fully exploring their role in knowledge accumulation.
Interviewing report-authors, we see that this process can drastically affect the outcome.
In the EIAP we see how a process that was primarily driven by the only practitioner on
the panel, still led to a focus on policy and academic priorities. The panel was strictly set
in terms of scope and time from the outset in the panel’s Terms of Reference; not only
was it to be institutionally focused (logical and expected) but member states had frequent
interjections into the process and were the obvious audience for the report. We also see
how the strict timetable that was quickly dismissed as impossible by the chair was still
adhered to in principle when an initial report was required for presentation to member
states at the WHA only 4 months after the panel had been established. Adding this to
a process of evidence collection which was not as complete as the chair would have liked,
and a sense that the problems had already been laid out by the media, the likelihood for
any learning to have occurred during this panel process is minimal at best.
Looking at the HLIP, we see how such a different panel could have such a similar out-
come. In the first instance, the panel had much more time, many more practitioners, and
no need for accountability or performativity. However, as we look deeper into the process
of the report itself we see how dependent the evidence-collection was on the experience
of the panel members. This is particularly constraining given that only 3 members of the
panel were west Africans and very large difficulties were found in remotely engaging with
them. This disparity in evidence - in addition to an academic frame from the outset, entire
passages being written by academic members to which the panel deferred, and an early
decision to publish in the Lancet for an academic audience - created a situation whereby
the lessons focus heavily privileged academic members’ priorities.
What does this mean for codified knowledge accumulation from disease outbreak re-
sponse? This final chapter will make the argument for the three main contributions of
this thesis. First, paying theoretical attention to report processes and the methods by
which reports are constructed is just as important as paying attention to the composition
of the panel or the final results of the report. Second, we argue that a practical focus
on the production of codified knowledge is necessary due to the way in which knowledge
codification functions as a learning process in itself. Finally, this chapter will argue that
a report’s performativity extends beyond the report as an object but into the process
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itself, meaning that a report is not only a missed opportunity for learning but an active
privileging of certain knowledges over others. This chapter will then conclude with some
suggestions for further research and recommendations for policy.
8.2 Codified knowledge production from outbreaks: more
than who learns what
This section explores the first contribution of this thesis: theoretical exploration of report
contexts, authors, and outcomes is insufficient and a process-based view is required to
fully capture the utility of codification. We begin with a recap of the theoretical explan-
ation for codified knowledge as a performative object and as a learning object. Then we
reiterate how the data demonstrates how reports with varying characteristics have reached
very similar conclusions. This section closes by arguing that the process is therefore an
important factor in understanding the performativity and learning processes of codified
knowledge production.
When we looked at the function of so-called lessons learned reports, we first had to
explore current theorizations surrounding them. Birkland (2009) theorised these lessons
learned reports as ‘fantasy documents’, demonstrating that a need to be seen to have
‘done something’ forms a large part of the rationale for writing a lessons learned report.
Additionally, Birkland (2009) noted how this performativity (the writing of a report to
‘perform’ learning) is widely accepted and thus because learning is not expected, these
documents are generally ignored after being published. This performativity aspect of the
lessons learned report is also explored by Gephart et al. (1990).
For Gephart et al. (1990), the sensemaking aspects of a public inquiry further detail the
performativity of the public inquiry and the ensuing report. Gephart et al. (1990) notes
that the spectacle of the public inquiry is a performance by which allows cultures to ’make
sense’ of what happened during a crisis and move on. By the same token, the report of
the public inquiry forms a ’sensegiving’ activity which imparts a particular narrative and
a particular interpretation upon the crisis, thereby providing the image of having learned
from it. This exploration of the sensemaking properties of the lessons learned report is
further explored by authors like Brown (2000, 2004).
As Brown (2000, 2004) notes, the lessons learned report itself forms multiple per-
formative roles. In the first instance it is established as an authoritative account of the
crisis which establishes a particular interpretation and therefore informs particular ’les-
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sons’. Second, the report apportions blame, giving a sense of accountability to the report
- someone has been held to account by being named in the report. Third, the report
presents an omnipotent view of the future by which crisis of a similar kind can be eas-
ily responded to, thanks to the lessons from the current crisis. All three of the various
performative actions re-establish the authority of the institutions producing the report,
allowing for a continuation of the status quo.
Finally, Roux-Dufort (2000) extends these arguments to the generality of learning from
crisis. Roux-Dufort (2000) argues for three types of normalization process which contrib-
ute to an inhibition of learning from crises: cognitive normalization applies ’standard’
problem-solving techniques to the extra ordinary problem of crisis; psychological normal-
ization attributes root causes and human error to the crisis, giving a sense that ’we can
be better’; and socio-political normalization asks experts to assess the crisis and make
technical recommendations to make the crisis a technical object not a social object. These
processes, Roux-Dufort (2000) argues are equally performative and are attempts at re-
establishing the status quo as quickly as possible.
Theoretically lessons learned reports are discussed mostly for their role as objects. For
Birkland (2009), they are fantasy objects used to assuage fears and perform ’doing some-
thing’. For Gephart et al. (1990) and Brown (2000, 2004), they are socio-political objects
designed to establish a particular narrative and re-establish particular institutions as au-
thoritative. Finally, for Roux-Dufort (2000), they form a part of cognitive, psychological,
and socio-political normalization which allow for the re-establishment of the status quo.
What these object-based views of lessons learned reports miss, however, are the processes
that take place during the process of writing a lessons learned report.
As has been shown through the document analysis and the report user interview data,
different types of author focus on different lessons learned. This is not surprising, everyone
has various experiences and viewpoints which will guide their interpretation of the crisis.
However, what we also saw was a large convergence in the broader evidence towards
certain lessons - we saw how lessons surrounding communication, community involvement,
and health systems strengthening were highly converged upon, and that when depth of
analysis is accounted for, surveillance, WHO authority, and biomedical countermeasures
were converged upon. This trend occurs despite a total of 267 different documents with
varying contexts, motivations, performative needs, authors, and audiences. Theory tells
us that this should produce a vast swathe of different lessons with no real convergence,
yet the opposite is true.
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What we found when looking at two specific reports with very different characteristics
but very similar lessons is that the processes by which the reports were produced heavily
affected the outcomes. While the EIAP was seemingly performative from the outset,
its chair and only practitioner acted against that performativity throughout and yet the
processes involved of continuously reporting to member states, having such little time to
fully assess the outbreak, and having no real debate over the problems, only the solutions,
created a report which largely fit with the priorities of the policymakers that commissioned
it. The HLIP on the other hand was largely ‘indepdendent’ and has no real need to be
seen to be doing something or to apportion blame, however the lack of full and meaningful
engagement with the panel, combined with the reliance on panel members for evidence,
resulted in a text which stuck to the dominant paradigm and had limited scope for learning.
The processes here, while different in character, are similar on a deeper level. Birkland’s
2009 framework, as we saw in Chapter 2, shows that a learning process in policy engenders
group mobilisation, agenda setting, and discussion of ideas. On the surface, these reports
had processes which did mobilise groups, set agendas, and discussed ideas. However,
the ways in which the reports were participatory, evidenced, and disseminated weakens
the impact of these factors: limited participation weakened group mobilisation, limited
evidencing weakened the discussions, and limited dissemination weakened agenda-setting.
These reports, in essence, performed the outcomes that Birkland 2009 notes are conducive
to learning but did not invest in the underlying processes that underpin these outcomes.
The process of writing a report, then, is equally important at the context, authors, and
audience. A huge number of pieces of writing were produced following the 2013-2016 west
African Ebola Crisis, yet a number of clear lessons emerged as dominant, all fitting with
the dominant Global Health Security paradigm. Looking at the processes of two different
reports we can see how different contexts produce the same result by limiting the space
for the processes of learning and engagement. This demonstrates that an object-based
view of lessons learned reports is theoretically insufficient and that a process-based view
is required to fully examine the learning role of lessons learned reports.
8.3 The ‘lessons learned’ report’s role in knowledge accu-
mulation
This section explores the second contribution of this thesis: practical attention should be
paid to the codification process because the processes of codified knowledge production
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and use are important factors in the accumulation of knowledge from disease outbreak
responses. We begin with a recap of the theoretical description of reports as positive
vehicles for knowledge transfer and knowledge accumulation through both the object (the
report) and the process of knowledge codification (the report process). We then move
on to the data, showing that the processes of a report can heavily decrease the space
for learning, and is not just positive space for knowledge codification. The section then
closes by arguing for a more practical focus on report construction processes with attention
being paid to giving space, time, and resources for learning as well as facilitating more
meaningful panel engagement.
In exploring knowledge accumulation from disease outbreaks we began by exploring
the concept that knowledge accumulation operates in a continuous cycle. This cycle,
according to many theorists - like Kolb (1984), Argyris and Scho¨n (1996), and Argote
and Miron-spektor (2011) - occurs via the repeated sequence of two actions: deriving
and abstracting knowledge from task experience, and applying that new knolwedge to
new experiences. This cycle continuously creates new knowledge from repeated tasks and
knowledge accumulates as task experience accumulates.
This cycle can be conceptualized at multiple levels and has led to the creation of two
separate fields: organizational learning and knowledge management. In each of these fields,
new knowledge is produced through individual-level cognitive processes and group-level
social processes (Crossan et al., 1999). In order to continuously produce and accumu-
late knowledge (particularly tacit knowledge) the members of the group or organization
must remain reasonably stable over time (Argote and Miron-spektor, 2011; Easterby-Smith
et al., 2000). Even organizations with discrete project boundaries can transfer tacit know-
ledge because of their reasonably stable personnel (Scarbrough et al., 2004; Boh, 2007).
Large scale crises, however, are different because of their exceptionalism. In the first
instance, extra ordinary disease outbreaks do not occur every day, often large spans of
time occur between different outbreak experiences (Kouzmin et al., 1995; Corbacioglu and
Kapucu, 2006). This can pose a barrier to knowledge accumulation because people may not
remember the last experience or may even not have been involved in the last experience,
limiting knowledge transfer. Second, these events are highly heterogeneous - different
contexts, different pathogens, different times, different countries, different capabilities,
etc. all contribute to highly variable disease outbreak responses (Elliott, 2009; Deverell,
2009). This variability means that lessons from one outbreak response may not necessarily
be applicable in the next. Third, outbreaks are complex events that require multifaceted,
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sometimes multinational responses and often causes and effects are difficult or impossible
to disentangle (Comfort, 1996; Comfort and Louise, 2004; Comfort, 2005; Comfort and
Kapucu, 2006). This ambiguity in cause and effect can also decrease opportunities for
knowledge accumulation because causes and effects identified in one outbreak may be
irrelevant in the next or not discoverable in the next.
Theory offered a solution in the form of knowledge codification, however, and provided
a mechanism by which these barriers to knowledge accumulation could be overcome. Zollo
and Winter (2002) and Echajari and Thomas (2015) both argued that codified knowledge
(knowledge written down in reports, paper, diagrams, etc.) could be a useful form of know-
ledge for overcoming these barriers because it articulates knowledge for use across space,
time and persons. Additionally, codified knowledge includes details about why certain
recommendations were made, allowing future learning to build upon it. Furthermore, the
authors argue, the very processes of codification are useful because they are also learning
processes by which knowledge is created through articulating the tacit. Therefore, reports
and papers were a clear solution to the problems presented for knowledge accumulation
from disease outbreak response.
Further to this, Birkland (2009) noted a cyclical process of learning from disaster
events. Figure 8.1 shows this cycle as an ideal-type learning process.
This model is a useful frame for us to begin examining the ways in which lessons
learned reports contribute to knowledge accumulation because it provides us with criteria
by which we can assess report processes.
The first set of data that allow us to discuss the role of lessons learned reports in these
processes is the document analysis of lessons learned reports themselves. This analysis
demonstrated the knowledge produced from the ebola crisis, a first part of the knowledge
accumulation cycle. As we saw in chapter 5, this production of knowledge highlighted
communication, community involvement, and health systems strengthening as central les-
sons from the ebola crisis. This partly demonstrated the paradigm-challenging nature of
the outbreak by showing prominent lessons
We did, however, see that these paradigm-challenging lessons were often referred to
either in a frame consistent with GHSp or in a superficial manner with no real analysis. We
saw that lessons around health systems strengthening, for example, were often re-framed
to refer not to broad health sector reforms but narrow contributions to a global ‘need’
to prevent, detect, and respond to health threats. Furthermore, we saw that actors not
traditionally considered by the GHSp found these lessons particular difficult because they
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Figure 8.1: An ideal model of event-related policy change
Source: (Birkland, 2009, p.151)
were stating the obvious and not applicable to the context.
Returning to our conceptualization at the end of chapter 2, we can see with Figure 5.2
how these blockades can lead to a selection pressure towards a particular knowledge.
Taking the evolutionary perspective of knowledge (a co-opting of Nelson and Winter
(1982) and their evolutionary perspective of economic change) we can characterise the
production of knowledge as tending towards a paradigm due to two selection pressures:
superficial exploration of extra-paradigmatic lessons, and co-opting new knowledges into
the framing of the existing paradigm.
When we look at the data from the report users, we get another picture of this evol-
utionary process but from the use side. In particular, we understand that the use of a
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Figure 8.2: Mapping the knowledge accumulation cycle over time in discontinuous outbreaks.
Source: Author’s elaboration and expansion on Kolb (1984)
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report’s lessons is dependent upon the context of the user. First, we found that operational
personnel were less likely to find reports useful because of their superficiality - operational
responders either didn’t trust the lessons provided or didn’t find them useful.
In addition to these production-related issues, use was also limited by the knowledge
processes employed by operational responders. A high reliance upon transactive knowledge
(Brauner and Becker, 2006) and professional/ personal networks as knowledge sources
made reports a less useful vehicle. In particular it is those knowledges which are available
and accessible which get used - users need to be able to find and understand lessons as
well as access the people who produced it.
Looking again to our evolutionary perspective of knowledge accumulation, we can
see how use also creates selection pressures that tend towards dominant paradigms. If
only those knowledges which are available and accessible are used (thus completing the
accumulation cycle) then the more prominent lessons are the lessons which ‘survive’ to
the next outbreak, and other lessons are re-invented as before.
Codified knowledge production and use create dual selection pressures on the accu-
mulation of knowledge. Production is constrained by superficial explorations of extra-
paradigmatic lessons and the co-opting of non-paradigm lessons to support the paradigm’s
aims. Use is constrained by the simple availability and applicability of lesson - if users
cannot find or use the lessons outside the paradigm, these lessons are lost. We therefore
argue that attention must be paid to the processes of report construction because they
represent an evolutionary form of knowledge accumulation that has thus far been under
studied.
8.4 Report construction processes: more than a missed op-
portunity
What, then, do the report processes themselves tell us about knowledge accumulation from
disease outbreak response? This section explores the third contribution of this thesis: re-
ports that have constrained processes, like those in our two cases, are more than just a
missed opportunity but they are an active closing down of knowledge pathways which
harms future knowledge accumulation from outbreak response. The section begins with
a recap of the theoretical assumption that a report is performative and therefore offers
no learning, or ‘fantasy learning’. Then we recap the notion of knowledge accumula-
tion through codification of knowledge. We then demonstrate the evidence that report
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processes show not a lack of learning but learning along a particular pathway. The sec-
tion closes by arguing that report production processes which limit the space for learning
are not limiting learning but actively shifting priorities and knowledges down particular
pathways which privilege certain knowledges and communities over others.
In a previous section of this chapter we recapped the performativity of lessons learned
reports. We saw how Birkland (2009) had conceptualized them as fantasy documents
which presented not a ’real’ account of events but a narrative of events which supported
the re-establishing of an institution’s authority. This, (Birkland, 2009) argued, was a main
reason why these reports played no role in learning from disasters and crises.
We also saw from Gephart et al. (1990) and Brown (2000, 2004) how reports contribute
to societal-level sensemaking. We saw from Gephart et al. (1990) that the very spectacle
of a public inquiry creates the impression that something is ‘being done’ and that learning
is taking place. We saw from Brown (2000, 2004) how the very construction of the reports
themselves is designed to re-establish institutions as authoritative, apportion blame to
other institutions, and to provide a vision of omnipotence for future crises of the same
type. In effect these types of reports are performative, they ‘perform’ learning rather than
actually learning.
What we found in exploring the embedding case of the 2013-2016 is that this view
is not accurate when one considers processes of codified knowledge production and use.
Observing an evolutionary process of knowledge accumulation we found that the processes
of report production and use are highly important to learning from disaster scenarios.
In addition to this, through interviews with report authors and users we developed
and examined three characteristics which contribute to the role that codified knowledge
plays in knowledge accumulation:
Participatory. We found that participation in reports is a factor which can open up
or close down the process of knowledge accumulation. Users of reports were often positive
about their own participation in the report construction processes, citing an opportunity
to reflect upon their own experiences and using the process to advocate for certain per-
spectives. Other users, however, were less positive about the participatory approaches of
these reports, they found that they were invited in a tokenistic way and were not fully
engaged by other members.
As we saw in the Ebola Interim Assessment Panel and the Haravrd-LSHTM Inde-
pendent Panel, participation is not a binary, it is a spectrum. In the EIAP, we saw how
participation was constrained by the time and scope of the process and the inability to
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fully engage during country visits. In the HLIP we saw how having various constituencies
on the panel is insufficient and that in person engagement is necessary to fully participate
in knowledge production.
Participation, then, is a useful characteristic for a report process to embody be-
cause it provides a breadth of perspective and a reflexive method to understanding ‘what
happened.’ However, participation needs time and resources to fully engage with panel
processes and contribute an opening up of knowledge spaces rather than closing them
down into the dominant paradigm.
Evidenced. A core tenet of any investigation, a strong evidence base allows users to
trust the outcomes of the report. This is also linked with participation - if users see that
people ‘like them’ are providing evidence then a report is more likely to be used and its
knowledge is more likely to ‘survive’ to the next outbreak. Additionally, for those using
reports an advocacy tool, a strong evidence base gives weight and credence to the claims
being made, particularly if multiple reports make the same claims.
Looking at our two examples we can see how processes don’t just need to gather
evidence but it needs to be used. The EIAP had high access to a vast array of evidence,
including high-level interviewees and on-the-ground, in-country interviewees. Despite this,
however, the EIAP makes very little of its wealth of evidence, relegating its evidentiary
base to an annex and using evidence only when discussing lessons outside of the GHSp.
The HLIP suffers from the opposite problem; a high use of little evidence. The report of
the HLIP cites a number of news articles and academic papers but has little to no input
or evidence from operational responders or practitioners.
Each of these opposing issues with evidence show us the various ways that a paradigm
can shape outcomes of knowledge accumulation. For EIAP, the lack of time and space to
use evidence outside of the GHSp limited the scope for making extra-paradigmatic claims.
On the other hand, the HLIP’s dearth of evidence outside the GHSp limited its capacity
to make claims outside the paradigm.
Disseminated. Accessibility and applicability were two key aspects of reports that
users identified. These two characteristics come down to the question of dissemination:
how was a report made accessible and argued for its applicability. In this way, reports and
panels have to argue for their own existence and for the utility of their knowledge.
Viewing our two examples, we again see two very different sides of dissemination. First,
for an independent academic effort, the HLIP had remarkable reach including a briefing
of the WHO Executive Board and engagement with high-level actors at their press events.
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This was partly down to the weight of influence held by many of the panel members
including well respected academics and advocates like Prof. Peter Piot. The EIAP on the
other hand, suffered from a poor engagement process partly because its intended audience
(the 2015 WHA) was engaged during the draft phase.
This dissemination meant that the report of the EIAP had to quickly cater to the
needs of its primary audience and stay under the GHSp because it had no time nor scope
to expand outwards. The dissemination of the HLIP, on the other hand, allowed it to have
influence on policy (Abdulla et al., 2015) and bring its conclusions to a higher level that
normally expected of a single academic publication.
Returning, finally, to Birkland (2009) and the event-based learning cycle he proposes
in Figure 5.1 (page 193), we can see where each of these characteristics contributes to
learning and, over time, to knowledge accumulation:
• Making the process participatory increases agenda attention and mobilises groups
because people of various communities and constituencies are made aware of the
process as it is ongoing and are therefore more likely to engage. Participation also
opens up the discussion of new ideas so as not to constrain thought into a single
paradigm.
• Having a strong evidence base allows for group mobilization because an advocate
has a robust platform from which to argue for mobilization. Evidence also allows
for substantive discussions of ideas and claims.
• Dissemination ensures that groups are aware of the report and panel and allows for
further discussion of ideas outside of the panel’s limited forum.
As we have seen the EIAP and HLIP, each of these characteristics also has the potential
to limit the accumulation of knowledge as well as facilitate it:
• Limited participation constrains discussion and mobilization into narrow constitu-
encies and paradigmatic lessons
• Thin or unused evidence bases limit the capacity to evidence extra-paradigmatic
lessons and thus constrain knowledge production to a single set of assumptions
• Poor dissemination limits the use of lessons, disproportionately affecting those les-
sons which are novel and thus limiting their scope for implementation in future
outbreaks
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It is through these processes of participation, evidencing, and dissemination that codified
knowledge facilitates or constrains the accumulation of knowledge from disease outbreak
responses.
8.5 What are the alternatives?
Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that the GHS paradigm shapes knowledge ac-
cumulation to produce a very particular set of lessons in line with the paradigm’s assump-
tions. This argument inherently assumes that there are other pathways that knowledge
accumulation could have followed if the GHSp had less influence over the way in which we
learn from disease outbreaks. This section presents two examples of the various pathways
knowledge accumulation could alternatively have taken: Universal Health Coverage and
One Health & Planetary Health. This list is not exhaustive and purely an overview of the
approaches, but illustrates that alternative pathways exist, and could have been followed
were it not for the influence of the paradigm shaping knowledge accumulation.
Universal Health Coverage
The first perspective here is on which has been gaining traction in recent years, seemingly
spurred by a shift in leadership at WHO (Ghebreyesus, 2017). Universal Health Coverage
(UHC) is an objective of global health defined as:
“ensuring individuals have access, without discrimination to comprehensive,
appropriate and timely, quality health services determined at the national
level according to needs, as well as access to safe and affordable medicines,
while ensuring that the use of these services do not expose users to financial
difficulties” (Wenham et al., 2019, p.2)
In effect, UHC is the operationalisation of WHO’s foundational principle that “the highest
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being”
(World Health Organization, 2014a, p.1) through an economic logic that access to this
right must not cause financial difficulties.
The focus of UHC tends to be on equity of health access across countries (Tichenor
and Sridhar, 2017; Wenham et al., 2019; Kutzin, 2013; Tangcharoensathien et al., 2015),
particularly through financial means (Tichenor and Sridhar, 2017), development (Kutzin,
2013), and the Sustainable Development Goals (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2015). This
focus in financial aspects of equity in health access tends to bring in institutions like the
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World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, rather than placing WHO at the
core of its framework.
From the persepctive of lessons from the Ebola crisis, some documents were found
to have lessons for Universal Health Coverage. These included an Oxfam report (Ox-
fam, 2015) and a European Parliament resolution (European Parliament, 2015). In these
contexts, UHC was discussed as “re-prioritizing investment in healthcare ... protecting
people’s health and preventing the spread of diseases” (Oxfam, 2015, p.2).
UHC has also been proposed as complementary to Global Health Security by a number
of authors (Wenham et al., 2019; Ooms et al., 2017; Kutzin and Sparkes, 2016; Jain and
Alam, 2017). In these instances, authors draw on Health Systems Strengthening as a
means to ensure Global Health Security through Universal Health Coverage. While UHC
does offer an alternative pathway for knowledge accumulation, then, it is also possible that
UHC offers a complement to the GHSp.
One Health and Planetary Health
One final pair of examples of an alternative perspective to GHS are the notions of One
Health and Planetary Health which both attempt to expand Global Health beyond the
realm of human health. One Health expands the conception of Global to the health of
animals, stressing “the need to work across disciplinary divides through a cross-sectoral,
collaborative and integrated approach to zoonotic diseases, as well as other health problems
that cut across the human-animal-ecosystem interface” (Bardosh, 2016, p.4). One Health
takes into account animal and ecosystem health because of non-human reservoirs that
could impact the prevalence of human health threats.
Planetary Health is another attempt to expand beyond the human, this time taking a
holistic approach which not only incorporates other living organisms but the planet itself.
The Lancet’s Commission on planetary health discussed it as such:
“Health effects from changes to the environment including climatic change,
ocean acidification, land degradation, water scarcity, overexploitation of fish-
eries, and biodiversity loss pose serious challenges to the global health gains of
the past several decades and are likely to become increasingly dominant during
the second half of this century and beyond” (Whitmee et al., 2015, p.1)
Planetary Health, then, is an integrated conceptualization which combines climate change
concerns, ecological perspectives, and health concerns together in a holistic manner.
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Both of these perspectives expand the definition of global health beyond the human
and incorporate, to various extents, animal, ecological, and climate health. In the case
of disease outbreaks, these expand the lens to look at the animal, ecosystem, and climate
drivers
These perspectives on health at a global level are illustrative examples of some of the
pathways that knowledge accumulation could have taken. This thesis makes no argument
that any of these perspectives are normatively better or worse than Global Health Security,
nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive. What this thesis does show, however, is that
the paradigm of Global Health Security filters lessons in such a way as to re-entrench its
own dominance and better competes for limited attention and resources.
8.6 Conclusions
This thesis have made three main contributions: theoretical exploration of report con-
texts, authors, and outcomes is insufficient and a process-based view is required to fully
capture the utility of codification; practical attention should be paid to the codification
process because the process itself is an opportunity for learning; and reports that have
constrained processes, like those in our two cases, are more than just a missed opportunity
but they are an active closing down of knowledge pathways which harms future knowledge
accumulation from outbreak response. This section summarises these three key arguments
then moves on to discuss the limitations, and finally makes suggestions for future research
and recommendations for policy.
Contributions
The first contribution of this thesis has been that an object-based view of lessons learned
reports is insufficient for their analysis. While many theorists have argued their perform-
ativity and how a need to be seen to be ’doing something’ and apportion blame causes
lessons learned reports to be weak aspects of disaster learning, these have tended to focus
on the reports as objects and do not acknowledge that varying contexts, authors, and
audiences produce similar reports. In demonstrating this empirically through document
analysis, we find that a process view of lessons learned reports is required to fully theorize
their role in disaster learning.
The second contribution concerns whether the process of report construction is indeed a
learning process. In conceptualising learning we came across some of the key problems with
learning from disease outbreaks: event rarity, heterogeneity and complexity interrupting
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the learning cycle. We also found that knowledge codification as a process should allow
for a reduction of the complexity of the event, as well as the ability to pass this knowledge
on from one scenario to the next. However, the document data demonstrated how the
reports seem to be privileging analysis of lessons within an already dominant paradigm.
Additionally the process data showed that limited space, time, scope, and engagement
created two panels which - despite being very different in terms of context, authors, and
audience - were very similar in terms of lessons.
Finally, this thesis contributes to this process-based view of the lessons learned report
by arguing that a report is more than a missed opportunity for learning but a narrow-
ing of the scope of learning to only certain privileged knowledges. We argue that on the
one hand, theory says that these reports should be incredibly useful for transferring and
producing knowledge, yet on the other disaster learning theory argues that they are per-
formative, socio-political objects. We demonstrated that a process-based view of these
reports finds that they are both - they operate to facilitate learning whilst also performing
their socio-political and performative function. This, we argue, is worrying in our case
because the performative and socio-political operates to guide and constrain the learning
processes, leading to privileged knowledge and the shutting out of certain lessons. In es-
sence, the socio-political function isn’t inhibiting knowledge accumulation, it is directing it
towards easy, technology-focused solutions unconducive to long-term sustainable outbreak
responses.
Limitations
Like any study, this thesis has its limits and boundaries to what it can and cannot claim to
know. This section briefly discusses three limitations: this thesis first ignores the role that
tacit knowledge processes play in learning from outbreaks, an important aspect of know-
ledge dynamics particularly for practitioners; the very nature of researching exceptional
events mean that this research falls victim to event heterogeneity, learning or knowledge
codification could be very different in other disaster, crisis, or even outbreak contexts;
and finally the limits of coverage, both in terms of documents and interviews, mean that
there may be some aspects of this phenomenon left unexplored, they will remain for now
unknown unknowns.
First, the tacit knowledge dimension to learning is an important facet to note because it
plays such an important role in practitioner learning during outbreaks and other disasters.
While the focus of this thesis is on codification and codified knowledge, without tacit
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knowledge all of these processes would be rendered impossible. Tacit knowledge is needed
to be able to interpret these documents and this is gleaned from education and field
experience - not from reading more reports.
Additionally, there are many processes by which practitioners transfer tacit knowledge
without needing to write reports or codify knowledge. In these cases, knowledge is trans-
ferred through training programs, conferences, workshops, pedagogy, debriefs, and myriad
other informal and formal interpersonal processes. These are all important aspects of
learning and knowledge accumulation in disease outbreak response, but given our focus
on the role of codification and lessons learned documents, were outside the scope of the
present study.
Second, context differences could drastically affect the outcomes here. As we discussed
during the thesis, these events are extra ordinary - they do not happen all the time, they
come as a surprise, and they are not ’normal’ events. As such, learning from them is also
not ’normal’ and should not be treated as such. While this allows for some generalisability
to other extra ordinary circumstances, it is safe to say that these emergency-mode pro-
cesses may not be applicable in ’normal’ times and such explanations are, again, outside
of our scope here.
Third, and finally, there are limits to the coverage of the data presented here. In the
first instance, this is an embedded case study meaning that one event is studied and two
reports are examined in detail. What is more, even within this it cannot be guaranteed
that full coverage of all documents presenting lessons from the Ebola Crisis were covered,
and it is certain that all report authors and report users were interviewed. As such, we
cannot account for the unknown unknowns that still remain.
Suggestions for Future Research
This thesis has made three main contributions: looking at the processes of knowledge
codification, the pressurised nature of the learning process, and the diversion of the know-
ledge accumulation down specific pathways. This thesis, as noted above, has some gaps
and thus we make some suggestions for future research in order to complement the work
presented here.
On avenues for future research, we focus on three main areas. The first, is the notion of
’normal’ outbreak learning. Disease outbreaks on a small scale occur quite frequently and
can be considered ’normal’ for some actors (like the WHO, MSF, the Red Cross, etc.). In
learning from these smaller scale, less exceptional events, how does learning differ? This
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would be an interesting avenue to complement the larger, more extra ordinary research
cases presented here.
Second, work on Simulation Exercises could be a useful avenue to explore. Exercises
like Dark Winter, TOPOFF, and others, play a role in attenuating policymakers to par-
ticular issues within responses. However, these are subject to the biases and processes of
those who design the materials, timelines, and activities of the simulation itself. What
variables are taken into account? Who decides what the main aspects presented to the
players will be? These could be an interesting focus to understand what learning looks
like an an ’artificial’ outbreak where the stakes are lower but the outcome is controlled.
Third, more in-depth fieldwork on the tacit elements of knowledge accumulation for
responses would be highly complementary to this thesis’ work. As described earlier, a
limitation of the thesis’ work is that it ignores the dynamics of tacit knowledge in outbreak
response. This means that the thesis misses a number of important elements of the tacit
understandings developed by operational response personnel in responding to individual
outbreaks. In particular exploring the search strategies and problem-solving techniques of
responders would offer tremendous insights into the tacit knowledge dynamics of disease
outbreak response.
Recommendations for Policy
This thesis began with a real-world problem: why do lessons learned documents from out-
break responses always have similar lessons? This thesis therefore concludes by attempting
to ’fix’ this real-world problem. Having argued that the processes of report construction
are extremely important, and having argued that these processes constrain learning to
particular pathways - hence leading to path-dependent knowledge accumulation from dis-
ease outbreak response - we make here some recommendations for how to ensure these
processes allow for learning and knowledge accumulation.
The first recommendations concerns time and scope of panels. As we saw in the EIAP,
severely constrained time can heavily decrease opportunities for learning. The timing of
the EIAP was an ’impossible’ one and yet the panel was held to it anyway which forced the
panel to rely on already established narratives and understandings to make sense of the
crisis at hand. We acknowledge that providing large expanses of time may not always be
appropriate, but providing good time in which the panel can then set their own timetable
will allow members the time to fully make sense of the crisis.
Furthermore, constraining the scope a panel’s investigation from the outset with highly
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stringent terms of reference (as we saw in the EIAP) or with an already pre-determined
outlet or set of research questions (like the was in the HLIP) can also limit the capacity
for learning. This pre-determined scope causes panel members to, again, readily adopt
the already dominant understanding of the crisis and not form their own opinions. In this
case, allowing a panel to fully assess the entire event and pick out the elements that they
deem important, not that the scope deems important, is a worthwhile endeavour that will
allow the panel to fully make sense of the crisis.
Second, we turn to panel member engagement. As we saw in the EIAP (where the
entire report was seeming driven largely by the chair) and in the HLIP (where some
members of the panel were unable to meaningfully contribute) the extent to which panel
members engage with the panel process is an important factor for the outcomes of report.
We recommend, first and foremost, that panel engagement is equitable (all members are
afforded equal opportunity to speak, give evidence, and author the report) and that all
members are resourced to be physically in the room (or if teleconferencing must be done,
everyone must teleconference). This will ensure that all of those in the room are equally
engaged and invested in the report’s process and outcomes.
Finally, dissemination and engagement of users in the process must be done from
the outset. Report users frequently cited a lack of appreciation for reports because they
didn’t have time to read them, nor did they think the recommendations pertained to them.
Having various report users represented on a meaningfully engaged panel ensures that they
are committed to the report and its outcomes. Furthermore, decisions about audience and
the various ways in which the report outcomes can be used and disseminated should be
considered at the outset. As one interviewee put it, the report is ”the beginning of the
process” - learning cannot be said to take place until it is put into action and therefore
dissemination and engagement with users is paramount to gaining that all important
action.
This thesis had argued for a more process-based analysis of lessons learned reports. It
has found that the processes by which these lessons learned reports are produced create
a situation where knowledge accumulation is not inhibited but directed down particular
pathways, privileging particular voices and knowledges. In recommending that panels are
given sufficient time & scope to fully make sense of the crisis, that all members of the
panel are meaningfully engaged, and that report users are considered & engaged from
the outset we hope that these reports can increase the learning opportunities offered and
create better, more resilient responses to future crises.
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Appendix A
Interview Protocols
A.1 Report-Authors
• What were the objectives of the report?
• What were your objectives going into it?
• How clear were you at the outset of the purpose of the panel/report?
• Did your understanding of the purpose change? How? Why?
• Were you clear on the intended outcome of the process?
• What about the intended uses of the outputs?
• How were you recruited for the panel?
• How did you establish the recommendations?
• How did you identify successes?
• How did you identify why these succeeded?
• How did you identify failures?
• How did you identify why they failed?
• How did you identify how to fix these failures?
• How were these transformed into concrete recommendations?
• When thinking about the report, what elements of your own personal experience did
you bring?
• How did your ideas of these change over the course of the deliberations/discussions/debates?
• In what ways were you involved in the dissemination of the outputs?
• Have you been approached since the process to speak to NGOs? Academic
Conferences? Workshops? Engagement Activities?
• What do you think is the role of large international expert assessments like the EIAP
or HLIA?
• What do you think were the main lessons from the Ebola outbreak?
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A.2 Report-Users
• What role did you take in response to the Ebola outbreak?
• How do you, personally, learn from your experiences?
• As a responder, what types of knowledge do you use?
• If a problem arises in response, where do you looks for solution?
• Personal networks?
• Academia?
• Professional bodies of knowledge?
• Organizational repositories?
• Who produces these types of knowledge?
• What do you think were the main lessons from the Ebola outbreak?
• Thinking of Ebola, how did your organization respond?
• What lessons has it internalised from its experiences?
• How were these lessons internalised?
• What processes? Debriefs? Post-project reviews? What was codified? How?
• What do you think is the role of large international expert assessments like the EIAP
or HLIA?
• Do you use them personally?
• What has your organization done with the outputs from such international
assessments?
